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FOREWORD
Th  e Asian crisis episode taught us that a banking crisis resolution is very costly, 
painful and complicated. However, it also inspires us that well-managed fi  nancial institutions 
– especially banks – and eff  ective banking supervision are essential to maintain fi  nancial 
system stability. A sound, effi   cient and competitive banking system is crucial to ensure 
sustained economic growth. To this end, a well designed and eff  ective regulatory framework 
is essential. 
Most of research and literature on problem bank resolution were mainly focus on the 
causes of the crises and resolution of systemic crisis. Th   ere were few studies on problem bank 
identifi  cation, intervention and resolution. To fi  ll this gap, Th   e SEACEN Centre initiated 
a research project entitled “Comparison of Problem Bank Identifi  cation, Intervention and 
Resolution in the SEACEN Countries”. 
Th   is study is organised in two parts. Part I, the overview, provides an informative and 
balanced summary of the current status of problem bank identifi  cation, intervention and 
resolution mechanisms in the SEACEN countries. It also provides a set of important policy 
lessons and implications based upon the regional experience throughout the 1997 fi  nancial 
crisis. Part II consists of seven country papers which outline the legal and regulatory 
frameworks on problem bank identifi  cation, intervention and resolution in each country.
Th   e SEACEN Centre gratefully acknowledges the contribution of the Project Leader                 
Mr. Sukarela Batunanggar (Bank Indonesia) and country researcher: Mr. Steven Avel (Bank 
of Papua New Guinea), Mr. Bisma Raj Dhungana (Nepal Rastra Bank), Mr. Harrison S.W Ku 
(Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan)), Ms. Uma Rajoo (Bank Negara Malaysia), 
P.W.D.N.R. Rodrigo (Central Bank of Sri Lanka), and Mr. Rath Sovannorak (National Bank 
of Cambodia). Th   e Centre and the Project Leader would also like to thank Mr. Conrado A. 
Reyno (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) and staff  s as well as Mrs.Tongurai Limpiti (Bank of 
Th   ailand) and staff  s who kindly provided information for the survey. Last but not least, Th  e 
Centre and the Project Leader would also like to express gratitude to Prof. Joon-Ho Hahm 
(Yonsei University South Korea) and Dr. David Scott (World Bank) for their insightful 
comments and suggestions. Certainly the views expressed in the paper are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily refl  ect those of Th   e SEACEN Centre or its member central 
banks.
We hope that this study will be valuable reference for supervisory authorities and 
policy makers in dealing with problem banks.
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Executive Director
Th   e SEACEN Centreiv
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Eff  ective problem bank identifi  cation and resolution is crucial to ensure not 
only the soundness of a bank, but also the resilience of the fi  nancial system as a whole 
– since banks are dominant players in the fi  nancial system. Successful problem bank 
management will reduce the potential of both individual bank failures and banking 
crisis as well as minimise resolution costs. Hence, a comprehensive, clear framework 
and guidelines for dealing with problem banks is crucial.
Th  is study aims at two main objectives: (i) to analyse the framework and 
process of problem bank identifi  cation, intervention and resolution in the SEACEN 
countries; and (ii) to identify key issues and lessons learned for an eff  ective problem 
bank management. 
In general, bank supervisors in nine SEACEN countries surveyed have a clear 
legal and prudential framework in dealing with problem banks. However, the level 
of progress diverges from country to country depending on their legal and political 
settings as well as economic development. Crisis hit countries (Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Th   ailand), and countries experiencing banking system distresses (Philippines and 
Republic of China, Taiwan) appear to have a more developed framework, particularly 
on crisis management. Supervisory authorities in the crisis-aff  ected countries have 
enhanced the eff  ectiveness of their banking supervision along with the post-crisis 
bank restructuring program. However, non crisis-aff  ected hit countries (Cambodia, 
Nepal, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka) have a relatively less comprehensive 
framework. Non-crisis countries mostly are yet to have an explicit deposit insurance 
scheme and develop a crisis management framework. 
Among key challenges for bank supervisors is to ensure both macro and micro 
supervisory objectives – to maintain fi  nancial stability and ensure depositor protection 
– are eff  ectively attained. In practice, it oft  en is diffi   cult to identify and measure as well 
as manage systemic risk which requires diff  erent skills and methodologies. Th  erefore, 
it is imperative to perform and enhance the effi   cacy of macro-prudential surveillance 
to identify, monitor and mitigate the risks to the fi  nancial system.
For countries which are yet to have a crisis management framework it is 
important to develop comprehensive fi  nancial safety nets, consisting of: (i) an explicit 
and limited deposit insurance scheme; (ii) a well-defi  ned and transparent LLR both 
in normal times and during systemic crises; and (iii) a clear crisis management 
framework. Deposit insurance and LLR can be important tools for crisis management, 
but they are not suffi   cient to prevent banking crises. Th   ey should be used along with 
measures such as market discipline and prudential banking supervision. A well-
devised framework is essential, but eff  ective implementation is much more important. 
It is necessary to perform a crisis simulation regularly in order to increase readiness 





Eff  ective banking supervision is the basic element of safety nets aiming at creating and 
promoting fi  nancial system stability. Banks, for the most part, are the dominant fi  nancial 
system component in the economy.  Banks carry numerous risks inherent with the business, 
and thus need to be regulated, supervised and managed in a healthy manner. Bank defaults 
– especially with systemic eff  ect – can endanger the stability of the fi  nancial system and the 
economy. Hence, the ultimate objective of bank supervision is to promote and maintain the 
soundness of fi  nancial institutions via regulation, which includes off  -site analysis and on-
site examination of risk management, fi  nancial conditions, and compliance with laws and 
regulations. 
Th  e lack of supervisory capability is oft  en cited as one of the reasons for fi  nancial 
system weaknesses [Mayes, Halme dan Liuksila (2001), Batunanggar (2002 and 2004)]. 
As Mishkin (2001) argued, asymmetric information leads to adverse selection and moral- 
hazard problems that have an important impact on fi  nancial systems and justifi  es the need 
for prudential supervision. 
Th   e origin of the Asian fi  nancial crisis was fi  nancial and corporate sectors weaknesses 
combined with macroeconomic vulnerabilities. Weaknesses in bank and corporate 
governance and the lack of market discipline allowed excessive risk taking, as prudential 
regulations were weak or poorly enforced. Close relationship between governments, 
fi  nancial institutions, and borrowers worsened the problem particularly in Indonesia and 
Korea [Lindgren et al. (1999)]. In a similar vein, Nasution (2000) and Batunanggar (2002 
and 2004) argued that drawbacks in risk management and bank governance as well as weak 
banking supervision were among the main contributory factors exacerbating the fi  nancial 
crisis in Indonesia in 1997-1998. Because of a combination of domestic and foreign factors, 
the crisis was particularly severe in Indonesia, Korea and Th   ailand. Malaysia and Philippines 
also experienced some eff  ects of the fi  nancial crisis and adopted measures to deal with the 
turmoil and strengthen their fi  nancial systems.
Th   e cost of a banking crisis is signifi  cantly large. Hoggarth, Reis and Sapporta (2001) 
found that the cumulative output losses incurred during crisis periods were large, estimated 
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in the order of 15-20 percent, on average, of annual GDP2. Th   e case-study evidence suggests 
that prompt intervention reduces the costs of intervention and promotes effi   ciency [OECD 
(2002a)]. Conversely, the inability to take fast and decisive actions in restructuring the 
banking system, when combined with political intervention, make the resolution of the 
banking crisis ineff  ective and costlier [De Luna-Martinez (2000), Batunanggar (2002 and 
2004)]. Failure to gauge the magnitude of the problems or delays in its resolution invariably 
compounds the problems and costs involved (Sheng, 1992). Furthermore, in the case of 
Indonesia, Batunanggar (2002 and 2004) found that the absence of fi  nancial safety nets and 
a crisis-management framework and guidelines as well as political intervention were among 
the culprits behind the ineff  ective, prolonged, and costly resolution of its banking crisis. 
Th   e central banks and supervisory authorities especially in crisis-aff  ected countries 
are committed to enhance the eff  ectiveness of their bank supervision along with their post-
crisis bank restructuring programme. Th   e main characteristic of a systemic crisis is that the 
fi  nancial condition of a bank will rapidly deteriorate as a result of an adverse economy and/
or a widespread bank-run. Pre-crisis, the focus of the supervisor is to assess the condition 
of the banks to determine quickly which of the banks have a better probability of surviving 
from those which are likely to fail if a crisis occurs. 
Hence, a clear and comprehensive framework and guidelines as well as methods for 
dealing with problem banks are crucial. Th   e problem banks identifi  ed should be managed 
rapidly, objectively, transparently, and consistently in order to restore the health of the 
fi  nancial system and the economy. 
1.1   Objectives of the Study
Most of the researches and literatures on problem banks focused on the resolution of 
systemic crisis with less attention given to the management of problem banks. Th  erefore, 
this project aims to analyse problem bank identifi  cation, intervention, and resolution in 
nine SEACEN countries3 and to identify the key issues as well as derive lessons learned for 
the eff  ective management of problem banks. 
Th   is chapter compares the approach and framework for problem bank identifi  cation, 
intervention and resolution in the SEACEN countries. Furthermore, it draws key lessons 
learned and recommendations for more eff  ective bank problem identifi  cation and resolution 
for the SEACEN countries in particular and for other countries in general. 
Th  e individual country papers identify the key issues – strengths, drawbacks 
and challenges – and propose policy recommendations in dealing with problem banks 
identifi  cation, identifi  cation and resolution in each country.
2  Th   ey provided a cross-country study on the measurement of the losses incurred during periods of banking crises. In contrast to previous research, 
they also found that the output losses incurred during crises in the developed countries are as high, or higher, on average, than those in the emerging-
market economies and also those of neighbouring countries that did not at the time experience severe banking problems. In the emerging-market 
economies, banking crises appear to be costly only when accompanied by a currency crisis. Th   ese results seem robust in allowing for macroeconomic 
conditions at the outset of crisis – in particular low and declining output growth – that have also contributed to future output losses during crises 
episodes.
3  Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of China (Taiwan), Sri Lanka, and Th  ailand. Philippines and 
Th   ailand completed the survey but did not contribute their country papers.3
1.2  Data and Methodology
Th   is study covers nine SEACEN member countries, namely, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of China (Taiwan), Sri Lanka, 
and Th   ailand. Philippines and Th   ailand participated in the survey but did not contribute 
their country papers. 
Th   e research project was based on literature review and survey. Th   e data and information 
collected for the research project include: (i) the legal framework for bank supervision based 
on the prevailing laws or acts, regulations, supervisory guidelines or manuals, in particular 
with regard to problem bank supervision and resolution; (ii) data and information covering 
the relevant issues concerning problem bank identifi  cation, intervention and resolution 
which are presented in the Appendix (Table 1-26); and (iii) other data and information from 
published documents. 
2. General  Framework 
Th   e framework for problem bank identifi  cation, intervention and resolution diff  ers 
from country to country. It is shaped by several factors such as political, economic and legal 
setting. An appropriate framework for dealing with weak and failing banks is necessary in 
order to provide a clear and sensible guideline for supervisors. Where bank supervision is 
separated from the central bank and a deposit insurance company exists, a mechanism for 
coordination between the related agencies is a crucial requirement. 
Th  e Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued a document, 
“Supervisory Guidance on Dealing with Weak Banks,” which provides a comprehensive and 
useful guideline for dealing with problem banks. As formulated by the Basel Committee, the 
three key tasks of the supervisor in dealing with problem banks are to identify the problems 
early, ensure preventive or corrective measures are adopted, and have a resolution strategy 
in place should the remedial action fail4. 
A weak bank is one whose liquidity or solvency is or will be impaired unless there is 
a major improvement in its fi  nancial resources, risk profi  le, strategic business direction, risk 
management capabilities and/or quality of management5.
Th   e guiding principles for supervisors when dealing with weak banks include speed, 
cost-effi   ciency, fl  exibility, consistency, avoidance of moral hazard, and transparency and and 
cooperation6. Figure 1 provides a brief summary of the guiding principles.
4  Supervisory Guidance on Dealing with Weak Banks, BCBS, BIS, March 2002.
5  ibid.
6  ibid.4
Figure 1: The Guiding Principles for Dealing with Weak Banks
•  Speed. Supervisors should act promptly. Experience from many countries shows that 
     regulatory and supervisory forbearance has exacerbated the problems of a weak bank. By not 
      dealing with the problems promptly, they have grown rapidly making the eventual resolution 
      efforts more difficult and more expensive, with the possibility of becoming more widespread
  and systemic.
•  Cost-efficiency. A least cost criterion should guide the supervisor when making choices
   between alternative actions consistent with achieving the supervisory objectives. It is      
    important that the supervisor considers all costs, including exogenous costs such as instability   
  of the financial system, in deciding on a course of action.
•  Flexibility. Legislation frequently adopts a rules-based approach. However, it is also helpful if    
    the legislation permits the supervisor to exercise discretion in the deployment and timing of 
     supervisory tools. Supervisors should be prepared to act flexibly by considering the full range
  of powers available when faced with a weak bank.
•  Consistency.  Consistent and well-understood supervisory actions will not distort the  
     competitive environment. Such an approach will also minimise confusion and uncertainty in   
    times of crisis. Similar problems in different banks, large or small, private or state-owned 
  should receive similar treatment.
•  Avoiding moral hazard. Supervisory action should not create incentives for banks to act in a  
     manner that incurs costs which they do not have to bear entirely. Shareholders should not be  
    compensated for losses when a bank gets into difficulty; otherwise it will encourage other 
    banks to behave less prudently on the expectation that they will receive a similar bailout if     
   problems occur. Equally, supervisory action should not protect the interest of the bank’s 
 corporate  officers.
•  Transparency and cooperation. Inadequate or incorrect information from the bank increases        
     uncertainty for everyone involved. It can lead to misplaced supervisory action and add to the 
   costs of solving the problems. The bank and the relevant authorities should aim for a high 
    degree of information sharing and transparency about their intended actions. Decisions on 
    disclosures, or not, to the general public are more difficult and must depend on the specific   
     situation - whether it contributes to the supervisor's objective in resolving the weak bank and 
  maintaining broader systemic stability.
Source: Supervisory Guidance on Dealing with Weak Banks, BCBS, BIS, March 2002.
Th   e  general  framework  in  dealing  with  weak  banks  is  presented  in  Figure  2  below.              
A detailed framework for dealing with a problem bank and a fl  ow chart for assisting the 
resolution of a failing bank facing solvency and systemic issues are provided in the Appendix 
– in Figures 16 and 17.  In actuality the frameworks and mechanisms in dealing with problem 
banks vary from country to country due to diff  erences in their legal, economic and political 
settings.5
 Figure 2













































3.   Managing Problem Banks in SEACEN Countries
Th   is section compares and interprets the information from the Survey Tables collected 
from the nine  SEACEN countries. It is useful to identify the general framework and process 
across countries for managing problem banks. However, we are mindful of the diff  erences in 
policies and in the activities listed as well as in the tools deployed. 
3.1  Legal Framework for Bank Regulation and Supervision
Generally, all the countries have clearly established legal frameworks for supervising 
banks in general and for dealing with problem banks in particular. Principally, the banking 
supervision in the SEACEN member countries consists of the regulation of capital and 
other general prudential regulations for the banks to adhere as well as provisions for the 
examination of the banks’ compliance with the regulations. In all the countries, except 
the Republic of China (Taiwan), the regulation and supervision of banks come under the 
authority of the central bank. For the non-bank fi  nancial institutions, some of them are 
under the supervision of the central bank while others come under the purview of the 
Ministry of Finance or is shared between the two. 
3.2 Prudential  Requirements
Th  e prudential requirements emphasize the obligation of banks to hold adequate 
capital as a buff  er to cover the inherent business risks and provide adequate risk management 
and control systems to mitigate the risks. 
Th   e prudential standards were formulated and published by the Basel Committee in a 
document, “Th   e 25 Core Principles for Eff  ective Banking Supervision,” issued in September 
1997. Bank supervisors must ensure that banks have adequate policies, procedures, and 
practices associated with: (i) management information system; (ii) risk management process; 6
(iii) internal controls; (iv) country risk and transfer risk; (v) market risk; (iv) legal lending 
limits to related companies and individuals; (vii) asset quality; (viii) loan and investment; 
(ix) know your customer; and (x) minimum capital adequacy. Th   e prudential requirements 
are also well-known as capital, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity 
to risks or “CAMELS”. 
Even though varying in practice, all the countries basically apply the same prudential 
standards for ensuring the soundness of banks. All the countries require their banks to 
maintain the minimum capital-adequacy ratio of eight percent as set by the Basle Capital 
Accord. In Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Nepal and Sri Lanka the capital 
requirement well exceeded the minimum standard. It is oft  en argued that the Basle risk-
weighted standards, developed for industrial countries, may not be completely suitable for 
banks in many emerging countries. Th  e overall minimum ratio of eight percent may be 
too low for banks operating in a much more volatile macro-economic environment7. Th  e 
revised Basel Capital Accord (Basel-II) framework which is more comprehensive and risk 
sensitive will address this problem.
In addition, most of the countries also apply liquidity ratios such as loan to deposit 
ratio and reserve ratio. 
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1) Of total deposits monitored on weekly basis (Balance with NRB/ Total deposits in Rs.)
2) 20 percent of total liabilities less liabilities due to the central bank and shareholders, to the holders of non 
  redeemable debt instruments and its liabilities on repos in relation to treasury bills or securities issued or
  guaranteed by the Government 
3) LDR = Actual liquid reserves/Total reservable liabilities; (10.75 percent of checking accounts, 9.775 percent 
  of passbook deposits, 5.5 percent of savings passbook deposits, 4 percent of savings time deposits,  
  5 percent of time deposits)
 “Connected lending” – the extension of loans to bank owners and management as 
well as to related companies – is a key corporate governance problem that contributed to the 
banking problem particularly in Indonesia, Th   ailand and Korea. High loan concentration to 
a single or group of borrowers and excessive exposure to certain economic sectors is also a 
source of vulnerability that contributed to the fragility of the banking sector. 8
All the countries have prudential limits regulating bank exposures to related parties, 
single borrowers and corporate groups (Figure 4). Sri Lanka set the highest limit of 30 
percent for a single borrower. Malaysia and Papua New Guinea prohibit loan extension to 
related parties. Republic of China (Taiwan) and Th   ailand set the loan exposure limits based 
on total equity instead of on the bank’s capital.
Figure 4
Loan Exposure Limits
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Prudential limits on foreign exchange exposures are also applied in all the countries 
(Figure 5). In some countries, Th   ailand for example, these limits are quite detailed, while 
in other countries, Malaysia for example, formal prudential rules on foreign exchange 
exposures are not specifi  ed. However, banks are required to set their own individual foreign 
exposure limits.9
To mitigate the liquidity risk from increasing maturity mismatch, some countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea) also require their banks to manage their maturity 
mismatch.
Figure 5
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OP = open position; fx = foreign exchange; K = capital
1) Individual limit : At the end of each day financial institutions shall maintain a net open position in each  
    currency in proportion to its capital at a rate not exceeding 15 percent or USD 5 million, whichever is the 
 greater. 
   Aggregated limit : At the end of each day financial institutions shall maintain an aggregate position in  
   proportion to its capital at a rate not exceeding 20 percent or USD 10 million, whichever is the greater.
 
Generally, all the countries adopt a “best practice” loan classifi  cation, which is similar: 
one to three months for “special mention”, three to six months for “substandard”, four to nine 
months “doubtful”, and six to twelve months for “Loss” category. Papua New Guinea and 
Republic of China (Taiwan) apply a more lenient standard which is six to twelve months for 
doubtful and over twelve months for loss (Figure 6).10
Figure 6
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2) Asset is classified into six categories: Pass (1 M.), Special Mention (2 M.), Substandard (3 M.), Doubtful (6  
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Th   e same condition applies to loan provisioning requirement which is one percent 
for performing loans, 2 to 5 percent for special mention, 15 to 25 percent for substandard 
(except Th   ailand which requires 100 percent), 50 percent for doubtful and 100 percent for 
loss (Figure 7).  Diff  erently, Cambodia requires a lower loan loss provisioning and only for 
substandard, doubtful and loss loans.
Figure 7
Loan Provisioning Requirements


































































1) The provisioning is based on the outstanding loan value minus value of securities
2) 1 percent and 2 percent of net value between outstanding loan and collateral. BOT applies IAS 39, therefore  
   FIs have to set 100 percent provision of the difference between outstanding debt and present value of
  estimated future cash flows from debtors or estimated future cash flows from sales of collaterals.11
3.3  Problem Bank Identifi  cation 
All the countries except Papua New Guinea adopt a risk-based framework in 
supervising banks. All the countries also implement early warning systems and risk 
assessment systems in identifying bank problems. In some of the countries, supervisory risk 
assessment (bank rating) and early warning systems have been adopted since early 1990s in 
Indonesia and Sri Lanka and in the Philippines in 1998. In most of the countries the same 
were adopted since 2003 up to the present (Figure 8). All the countries, except Malaysia, 
adopt a similar CAMELS rating system to assess banks’ risks. Th   ailand, in particular, uses 
much more indicators in applying a risk-based supervisory system.
Figure 8
Indicator/Risk Categories and Ratios Used in Supervisory Risk Assessment and Early

















































































































1) Also uses qualitative assessment on good governance and strategic risk. 
2) When bank supervisor conclude the final composite rating as supervisory rating, he or she should consider  
    external factors influencing bank operations such as macroeconomic and banking industry as well as bank 
  sensitivity to risk factors.
3) C-Capital Adequacy, A- Asset Quality, R- Regulations' compliance, S- Strategies and Stability, E- Earnings, 
 L-  Liquidity.
4) *Includes qualitative assessment. 
  
 
Besides the supervisory bank-rating systems, most of the countries also apply fi  nancial 
ratios and peer group analysis as part of their supervisory risk assessment and early warning 
systems.
Identifying and measuring banks’ problems and risks are challenging in line with the 
constantly changing business and external environment, particularly fi  nancial globalization. 
Consequently, the conventional tools for identifying banks’ risks, such as fi  nancial ratios, 
while they are still useful, are no longer suffi   cient. Th   ese challenges require bank supervisors 
to develop and apply a more risk-based and forward-looking tools to identify and measure 
banks’ risks not only stemming from internal factors but also external factors, such as shocks 
from both fi  nancial and real sectors, both domestic or international fi  nance. Corresponding 
to the challenges, all the countries also use other early warning tools in addition to CAMELS. 12
Four countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Republic of China (Taiwan), and Th  ailand) apply 
stress test to measure banks’ sensitivity to risks. Indonesia, Philippines and Th  ailand  have 
developed econometric models to predict bank failures. 
With respect to off  -site surveillance, all the countries put signifi  cant eff  orts on on-site 
examination to identify banks’ problems and assess their risks. Varying in their stages of 
development, all the countries except Papua New Guinea adopt a risk-based approach in 
examination which is more risk focused and forward looking.
Proper supervisory strategy and tools are essential for ensuring accurate and timely 
problem bank identifi  cation. However, much will depend on the quality of the banks’ 
information management systems, governance and control systems. Experience shows 
that there are four main factors causing a banking crisis or individual bank failure, namely, 
unsound banking practices, poor risk management, bad corporate governance and fraud. 
Th  e  fi  rst three causes were occurrences in all the countries, while fraud also occurred in 
most of the countries except Sri Lanka and Republic of China (Taiwan) (Figure 9).
Figure 9
















































1) Weakness in internal controls, governance, risk management skills, low capital base in the commercial banks.
Th  erefore, bank supervisors should encourage the practice of more eff  ective risk 
management and control, transparency and good governance which function as the fi  rst 
line of defence against bank problems and risks. 
In addition to the micro factors, bank supervisors also must be aware of the macro 
factors causing a banking crisis or individual bank failure, namely, economic recession, 
weak supervision system, and political intervention (Figure 10). In the case of Indonesia and 
Th   ailand, premature fi  nancial deregulation was also observed to be a culprit behind banking 
crisis or individual bank failure. Consequently, as mentioned in the previous section, there is 
a greater use of environmental analysis and stress testing to measure the impact of external 
shocks to the individual bank and the banking system. Particularly in the post-Asian crisis, 
the authorities lay considerable stress to ensure independence and eff  ectiveness of banking 
supervision.13
Figure 10

















































1) Increase of capital requirement. 
2) Currency crisis in the region led to massive outflow of funds from the regional economies and distressed
 corporations. 
3) Especially weakness in internal controls, governance, risk management skills, low capital base in the 
 commercial  banks.  
Some of the key issues and challenges related to problem bank identifi  cation in the 
SEACEN countries are as follows: fi  rst, compliance-based supervision and historical bank- 
performance analysis using backward-looking indicators are not eff  ective in identifying 
banks’ problems early and accurately. Th   is is mainly due to limited information available 
to the bank supervisor and lag in bank reporting. Th   e situation is made worse when the 
banks’ information systems, internal controls and corporate governance are weak. Problem 
banks in the SEACEN countries are generally caused by unsound banking practices, poor 
risk management, bad governance and fraud. Usually the problem banks disguise their 
fundamental problems that can only be detected by on-site work. On-site analysis is useful   
to uncover the root causes of the weaknesses. However, the identifi  cation of the banks’ 
problems based the on-site examination results are usually delayed so that the corrective 
actions cannot be taken promptly. Th   erefore, a risk-based supervisory strategy which is more 
focused towards banks’ high risk areas should be adopted and developed. More forward-
looking indicators and analyses as well as other tools such as stress testing are required to 
complement a conventional historical-trend analysis of banks’ performance. 
Second, in line with the implementation of risk-based supervision, the adoption of 
a more comprehensive bank risk management must be promoted to ensure that the banks’ 
risks are properly managed. Early introduction of the new initiatives will allow a better 
understanding of the concepts and their merits as well as facilitate preparation for gradual 
implementation. Th   e response of banks’ management to the adoption of risk management 
diff  ers depending on their knowledge, skill and experience. Th   e larger and better managed 
banks are usually more proactive compared to the smaller banks. 
Th   ird, developing the new supervisory framework and tools are less demanding as 
compared to their implementation. Th  e eff  ective application of the new framework and 14
tools requires not only enhanced business processes and systems, but more importantly, a 
paradigm shift   for the bank supervisors. It is important to note that the adoption of a risk- 
based supervision and risk management requires consistent change management. To make it 
work, strong leadership and commitment from top management as well as human resource 
development are essential to facilitate the process. In addition, there should be appropriate 
incentive systems both for the bank supervisor and for the banks’ management to develop 
their skills and migrate from a compliance-based and backward-looking approach toward a 
forward-looking approach and to use their judgment.
3.4  Problem Bank Intervention    
All the countries have clear grounds for receivership and early resolution of bank 
insolvency, and they adopt rule-based criteria for intervention.  Most of the countries use 
both capital inadequacy or critical undercapitalisation and liquidity inadequacy as criteria for 
intervention in a problem bank (Figure 11). Th   e Philippines uses only liquidity inadequacy, 
while Indonesia uses only capital-inadequacy criteria.
Some of the countries structure their early intervention framework into three 
categories: undercapitalised, signifi  cantly undercapitalised, and critically undercapitalised 
while others arrange it only into two categories. Th  e minimum threshold set by the 
authorities varies among countries ranging from below 4 percent to 6 percent (Figure 11). 
For the Philippines, its early intervention framework is structured diff  erently into four 
categories: up to 40 percent undercapitalised, up to 60 percent undercapitalised, up to 80 
percent undercapitalised, and more than 80 percent undercapitalised from the minimum 
statutory capital of 10 percent. 
When CAR falls below the minimum statutory level and/or there is non-compliance 
with the law, rules and regulations which jeopardize the condition of the bank, the supervisory 
authority has the discretionary authority to intervene. Th   e intervention measures include 
dismissal of the bank’s management and appointment of a temporary management, order 
for the bank to submit a capital-restoration plan, issuance of a cease and decease order, and 
closure if the intervention fails.
Bank intervention is a complex process which requires focus and careful attention.     
Two countries (Philippines and Nepal) have a special unit charged with the responsibility of 
supervising problem banks which are in critical condition. 15
Figure 11
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1) Supervisory has discretionary powers to take appropriate measures
2) Categorised differently into four types: up to 40 percent undercapitalised, up to 60 percent undercapitalised,      
     up to 80 percent undercapitalised, and more than 80 percent undercapitalised from the minimum statutory 
  capital of 10 percent.
Bank intervention should be based on a comprehensive analysis of the symptoms and 
causes of the defi  ciencies of problem banks. Th   e realization of the supervisory objectives 
of fi  nancial stability and depositor protection must also be kept in view. Once the bank 
supervisors identify the problems and the causes of a weak bank, timely and appropriate 
corrective actions – based on the condition and scale of the problem – are required to deal 
with the defi  ciencies and the behavioral change of the bank. 
However, the corrective action is mainly based on a lagging indicator of a bank’s 
fi  nancial health. Intervention in problem banks is likely to be triggered only aft  er they 
have been identifi  ed by the examiners, who rely on far more information than capital ratio. 
Th   erefore, in addition to quantitative criteria such as capital-adequacy ratio, non-performing 
loans or liquidity ratio, it is necessary to defi  ne and build into the trigger mechanism for 
problem bank intervention some qualitative criteria. 
Th  e above-mentioned problem is related to the rules-versus-discretion issue. 
Correcting a bank’s problems should be done in timely manner and based on sound judgment 
which requires some latitude of discretion, particularly in the case where contagion or 
systemic risks are evident. However, too much discretion creates a lack of transparency, 
erodes accountability, and has moral-hazard potential. Th   erefore, the challenge is striking 
a right balance. A bank’s problems and corrective action plans may not always conform to 
the detailed procedures stated in the exit-policy guideline. Consequently, it behooves the 
supervisor to make prompt and appropriate decisions to ensure that the bank’s problems are 
properly treated and in a timely manner. 16
Th  e other challenge is gaining the bank management’s commitment to adhere to 
the action plans in order to restore the bank’s health. Experience shows that the causes of 
problem banks are oft  en rooted in mismanagement, poor governance, and fraud. In such 
cases, it is diffi   cult to expect the bank management to commit to the corrective action plans. 
Th  e supervisor may ask the bank’s controlling shareholders to appoint a caretaker or to 
change the bank’s management. However, in practice this can be quite diffi   cult. Another 
related issue is the legal power of the bank supervisors in exercising the letter of comfort 
issued by the problem bank’s controlling shareholders. In some cases, the bank supervisors 
face diffi   culty enforcing the bank’s controlling shareholders to take the agreed-upon actions. 
Th   e supervisors may also be constrained by a weak legal system for them to take legal action 
against bad bankers and this gives rise to moral hazard which hinders market discipline. 
Th  e experience shows that the cases of successful bank intervention are supported by a 
combination of factors including: (i) early identifi  cation of both the symptoms and causes of 
the bank’s problems; (ii) prompt and timely corrective actions by the bank supervisors; and 
(ii) the bank’s owner and management’s commitment to turn around the bank. 
3.5  Problem Bank Resolution 
A coordination mechanism linking up the related authorities is crucial for the eff  ective 
management of problem banks. All the countries, except Sri Lanka, have clear coordination 
mechanisms for dealing with bank failures, which are formulated in a memorandum of 
understanding with other regulators, 
Th  e supervisory authorities or deposit insurance companies in the SEACEN 
countries use a variety of resolution methods for dealing with problem banks, including 
deposit payoff  s, purchase and assumption transactions, open-bank assistance, good bank 
versus bad bank, and bridge banks, publicly-assisted bank restructuring, and temporary 
nationalisation. In general, a country uses more than one method of resolution, but the 
best practices vary among the countries (Figure 12). Lindgren et al. (1999) identify that the 
techniques commonly used in most countries for the consolidation of the fi  nancial sectors. 
Th   ey include closures, mergers, purchase and assumption operations, and bridge banks. 
In all the countries, except the Republic of China (Taiwan), the central bank as a bank 
supervisor has the power to declare bank failure. In most of the countries, the power to 
determine the appropriate bank resolution method to adopt is reserved by the central bank 
(Malaysia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Th  ailand). In Indonesia it is solely 
determined by the deposit insurance company, while in Malaysia the central bank and the 
deposit insurance company jointly decide it. In the Philippines and Th  ailand,  besides  the 
central bank, the court system also has power to determine the bank resolution method. 
In Nepal, Papua New Guinea, and Sri Lanka, besides the banking supervisory authority, 












































































1) The methods are not specified. The one selected represents an actual case.
2) Restricted the bank failure in the event that there is any potential that will significantly endanger credit order 
  and financial stability.
Basically, there are three sets of criteria used to determine bank failure: (i) examination 
criteria based on the on-site examination result; (ii) liquidation criteria based on the 
liquidators’ appraisal; and (iii) market-value criteria. All the countries adopt the examination 
criteria to determine a failed bank. In addition to the examination criteria, the Philippines 
and Republic of China (Taiwan) also adopt the liquidation criteria. 
Th   e main objective of a bank restructuring programme is to overhaul the banking 
system and enable banks to function as fi  nancial intermediaries as effi   ciently and as quickly 
as possible. Th   e process of resolving fi  nancial crises typically involves three major steps: (i) 
diagnostic review; (ii) resolution of the non-viable institutions and recapitalisation of the 
viable ones; and (iii) resolution of the non-performing loans. 
Essentially, a bank restructuring programme consists of two main elements: 
(i) fi   nancial restructuring, including capital injection and loan restructuring; and (ii) 
operational restructuring entailing the improvement of a bank’s internal organisation, 
such as its operational effi   ciency, governance, risk management and control. Generally, 
the approaches adopted in Korea, Th   ailand, Indonesia and Malaysia are similar. Financial 
restructuring focused on the closure of adversely insolvent fi  nancial institutions, takeovers, 
carving out and transferring bad assets to a central agency, and capital injection from 
private and public sources. During the 1997/1998 Asian crisis, the crisis-aff  ected countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia and Th   ailand) carried out mergers, closures and state intervention in 
the distressed banks. Th   ere are several instruments used to recapitalize and purchase non-
performing loans (NPL), such as bonds (Indonesia and Philippines). 
In response to the banking crisis or individual bank failures, all the countries took 
measures to improve their banking regulation and supervision and encourage banks to 
adopt the best practices, including risk management, corporate governance, and internal 
control (Figure 13). Most of the countries also improved the resolution methods for their 
implementation eff  ectiveness.18
Figure 13












































































*  Risk management, corporate governance, internal control, etc
** Including lender of last resort for emergency situation, deposit insurance
Th  ailand, which was fi  rst hit by the Asian crisis in mid-1997, merged 12 fi  nance 
companies and one commercial bank, closed 59 fi  nance and securities companies and two 
commercial banks, as well as took over and recapitalised six commercial banks and 12 
fi  nance and securities companies. Indonesia was most severely impacted by the Asian crisis. 
Since the creation of the Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA) in January 
1998, the government of Indonesia initiated a bank restructuring programme as part of a 
broad resolution programme, which included takeovers, mergers and recapitalisation. Bank 
Indonesia and the IBRA enforced the closure of 64 medium and small private commercial 
banks, took over and recapitalised 14 commercial banks and 12 regional banks,  merged and 
recapitalised seven taken-over private commercial banks into one bank as well as merged 
three state-owned banks into a new established bank8. Compared to other crisis-aff  ected 
countries, Malaysia proved to be more resilient and eff  ective in surmounting the crisis. Only 
four banks were taken over which were merged into two banks, with no closures. 
Bank closures in the non-crisis-aff  ected countries were less frequent as compared to the 
crisis-aff  ected countries. Th   e situation in the non-crisis-aff  ected countries was characterised 
by the absence of deposit insurance systems, less developed systems for problem bank 
resolution and crisis management, and the adoption of open-bank resolution as the most 
visible option for bank supervisors in dealing with failing banks. Th   is situation was quite 
similar to the conditions prevailing in pre-crisis Indonesia and Th   ailand in 1997/98 where 
open-bank resolution was preferred over closure. However, the experience shows that open-
bank resolution is ineff  ective and induces moral hazard. Th   is issue is also related with the 
diffi   culties faced by bank supervisors to take strong enforcement against bad behavior of 
bank management and owners, which hinder market discipline.
To be eff ective, the resolution process for problem banks has to be speedy, objective, 
transparent, and consistent in order to restore the health of the fi  nancial system and the 
economy. 
8  See Batunanggar (2002 and 2005) for detailed information and analysis.19
3.6  Safety Nets and Crisis Management  
Financial safety nets are vital for ensuring fi  nancial system stability. Comprehensive 
safety nets cover lenders of last resort (both for normal condition and systemic crisis),  deposit 
insurance schemes, and crisis management. Most of the countries, particularly Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Republic of China (Taiwan) and Th   ailand, improved their 
fi  nancial safety nets and crisis management in order to strengthen the resilience of their 
fi  nancial systems (see Figure 13).
Crisis-aff  ected countries have clear crisis-management frameworks in place, including 
policies in dealing with systemic banking crisis, roles and responsibilities, coordination 
mechanisms linking relevant agencies in dealing with systemic crisis, and provision of 
liquidity assistance for banks in emergency condition. Non-crisis-aff  ected countries, such 
as Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, evidenced less developed fi  nancial 
systems and are yet without crisis-management frameworks. However, Nepal is reported 
to have a coordination mechanism for dealing with systemic crises, but it is still under 
development. 
3.6.1  Lender of Last Resort (LLR)
Walter Bagehot (1873), the founding father of modern LLR, stated the three principles 
of LLR: (i) provision for lending against suffi   cient collaterals (for solvent banks only); (ii) 
provision for lending with penalty rate (for liquid banks only); (iii) announcement of the 
commitment to lend without limit (to ensure credibility)9.
Th   e historical experience suggests that successful lender-of-last-resort actions have 
prevented panics on numerous occasions (Bordo, 2002). According to Mishkin (2001),   
central banks can encourage the recovery of fi  nancial crisis by providing loans as lender of 
last resort. Although there may well be good reasons for maintaining ambiguity over the 
criteria for providing liquidity assistance, He (2000) argued that properly designed lending 
procedures, clearly laid-out authority and accountability, as well as disclosure rules, will 
promote fi  nancial stability, reduce moral hazard, and protect the lender of last resort from 
undue political pressure.
While individual frameworks diff  er from country to country, there is a broad consensus 
on the key considerations for emergency lending during normal and crisis periods. LLR 
for normal times which is also known as normal or “secured” lending, basically follows 
the Bagehot rules. While LLR for systemic crisis, sometimes called “unsecured” lending, is 
provided based on certain exceptions such as: (i) measures aimed at containing the crisis, 
with the decisions jointly made by the monetary, supervisory, and  fi  scal authorities; and 
(ii) relaxation of repayment terms to accommodate the implementation of a systemic 
bank-restructuring strategy. 10 However, as argued by Sinclair (2000) and Goodhart (2002), 
within the time scale allowed, it is oft  en diffi   cult, if not impossible, for the central banks to 
distinguish between a solvency and a liquidity problem.
9  Th   e LLR concept was born in the19th century by Henry Th   ornton (1802) who explicated the fundamental elements of good central banking practice 
in the light of emergency lending. Walter Bagehot (1873) developed the concept of Th   ornton (even though he did not mention his name).
10  See Dong He (2000), for detailed guiding principles of LLR for normal times and systemic crisis.20
In line with the common practice, all the countries provide direct lending to individual 
illiquid banks as part of their role as lenders of last resort. Interestingly, Papua New Guinea 
and Nepal also provide direct lending to individual insolvent banks. However, none of the 
countries provide direct lending to individual, insolvent non-depository institutions. In the 
Republic of China (Taiwan), both the central bank and the deposit insurance company are 
responsible for providing emergency liquidity assistance (joint decision).
It is important to note the Indonesian experience in providing emergency liquidity 
assistance during the 1997/98 crisis. Bank Indonesia provided around Rp170 trillion to 
banks facing serious liquidity problem aft  er they were hurt by systemic bank-runs. Th  e 
large budgetary cost that this entailed created tension and distrust between Bank Indonesia 
and the Government, particularly over the accountability and integrity of Bank Indonesia 
in providing the emergency liquidity support. Th   e problem arose from unclear criteria for 
distinguishing good from bad banks and the absence of LLR guidelines and procedures to 
ensure accountability. In addition, there was also a lack of coordination between the agencies 
in managing the crisis.
3.6.2 Deposit  Insurance
Th   e experience shows that deposit insurance scheme is one of the important elements 
for maintaining fi  nancial system stability. In general, deposit insurance is aimed at three 
interrelated aspects: (i) protection of deposits, particularly small deposits; (ii) maintenance 
of public confi   dence in the fi   nancial system, especially the banking system; and (iii) 
maintenance of fi  nancial system stability. 
Essentially, the main objective of deposit insurance is to avoid bank-runs. According 
to the Diamond-Dybvig model (1983), bank runs are indicated by “self-fulfi  lling prophecy” 
where the deterioration of depositors’ confi  dence can lead to banking crisis. Th  e  problem 
is caused by two factors: (i) there is asymmetric information between depositors and bank 
management; and (ii) generally, the incapability of depositors to assess a bank’s soundness. 
In addition, banks are also vulnerable to the event since their liquid assets are usually less 
than their liquid liabilities.
Prior to the 1997 crisis, none of the East Asian crisis-aff  ected countries, except the 
Philippines –which was least aff  ected by the crisis – and the Republic of China (Taiwan), 
had explicit deposit insurance schemes. A limited deposit guarantee in Indonesia was fi  rst 
applied when the authorities closed down Bank Summa at the beginning of the 1990s, which 
was considered unsuccessful. Subsequently, there were no further bank closures until the 
authorities closed down 16 banks in November 1997, and introduced a limited guarantee. 
However, this failed to prevent systemic bank-runs. Batunanggar (2002 and 2004) argued 
that a very limited deposit-insurance scheme was not eff  ective in preventing bank-runs 
during the 1997 crisis in Indonesia11. Th   erefore, if a blanket guarantee had been introduced 
earlier at the outset of the crisis, the systemic runs might have been reduced. 









































  To strengthen the resilience of their fi  nancial systems, some ASEAN countries began 
to develop their deposit insurance schemes and established independent agencies to insure 
deposits. Indonesia, for example, enacted its Deposit Insurance Law12  in September, 2004 and 
established the Indonesian Deposit Insurance Corporation a year later. Following Indonesia, 
Malaysia established its Malaysian Deposit Insurance Corporation in 2005. Eff  orts are also 
underway in Th   ailand and Nepal to establish their deposit insurance agencies. Sri Lanka still 
adopts a voluntary deposit insurance scheme which was operational in 1987, while Papua 
New Guinea is yet without a deposit protection scheme.
12  Law number 24  on September 22, 2004.22
3.6.3 Crisis  Management
Crisis management is aimed at minimizing the impact of fi  nancial distress. It is a 
plan for restoring fi  nancial stability quickly and cost-eff  ectively should a major crisis occur. 
Usually it is detailed in a protocol for deployment by a crisis management team and it clearly 
defi  nes the roles and responsibilities of the related parties in the resolution of a fi  nancial 
crisis.
Basically, a comprehensive crisis-management framework should clearly defi  ne some 
criteria for systemic risk, roles and responsibilities as well as a coordination mechanism 
linking the relevant agencies in dealing with systemic crisis, and provide instruments for 
dealing with systemic crisis. Some countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Republic 
of China (Taiwan) and Th  ailand) already possess explicit crisis-management policies or 
frameworks. Whereas in others (Nepal and Papua New Guinea), the crisis-management 
policies are less explicit and comprehensive, while in Cambodia and Sri Lanka they are still 
unavailable.
Similar with Indonesia’s case, when there is a systemic crisis and Republic of China, 
Taiwan’s CDIC is unable to resolve the problem banks’ purchase and assumption transactions, 
the CDIC may set up a bridge bank to assume all or part of the business, assets and liabilities 
of the banks. Republic of China, Taiwan established the Financial Restructuring Fund13.  
Indonesia, in particular, aft  er learning tough lessons from the 1997/98 crisis, is 
earnest in its commitment to improve its fi  nancial safety nets which cover LLR for systemic 
crisis, deposit insurance scheme, and crisis management14. Bank Indonesia and the Ministry 
of Finance have developed a fi  nancial safety-net framework and enacted regulations and 
procedures for an Emergency Financing Facility. To ensure eff  ective coordination between 
Bank Indonesia, the Indonesian Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Ministry of Finance 
in maintaining fi  nancial system stability, the Coordinating Committee and Financial System 
Stability Forum was established. Furthermore, a Task Force under the Financial System 
Stability Forum fi  nalised the draft   of the Indonesian Financial Safety Net Law and is currently 
developing a crisis-management protocol for Indonesia. 
13  See Ku (2008) for more detailed information.
14  See Batunanggar (2002, 2003 and 2006) for Indonesian fi  nancial safety nets and crisis management.23
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Introduction of a blanket guarantee
Institutional measures
Establishment of an overarching restructuring 
authority
Establishment of a separate bank restructuring
authority
Establishment of a centralized asset  
management company 
Adoption of a special corporate debt 
restructuring framework
Operational autonomy or restructuring agency
Restructuring measures
Intervention of financial institutions that were 
weak or insolvent
• Merger of weak institutions
• Closure of insolvent institutions
Use of public funds to purchase non  
performing assets
Use of public funds to recapitalize institutions,
including state intervention in banks
Elimination or dilution of current shareholders 
stakes of insolvent banks
New direct foreign investment
Other measures 4)
Measures to encourage corporate restructuring
Steps to improve prudential supervision and
regulation
9 : Yes;  – : No;  Ltd : limited 
1) Introduction of FSRP high level committee. 
2) Establishment of asset management companies to buy bank NPLs.
3) Grievances Hearing Cell in NRB
4) Other measures in Nepal including establishment of DRT, operation of High level co-ordination Committee 
  for FSRP, strengthening of credit information Bureau and Legislative reforms.
4.   Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Th  e Asian crisis taught us an expensive lesson that resolution of banking crises is 
exceedingly costly, painful and complicated. However, it also left   us with a deep impression 
that well-managed banking systems and eff  ective banking supervision are essential for 
maintaining the stability of fi  nancial systems. 24
Eff  ective problem bank identifi  cation and resolution are crucial in ensuring not only 
the soundness of a bank, but also the resilience of the fi  nancial system as a whole – since banks 
are dominant players in the fi  nancial system. Th   ey will reduce the potential of individual 
bank failures and banking crisis as well as minimise their resolution costs. Hence, a clear and 
comprehensive framework and guidelines for dealing with problem banks are vital.
In general, the bank supervisors in the nine SEACEN countries surveyed have 
established clear legal and prudential frameworks in their fi  nancial systems for dealing with 
problem banks. However, the stage of development of their crisis-management frameworks 
varies between the countries, depending on their legal and political settings as well as on 
their economic development. Th  e  non-crisis-aff  ected countries (Cambodia, Nepal, Papua 
New Guinea and Sri Lanka) have less comprehensive frameworks. Whereas the crisis-
aff  ected countries (Indonesia, Malaysia and Th   ailand), and the countries which experienced 
banking system distress (Philippines and Republic of China, Taiwan), appear to have more 
developed frameworks particularly for crisis management. Th   e supervisory authorities in 
the crisis-aff  ected countries have enhanced the eff  ectiveness of their banking supervision 
along with their post-crisis banking restructuring program. 
Problem banks in the SEACEN countries are generally caused by unsound banking 
practices, poor risk management, bad governance, and fraud. Th   e following are some of the     
key issues and challenges related to the identifi  cation of problem banks: First, compliance-
based supervision and historical bank-performance analysis using backward-looking 
indicators are not eff  ective in identifying the banks’ problems. Th  is is mainly due to the 
limited information available to the bank supervisors and a time lag in the bank reports. 
Th   e condition is made worse when the banks’ information systems, internal controls and 
corporate governance are weak. Usually the problem banks disguise their fundamental 
problems which can only be detected by on-site work. However, the on-site examination 
results are usually delayed so that the corrective actions cannot be performed promptly. 
Th   erefore, a risk-based supervisory strategy which is focused toward banks’ high-risk areas 
should be adopted and developed. Besides, forward-looking indicators and analysis as well 
as other tools such as stress testing are required to complement a conventional historical-
trend analysis of banks’ performance. Second, in line with the implementation of risk-based 
supervision, the adoption of comprehensive bank-risk management must be promoted to 
ensure that the banks’ risks are properly managed. It is wise to introduce the new initiatives 
early to allow time for people to gain understanding and facilitate preparation for their 
gradual implementation. Th  ird, developing the new supervisory frameworks and tools is 
much easier than their implementation. Th  e adoption of risk-based supervision and risk 
management require rigorous and consistent change-management. Eff  ective application of 
the new frameworks and tools requires not only enhanced business processes and systems 
but, more importantly, a paradigm shift  ing for bank supervisors. Th   ere should be incentive 
systems both for the bank supervisors and for the banks’ management in developing 
their analytical skills and using their judgment. To make risk-based supervision and risk 
management work, strong leadership, top-management commitment, and human resource 
development are necessary to drive and facilitate the process. 
We learn from experience that successful bank interventions are supported by a 
combination of factors, including: (i) early identifi  cation of both the symptoms and causes of 
the banks’ problems; (ii) timely and appropriate corrective actions by the bank supervisors; 25
and (iii) the bank owners’ and management’s commitment to turn around the banks. Bank 
supervisors face at least three key challenges: First is performing a comprehensive analysis 
of the causes and symptoms of the weaknesses of problem banks. Once the bank supervisor 
identifi  es the problems of a weak bank, then timely and appropriate corrective actions – 
based on the condition and scale of the problem – are required to deal with the defi  ciencies 
and behavioural change of the bank. However, the prompt corrective actions is mainly based 
on a lagging indicator of a bank’s fi  nancial health. Intervention in problem banks is likely 
to be triggered only aft  er they have been identifi  ed by examiners, who rely on far more 
information than the capital ratio. Th  erefore, in addition to quantitative criteria such as 
capital-adequacy ratio, non-performing loans or liquidity ratio, it is necessary to include 
qualitative criteria as part of trigger mechanism for problem bank intervention. 
Th  e second is related to the rules-versus-discretion issue. Correcting the bank’s 
problems should be timely and based on sound judgment. Th   is requires some latitude of     
discretion, particularly in the case where contagion or systemic risk is evident. However, 
too much discretion creates a lack of transparency, erodes accountability, and has moral- 
hazard potential. Th   erefore, the challenge is striking a right balance. Th   e bank’s problem and 
corrective action plans may not always correspond to the detailed procedures stipulated in 
the exit policy guideline. Consequently, the supervisor is called to respond and take quick 
action to ensure that the bank’s problems are handled properly and in a timely manner. 
Th   e third is gaining the bank’s management commitment to implement the action 
plans for restoring the bank’s health. In general, the causes of problem banks in the SEACEN 
countries are rooted in mismanagement, poor governance, and fraud. In such cases, it is 
unrealistic to expect the bank management’s commitment to adhere to the action plans. Th  e 
supervisor may ask the bank’s controlling shareholders to appoint a caretaker or to change 
the bank’s management. However, in practice this can be diffi   cult. Also, in a country where 
the legal system is weak, instituting criminal action against frauds committed by bad bankers 
to minimise moral hazard is a huge challenge.
Th   e resolution process has to be speedy, objective, transparent, and consistent if it is 
to be eff  ective in restoring the health of the fi  nancial system and the economy. Th  e  crisis- 
management frameworks for dealing with problem banks have been signifi  cantly improved 
in the crisis-aff  ected countries as part of their post-crisis restructuring programme. However, 
non-crisis countries tend to have a less comprehensive problem bank resolution framework. 
Th  ey mostly do not yet have an explicit deposit insurance scheme and develop a crisis 
management framework. Th  ese conditions correspond to less frequent individual bank 
closures which are probably due to adoption of open bank resolution and/or non-existence 
of systemic bank failure in those countries. However, open bank resolution is ineff  ective and 
induces moral hazard.
Th   e other challenge for bank supervisors engaged in the resolution of problem banks 
is ensuring both the macro and micro supervisory objectives – maintenance of fi  nancial 
stability and depositor protection – are eff  ectively attained. In practice, it is oft  en diffi   cult for 
the supervisors to identify and measure as well as manage the systemic risks which require 
diff  erent skills and methodologies. Th   e Asian fi  nancial crisis and crises in other countries 
show that eff  ective micro-prudential supervision which is aimed at ensuring the soundness 
of individual banks, must be combined with macro-prudential surveillance to ensure the 26
stability of the fi  nancial system. Th   erefore it is imperative to perform – and enhance the 
effi   cacy of – macro-prudential surveillance to identify, monitor, and mitigate the risks to the 
fi  nancial system.
For countries which do not yet have a crisis-management framework it is important 
to develop comprehensive fi  nancial safety nets, consisting of: (i) explicit and limited deposit 
insurance schemes; (ii) a well-defi  ned and transparent LLR both in normal times and during 
systemic crises; and (iii) clear crisis-management frameworks. Deposit insurances and LLR 
can be important tools for crisis management, but they are not suffi   cient to prevent banking 
crises. Th  ey should be deployed along with other fi  nancial stability tools such as market 
discipline and prudential banking supervision. 
Finally, history teaches us that fi  nancial crises are oft  en repeated, though no two crises 
are alike. Th   ey are also diffi   cult to predict and, thus, to avoid. Hence, both crisis prevention 
and crisis resolution are crucial for ensuring the resilience of the fi  nancial system. Th   e key is 
to ‘be well prepared’ – to always expect the unexpected. A well devised crisis-management 
framework is essential, but its eff  ective implementation is even more important. Th  erefore, 
capacity building is indispensable. 
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 Figure 16
Detailed Framework in Dealing with Problem Banks 
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Figure 17
Flow Chart to Assist Resolution of Weak Banks
Focus on Solvency and Systemic Issues


















–  M&A and P&A
–  Combined temporarily with a
  public sector resolution
Consider public sector resolution
(section 6)
–  Temporary bridge bank
– Open-ended  assistance






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Period Overdue for Interest Suspension and Loan Classification 
Country 
Period overdue for 
interest suspension 
Substandard  Doubtful  Loss 
Cambodia   3 M  3 M  6 M  12 M 
Indonesia    3 M  3 M  6 M  9 M 
Malaysia    3 M  -  -  - 
Nepal   ≤3M  ≤6M ≤ 12M > 12M 
Papua New Guinea   > 30days<90 days > 90days<180days > 180days<360days > 360days 
Philippines    1 M  3 M  4 to 5 M  6 M 
Sri Lanka    3M  6M  9M  12M 
Rep of China 
(Taiwan) 
1 M -3 M (No 
Collateral) 
1M -12 M(With 
Enough Collateral) 
3 M -6 M (No Collateral) 
Over 12 M  (With 
Enough Collateral) 
6 M-12 M 
(No Collateral) 
 
Over 12 M 
(No Collateral) 
Thailand 1)    3 M  3 M  6 M  12 M 
M = month (s) 
1) all assets are classified into one of  6 categories – Pass (1 M.), Special Mention (2 M.), Substandard (3 M.), 
Doubtful (6 M.), Doubtful Loss (12 M.), and Loss (write-off). 
 
Table 3. Loan Provisioning Requirements 





mentioned  Substandard  Doubtful  Loss 
Cambodia  -  -  10  30  100 
Indonesia  1 
 
5  15  50  100 
Malaysia  1.5 (general 
provision) 
N/A  20  50  100 
Nepal  1  NA  25  50  100 
Papua New 
Guinea 
1  5  25  50  100 
Philippines  1 regular 
5 restructured 
5  10 regular 
25 unsecured 
50  100 
Sri Lanka 1)
Rep of China 
(Taiwan) 
Thailand 2)   1  2  100  100  100 
  0  2  10  50  100 
  1   20  50  100 
1) The provisioning is based on the outstanding loan value minus value of securities 
2) 1% and 2% of net value between outstanding loan and collateral.  BOT applies IAS 39, therefore  FIs have to set 
100% provision of the difference between outstanding debt and present value of estimated future cash flows 
from debtors or estimated future cash flows from sales of collaterals.  
 36






implemented   System type 
Cambodia 
National Bank of 
Cambodia  
CAMELS  2003  Newly introduced Cambodia Off-site Bank Report for prompt 
corrective action (not yet fully implemented) 
CAMELS 1991 
2004 (imprvd) 
Off-site supervisory bank rating system 
Risk Matrix  2003  Off-site supervisory tools to measure the level and trend of bank’s 
risks:  credit, liquidity, interest rate, forex, operational, compliance, 
legal and strategic risk and to determine supervisory plan and risk-
focused examination.  
Stress Test  2003  Sensitivity analysis tools at to measure the impact of certain changes 
in macroeconomic variables to the bank’s earning and capital. Macro 







  2005  Early warning model - failure and timing to failure prediction. It is 







  2007  Continuous surveillance aimed at assessing significant activities that 
affect the stability and soundness of individual FI and its Group. 
 
  Macro-prudential 
Surveillance 
 
 To identify domestic inter-linkages between different sectors within 
the economy and their implications on banking sector stability e.g. 
corporate sector, household sector and financial markets  
 
  Enhancement to 
Stress Test 
Framework 
  2007  To better assess the areas of vulnerability and resilience level of 
individual banking institutions and the system as a whole to 
exceptional but plausible adverse events 
CAMELS 
 
 2003  On-site supervisory bank rating system 
CALES  2004 Jan  off-site bank rating system 




PCA  July 2008  Circular issued on 16 August 2007 (under Basel II framework) 
Papua New 
Guinea   
Bank of PNG  
CAMELS  2003  Off-Site Supervisory internal banking rating system 





  1998  Off-site supervisory tools to measure and assess eight categories of 
risk (credit, market, interest rate, foreign exchange, liquidity, 
operations, legal and compliance) in terms of quantity of risks, quality 
of risks, aggregate risk and direction of risk 







2004  Rating system used in supervising branches of foreign banks  
  Bank 
Performance 
Report (BPR) and 
Bank Folder 
 1998  Supervisory tool used in monitoring the financial performance of 
supervised entities in between on-site examinations.  The BPR 
contains, in one compact report, key performance indicators that 
support CAMELS soundness analysis. Current performance levels are 
related to historical trends and relative performance vis-à-vis peer 
group. 
  Top Corporate 
Borrower Reports 
 Tool used to measure and monitor the total exposures of the banking 
system to a particular borrower, family, and/or business group, as 
well as any developments in the loan-beneficiary industries which 
could affect the status of such exposures.   
  Early Warning 
System (EWS) 
 Statistical model that generates one-year ahead forecasts of key bank 
performance variables, especially solvency and asset quality.  This is 
used to help prioritize on-site examinations.   
Sri Lanka  
Central Bank of 
Sri Lanka  
CAMELS     1990 
2005 
Off-site supervisory bank rating system 
Uses sensitivity analysis to assess the impact on capital.  37
Table 4.2. Indicator/Risk Categories and Ratios Used in Supervisory Risk Assessment and 
Early Warning Systems - Financial Ratio and Peer Group Analysis Systems 







quality  Solvency 
 
Profit-








Economic    Others   
Cambodia  Bank 
performance
 report 
43  16  9  13  5 
Indonesia  BPeR 1)    18  3  6  3  4  -  -  -  2 
Malaysia  n/a
Nepal   Bank 
monitoring  25  7  **2  8  3  5    
Papua New 
Guinea 
CAMELS  14  4  3  2  3  2  -  -  - 
n/a Philippines 
Sri Lanka  -  19  4  3  9  2  1  -  -  - 










AR S E L  











  6  1  1  1  1  -  -  2  - 
1)Bank Performance Evaluation Report is used as supporting tools for bank supervisor as part of core knowledge of risk-
based supervision. 
2)Capital market monitoring ratios relating to trading activity. 
 
 






Off-site supervisory bank rating system 
  Stress Test 
(CBC) 
       Since 2006  Under development and used as financial system stability 
surveillance tool  
  CAMELS  
(CDIC) 
1994   Off-site supervisory bank rating system  









Individual bank 1) 
  2006-present  Off-site supervisory tools to assess the level and trend of bank’s 
risks.   
Early Warning 
Model of Banking 
Distress 2) 
 Analytical tools used for financial system stability surveillance and 
risks assessing of banking system distress.  
Thailand   
Bank of Thailand 
Stress test  2007  Sensitivity analysis tool aimed to measure the impact of change in 
macroeconomic variables to the bank’s earning and capital. 
1)  EWS is conducted in 3 approaches, namely Supervisory Standard, Off-trend Deviation, and Peer Comparison. All 
approaches are employed with the same 14 financial ratios of each individual bank, representing solvency, profitability, 
asset quality, market risk, and liquidity risk. Trigger points are divided into 3 levels, namely green, yellow, and red in order 
to create early warning zone for examiners to closely monitor vulnerabilities of financial institutions. 
2)  Using combination of various methods, e.g.  trigger points, trends, econometrics model, together with expert judgment, 
and indicators, including systemic financial variables and macroeconomic variables. 38
 Table 5. Explicit Structured Early Intervention Framework 
Country 
Capital Level Trigger/ 
Mandatory and Discretionary Actions 
Undercapitalised Significantly Undercapitalised Critically Undercapitalised 
Cambodia 
CAR >10% but <15%   CAR <5% 
  ) *   s e r u s a e M   o i t a R   r e g g i r T
6% < CAR < 8% 
•  Bank is obliged to submit capital restoration plan 
•  Prohibition of the Bank from paying out any distribution of capital 
•  Prohibition of the Bank from conducting any transactions with a related party and or any other parties 
•  Imposition of restriction on the Bank to carrying out business expansion plan or new business 
activities that have never been performed before 
•  Imposition of restriction on the Bank pertaining to payment salaries, compensation or any other form 
of similar payment to the management of the Bank, and or compensation for related parties 
•  Prohibition for the bank from executing payment on subordinated loan 
•  Mandatory reporting by the bank for any change in share ownership in any amount less than 10% 
•  Submit a detailed daily report concerning liquidity schedule 
•  Submit the realization of capital restoration plan monthly 
 
Indonesia 
CAR < 6% 
•  Bank is obliged to submit capital restoration plan 
•  Prohibition of the Bank from paying out any distribution of capital 
•  Prohibition of the Bank from conducting any transactions with a related party and or any other parties 
•  Imposition of restriction on the Bank to asset growth 
•  Imposition of restriction on the Bank to carrying out business expansion plan or new business 
activities that have never been performed before 
•  Imposition of restriction on the Bank pertaining to payment salaries, compensation or any other form 
of similar payment to the management of the Bank, and or compensation for related parties 
•  Prohibition for the bank from executing payment on subordinated loan 
•  Mandatory reporting by the bank for any change in share ownership in any amount less than 10% 
•  Submit a detailed daily report concerning liquidity schedule 
•  Submit the realization of capital restoration plan monthly 
•  Bank is prohibited from selling or reducing the amount of its assets or strengthening its commitment 
and contingencies without supervisor’s permission 
•  Bank must submit some relevant information monitored closely by bank supervisors 
Malaysia  Supervisory has discretionary powers to take appropriate measures. 











-Interaction with the 
senior management 






CAR < 9% and ≥ 6%  
-Action required under category 1. 
- Suspension of lending, investment, 
and credit extension activities 
-Prior approval of NRB for 
acquiring, through purchase or lease, 
additional 
fixed assets; 
-Prior approval of NRB for 
establishing new business lines 
-Other actions under NRB Act 2058 
and BAFIA 2063. 
 
CAR < 6% and ≥ 3%  
- Action required under category 2. 
- Restriction on deposit mobilization 
- Prohibition from acquiring, through 
purchase or lease, additional fixed 
assets; 
- Restrictions on paying incentives, 
severance packages, management 
fees or other discretionary 
compensation to directors or officers 
without 
prior approval of NRB. 
- Restriction on SLF. 
- Other actions under NRB Act 2058 
and BAFIA 2063. 
 
CAR <3% and ≥ 1%    
-Action required under category 3. 
-Restrictions on salary increments, 
recruitments and promotions. 
-Action to directors and chief executive 
if capital position doesn't improve 
in 6 months after initiating action under 
this category. 




- Action required under category 4. 
-Declare the bank as problem bank and 
initiate actions under Section 86 of 
NRB Act. 
-Suspend existing board of directors and 
chief executive of the bank and 
bring in new board and management. 
-Initiate steps to dilute the ownership of 
the existing shareholders. 
-Other actions under NRB Act 2058 and 
BAFIA 2063. 
 
CAR >5% but  <10%39
Country 
Capital Level Trigger/ 
Mandatory and Discretionary Actions 
Papua New 
Guinea 
CAR <12% or Tier 
1 <8% 
Leverage <6% 
•  Bank to provide 
detailed plan for 
increasing capital  
•  No dividends of 
any kind shall be 
declared or paid 
•  No new business 
activities may be 
entered into or 
undertaken 
•  No new branches 
may be opened 
•  No new loans 
CAR <8% or Tier 1<4% 
Leverage <4% 
•  Urgent need for capital injection 
•  Appointment of Statutory 
Manager to run the affairs of the 
bank  
CAR & Tier 1 no longer relevant. 
Leverage <2% 
• Based on the Statutory Manager, 
recommendations for receivership and 
liquidation process 
Philippines        1 . 8   e l b a T   e e S
Sri Lanka  Supervisory has discretionary powers to take appropriate measures. No specific measures under each 





•  Cannot make any cash 
distribution and pay the 
compensation, bonuses, and 
other similar allowances given 
by the bank to directors and 
supervisors. 
•  May order the bank to submit a 
time-limited improvement plan 
for capital increase or reduction 
of total risk assets. 
•  May restrict risk-based assets 
increase or take other necessary 
measures.  
CAR <6% 
• May dismiss the directors and 
supervisors. of the bank. 
• May order the bank disposal 
specific assets. 
• May restrict or ban the credit or 
other similar transactions with 
related parties. 
• May restrict equity 
investments. 
• May order the bank to dismiss 
some of its branch 
organizations within a certain 
period of time. 
• May take conservatorship or 
other necessary measures. 
- 
Prior to CAR< 8.5% 
(In case the condition or operation of a financial institution is such that serious damage may be caused 
to the public interest.) 
•  Must submit capital strengthening plan 
•  Recommend such financial institution to delay or postpone their distributions of dividends and/or 
bonus payoffs.  
•  Recommend such financial institution to decelerate an expansion on risk assets and avoid taking 
deposit by providing abnormal high rate of interest.  
•  Sanction in various forms. 
Undercapitalised (CAR < 8.5 %) or (Tier 1 < 4.25%) 
Thailand 
•  Must submit capital resolution plan 
•  Order to decrease/increase capital funds 
•  Prohibit from distributing or disposing of the whole of any part of profits and bonus 
•  Prohibit from expanding risk assets  
•  Prohibit from taking deposit by providing abnormal high interest rate and borrowing funds with 
abnormal high cost 
•  Impose restriction on management fees 
•  Impose restriction on certain transactions with affiliated companies or related person or management. 
•  Remove management  
•  Take over the control 
•  Must be placed on conservatorship 
•  Revoke the banking license  
CAR = capital adequacy ratio 
Indonesia: * For all banks having CAR <8%: Bank supervisor order: (i) Capital Restoration Plan; (ii) Mandatory Supervisory 
Action; (iii) Certain Actions, such as change Board of Directors and senior management, write-off bad loan, conduct merger 
with other bank(s), sell the bank, delegate the management of part or all of the bank to another party, sell part or all of assets 
and liabilities, suspend certain business activities. 40
Table 6. Explicit Structured Early Intervention Framework in the Philippines 
Capital Level Trigger/ Mandatory and Discretionary Action 
Up to 40% Undercapitalised  Up to 60%  
Undercapitalised 
Up to 80%  
Undercapitalised 
More than 80%  
Undercapitalised 
-  Suspension of authority to 
invest in non-allied 
undertakings (for UBs only) 
-  Suspension of authority to 
invest in allied undertakings 
UBs/ RBs/ 
- Suspension of securities  and 
dealership functions (for 
UBs only) 
-  Restrictions on lending to 
affiliates 
- Suspension of branching 
privileges 
-  Suspension of declaration of 
cash dividends 
-  Restrictions on overall loan 
growth/investments (new 
loans to the extent of 
collections only) 
-  Denial of access to BSP 
rediscounting facilities 
-  Suspension of authority to 
accept or create demand 
deposits or operate NOW 
accounts 
-   Suspension of authority to 
accept or handle 
government deposits 
- Suspension of authority to invest in 
non-allied undertakings (for UBs 
only) 
- Suspension of authority to invest in 
allied undertaking 
-Suspension of securities and 
dealership functions (for UBs 
only) 
-Suspension of branching privileges 
- Suspension of declaration of cash 
dividends 
- Restrictions on overall  loan 
growth/ investments (new loans to 
the extent of collections only) 
- Restrictions on lending to affiliates 
- Denial of access to rediscounting 
facilities 
- Suspension of authority to accept 
or handle government deposits 
- Suspension of authority to engage 
in quasi-banking activities 
- Suspension of authority to engage 
in derivatives activities 
- Suspension of FCDU activities 
- Suspension of trust operations 
- Suspension of authority to accept 
or create demand deposits or 
operate NOW accounts 
 
- Suspension of authority to invest in 
non-allied undertakings (for UBs 
only) 
- Suspension of authority to invest in 
allied undertakings 
- Suspension of securities and 
dealership functions (for UBs 
only) 
- Suspension of branching privileges 
- Suspension of declaration of cash 
dividends 
- Denial of access to BSP 
rediscounting facilities 
- Suspension of authority to accept 
or create demand deposits or 
operate NOW accounts 
- Suspension of authority to accept 
or handle government deposits 
- Suspension of authority to engage 
in quasi-banking activities 
- Suspension of authority to  engage 
in derivatives activities 
- Suspension of FCDU activities 
- Suspension of trust operations 
- Suspension of international 
banking activities 
- Suspension of lending activities 
- Suspension of issuance of 
domestic L/Cs 
 
- Suspension of 
clearing privileges 
 
- Suspension of 
granting of 
bonuses/profit-




Table 7. Discretionary Policies of Intervention  
Country  Situations Allowing Authorities to Act  Measures 
Cambodia    o t   e r i u q e r   r o   n o i t u l o s e r   r o f   g n i t e e m   l a m r o F     % 5 1 <   R A C
top up capital 
Indonesia  CAR falls below the minimum (in practice Bank 
Indonesia sets an informal trigger ratio above the 
statutory minimum capital ratio) and the Bank has been 
imposed administrative sanctions by bank supervisor 
due to its violation of Banking Act. 
Dismissing the Bank management and then 
appointing a temporary substitute of the 
management until the General Meeting of 
Shareholders or the Meeting of Cooperative 
Members appoints the permanent substitute 
with the approval of Bank Supervisor. 
Malaysia  Non compliances to law, rules and regulations and 
taking into account the gravity of the concerns and the 
overall state of the bank  
To take any step/action, or not to do any act 
or action; prohibit bank from extending 
further credit facility; remove any officer of 
the bank; or appoint a person to advise the 
bank; assume control; 
Nepal   Non-compliance to law, rules, regulation and directives 
of NRB. 
NRB can take control over the bank and 
appoint a management committee (MC) to 
operate it, then corrective or restructuring 
actions are initiated by the MC 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Situations which may prompt the Central Bank to act 
will include amongst other things are: 
￿  Financial and operational weaknesses or non-
compliance with banking laws and prudential 
standards. This may include capital ratios falling 
below 12%, 8% & 6%; 
￿  High or increasing NPLs 
￿  Inadequate provisioning of loans 
￿  Continuous breaching of limits set by the CB; 
The CB will discuss with the Board 
corrective measures or remedial actions. It 
will also issue directives relating to the issues 
discussed. It will issue additional conditions 
on a bank’s license. 
In worst case scenarios, it will remove the 
Board of the bank and place a Statutory 
Manager to manage the affairs of the entity 
and put it back to a sound footing. In the 
event that the entity cannot be resurrected, it 
will be placed under liquidation. 
Philippines   
(a)  Illiquid but not insolvent; granted emergency loans  
(b)  1. unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in 
the ordinary course of business  
2.  insufficient realizable assets to meet liabilities 
3.  cannot continue in business without involving 
probable losses to its depositors and creditors 
4.  declared a bank holiday 
5.  suspended payment of deposit liabilities for 





Sri Lanka    , e z e e r f   t e s s a   , s k n a b   e h t   h t i w   g n i t a c i n u m m o C     m u m i n i m   e h t   w o l e b   l l a f   R A C





  a / n   a / n
Thailand  In practice, CAR falls below the internal used trigger 
ratio above the statutory minimum capital ratio 
BOT orders such financial institution to 
submit capital strengthening plan. In case-by 
case basis, BOT may request such banks to 
delay or postpone their distributions of 
dividends and/or bonus payoffs. Moreover, 
BOT may also request such banks to 
decelerate an expansion on risk assets and 
avoid taking deposit by providing abnormal 





Table 8. Restructuring Methods 














Sri Lanka  2) 




1) Based on legal provision 
2) These methods may not be applicable to all types of banks 
Table 9. Bankruptcy Procedures
Country  Trial length of time  Priority of banks’ 
secured loans 






  n.a.   -   a i d o b m a C
  h g i H   -   a i s e n o d n I
    h g i H   -   a i s y a l a M
(Company’s Act 1967) 
- 
Nepal  -  Extremely High (section 
6 NRB Act) 
High 
(Section 77f B&FIA) 
Papua New 
Guinea 
This is dealt with under the Bankruptcy Act. However, high priority is still given to 
secured loans. All loans given are fully secured.  
  h g i H     s e n i p p i l i h P
        a k n a L   i r S
Rep of China 
(Taiwan) 
  h g i H   -
Thailand  Depends on a case-by-case
basis. 
High 
Because bankruptcy law 
allows SC to be outside 





Because BF, T and W 
take precedence over 
unsecured claims in  









Table 10. Examples of Good Bank/Bad Bank 
Country  Year  Troubled bank  Good bank  Bad bank 
Cambodia  n/a  n/a   n/a  n/a 
1999  
  Bank PDFCI 
4 state-owned banks: 
3.  Bank BNI 
4.  Bank BBD 
5.  Bank BDN 
6.  Bank Exim 
Bank Danamon 
(surviving banks)  
 
4 state owned banks 
are recapitalized and 





2000   Bank Duta 
2.  Bank Rama 
3.  Bank TAMARA 
4.  Bank Tiara Asia 
5.  Bank Nusa 
6.  Bank POS 
7.  Bank JAYA 
8.  Bank Risyad Salim 
Bank Danamon  
those 8 troubled 
banks were merged 
with Bank Danamon.  
IBRA 
Malaysia  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Nepal   2001 & 
2006 
Nepal Bank Limited & Nepal 
Bangladesh Bank Ltd 
 
Standard Chartered 






PNG Banking Corporation Bank of South Pacific PNG Banking Corporation
Philippines  n/a 




Rep of China 
(Taiwan) 
2003 Kaohsiung Business Bank  Sold to E. Sun Bank
(domestic bank) 
Lone Star Asia-Pacific, Ltd 
Thailand   1998 - 
1999 
- The Laem Thong Bank 
- The Union Bank of 
Bangkok 
- The Bangkok of Bank of 
Commerce  
- First Bangkok City Bank 
- Siam City Bank 
- Bangkok Metropolitan 
Bank 
- Nakornthon Bank 
- Siam City Bank 
- Radanasin Bank 
AMCs such as  state-owned 
AMCs (BAM, SAM and 




 Table 11. Mergers, Closures, State Intervention, and Resolution Costs (1997 – 2007)  
Country Mergers  Closures  State  intervention 
Resolution 
Costs* 
Cambodia  No 16  commercial  Banks  1)   
 




2001 - 2007 
 
4 of 7 state commercial banks 
were merged into a single 
commercial bank (54%)  
5 commercial banks 
 
64 commercial banks 
(18%)  
 
9 commercial banks, 4 of 
them were self liquidated    
(.. %) 
 













Malaysia  assumed control over 4 BIs and 
merged 2 commercial banks. 
15 mergers (6%), finance 
companies and commercial 
bank) 
None  1 merchant bank and 2 
finance companies 
under the central bank 
control (3%) 
- 
Nepal   HISEF with Laxmi Bank  None  2 Banks, RBB &NBL  GDP  Rs. 558
billion cost for 







2 of the 6 commercial banks 
were acquired. 
Licenses were revoked 
with assets and liabilities 
transferred to new entities 
or the purchasing 
commercial banks.  
- - 
Philippines    2   :   k n a B   . m m o C   6 4
Thrift Bank : 20 
- - 
Sri Lanka    e r e w   s k n a b   e t a t s   2   -   -
recapitalized twice 
amounting to Rs. 35 
billion through the issue 
of restructuring bonds in 
1993 and 1996 
 





4 state banks were merged 
into 2 state banks. 
(5 state banks in total) 
12 private banks  were 
merged into 7 private banks. 




















44 finance and securities 
companies 







1998   - 2  commercial  banks
4 finance and securities 
companies 
Fund take conservator-
8 finance companies 
n/a 
1999  12 finance companies and 1 
commercial bank 
a / n   -   -  
2002  a / n   -   -   s k n a b   l a i c r e m m o c   2  
2004  2 commercial banks and 1 
finance company 
a / n   -   -  
2005  a / n   -   -   s k n a b   l a i c r e m m o c   4  
2007  a / n   -   -   s k n a b   l a i c r e m m o c   2  
*Percentage of GDP   1) as a requirement of bank capital increase) 
6 commercial banks 45
institution to an asset management company may be 
The losses from sale of NPLs by a financial  n/a
Table 12. Instruments Used to Recapitalise and Purchase NPLs  
Country  Instrument  Received  Description 
Cambodia      a / n   a / n
Indonesia  Bonds  Equity
private bank scheme may purchase back shares after 
Variable and fixed coupon bonds. Owner under the 
three years; tradable. 
Malaysia  Bonds  Equity
Nepal   n/a  n/a  In 1990s, government issued bond to recapitalize 
Under Danamodal 





banks in PNG, purchasing of NPLs is and can be 
Although this has never happened in the history of 
allowed. 
Philippines    -   a / n     a / n






Rep of China 
(Taiwan) 
Set up asset 
management 
company to buy 
financial 
institution’s NPLs 
carried forward over five years. 
 
Thailand  - P/N (Purchase 
NPL) 
 - Cash 
(Recapitalise)  
 - Debt to equity 
swap 
Equity
FIDF. FIDF took the shares to be a majority 
P/N with interest rate linked to deposit rate, aval by 
shareholder. After restructuring the banks, FIDF 
will divest the shares to the market. The former 
owners are not allowed to purchase the shares back. 46474849
Table 21. Statutory Time Limit of Reimbursement 
Country  Within 1 
week 
1 week to 1 
month 
1 to 3 
months 
3 to 6 
months 
Over 6 
months  n.a. 
Cambodia  -  -  -  -  -     
Indonesia  -  -      -  -  -
Malaysia  -  -  -   -  -     
Nepal   -  -  -   -  -     
Papua New 
Guinea 1) 
-  -  -  -  -  -  
Philippines  -  -      -  -  -  
Sri Lanka  -  -  -  -  -     
Rep of China 
(Taiwan) 
-  -  -   -  -   
Thailand  -  -  -  -  -     
2) No prescribed deadline and will disclose in the announcement of reimbursement details (case by case). 
 
Table 22. Actual Average Period of Reimbursement  
Country  Within 1 
week 
1 week to 1 
month 
1 to 3 
months 
3 to 6 
months 
Over 6 
months  n.a. 
Cambodia  -  -  -  -  -     
Indonesia  -  -      -  -   
Malaysia  -  -   -  -  -     
Nepal   -  -  -  -  -     
Papua New 
Guinea 
-  -  -  -  -     
Philippines  -  -       -  -   
Sri Lanka  -  -    -  -     
Rep of China 
(Taiwan) 
-  -   -  -  -     
Thailand  -      -  -  -   
1) Never happened. 
 
Table 23. Average Failure Resolution Cases in the Past 10 Years  
Country Deposit  payoff  Purchase and 
assumptions  Open bank assistance  Bridge banks 
Cambodia 17  banks 
Indonesia  70 banks 
Malaysia  -  -  - 




Philippines  176 
Sri Lanka  1 
Rep of China 
(Taiwan) 
5 banks 




-  -  - 
4 banks - - 
- 
-  - - 
- -  - 
- 
-  -  - 
63 fis. 3 banks, 12 fis.
NA NA NA
- 50PART II
COUNTRY CHAPTERSSeacen_Sukarela.indb   50 Seacen_Sukarela.indb   50 6/27/2008   4:25:12 PM 6/27/2008   4:25:12 PM51
CHAPTER 2
1. Introduction 
In most developing economies, including throughout Asia, the banking sector plays 
a crucial role in fi  nancial resource allocation and savings in the economy. Th  e health of 
an economy depends on the degree of safety and stability of its banking system. A sound, 
stable and robust banking system is a pre-requisite for the economic development and well 
being of a country. Unsafe banks can lead to systemic fi  nancial crisis, economic collapse 
and massive permanent economic losses, as in the Asian fi  nancial crises in 1997-1998 Th  e 
National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) is the authority responsible for ensuring the stability and 
soundness of the banking system. In the absence of a capital market, Cambodia’s banking 
sector plays a key role in the country’s economic development. Under the restructuring of the 
banking sector in the year 2000, banks were required to increase their individual minimum 
paid-up capital up to about USD13 million. Sixteen commercial banks were closed and the 
remaining banks committed more capital, with the result that the banking sector as a whole 
was strengthened. Th   us, a system for problem bank resolution and prevention of insolvent 
bank deserve attention in Cambodia before any future bank failure takes place. Th   e NBC, as 
the supervisory authority, continues to promulgate the laws and regulations in accordance 
with the Basle core principles and other best practices for eff  ective banking supervision, to 
strengthen the banking system.  
Th  e objectives of this paper are to focus on the overall policy and framework for 
the identifi  cation, intervention, and resolution of problem banks. and to highlight for 
consideration some of the issues concerning the establishment of additional guidelines,   
policy, and institutions for solving banking problems and for bank restructuring. Th  e  paper 
is divided into fi  ve parts. Th   e First Part is the introduction. Th   e Second Part presents the 
legal framework in dealing with problem bank. Th  e Th  ird Part deals with problem bank 
identifi  cation, while problem bank intervention and resolution are covered in the Fourth 
Part. Th   e paper ends with conclusion and consideration for establishing necessary framework 
and institution to detect any bank problem.
2.  Legal Framework in Dealing with Problem Banks 
2.1 Legal  Framework
Th   e current legislative framework has largely been developed in the second half of 
the 1990s in response to a shift   from a centrally planned to an open-market economy. Th  e 
fi  nancial reforms have focused largely on the re-regulation of the banking system that had 
earlier suff  ered from excessive liberalisation. Th   e main elements of the new legal framework 
are:
PROBLEM BANK IDENTIFICATION, INTERVENTION 
AND RESOLUTION IN CAMBODIA
by Rath Sovannorak1
1  Deputy Director, Bank Supervision Department, National Bank of Cambodia, e-mail: sovannorak@online.com.kh. Th   e views expressed in this paper 
are the views of the writer and do not necessarily refl  ect the views or policies of the National Bank of Cambodia52
Th  e Law on the Organisation and Conduct of the National Bank of Cambodia, 
promulgated in January 1996, replaced the 1992 law. Under this new law, the NBC is 
accorded legal authority and autonomy to license, de-license, regulate and supervise banks 
and fi  nancial institutions and other relevant establishments, such as auditors and liquidators, 
and also to participate in the formation and supervision of the money and fi  nancial markets. 
Th   e NBC is empowered to: 
a)  issue such decisions, regulations, and other directives; 
b)  appoint its offi   cers or any other qualifi  ed person to regularly inspect any bank or 
fi  nancial institution;
c) require  an  offi   cer or employee of a bank or fi  nancial institution to furnish to the 
Central Bank any information as may be required for the purpose of supervision and 
regulation; and,
d)  in accordance with the existing laws  take action or sanction against any offi   cial or 
employee of a bank or fi  nancial institution who is found guilty of contravening a 
provision of the existing laws or regulations of the NBC.
Th   e Law on Banking and Financial Institutions was enacted in November 1999 and 
a number of subsequent regulations (prakas) issued by the NBC. Until now the focus of 
the fi  nancial reform was on the building up of public confi  dence in the banking sector, 
chiefl  y through strengthening the regulatory system and prudential supervision. Th  e  Law 
on Banking and Financial Institutions represents a step forward towards promoting more 
orderly fi  nancial markets by providing the legal framework for the licensing, organisation, 
operation, and supervision of a broad range of fi  nancial service companies. Under the 
provision of Article 40) of this law, the Central Bank supervises the banking system and 
its related activities, such as the money market, the inter-bank settlement system, and the 
fi  nancial intermediation. Th   e Central Bank has the authority to: 
a.  issue licences and defi  ne the licensing process; 
b.  issue regulations for the implementation of this law;
c.   supervise the banking system through permanent off  -site monitoring and periodic 
on-site examinations of each institution; and should the need arises, extend on-
site examinations to its subsidiary or to any other related entities, including 
shareholders;
d.  and, in accordance with the  provisions of Articles 52 to 54 of this law, take disciplinary 
action. 
  As mentioned in Article 41 specifi  es the duties of the supervisory which include: 
a.  licensing a banking institution to carry out fi  nancial and banking operations in 
Cambodia, 
b. defi  ning and enforcing prudential rules that a banking institution must abide by, 
c.  supervising, permanently but aft  er the fact, through both off  -site and on-site 
examinations, the fi  nancial position and functioning of a banking institution, 
d.  imposing disciplinary sanctions against a banking institution for failing to comply 
with law and regulations, 
e.  referring to the courts if failure to observe laws and regulations undermines the 
public interest.53
Managers and shareholders of the banking institutions are accountable for 
mismanagement, and for defi  ciencies in internal control, in accordance with the provisions 
of Articles 14, 19, 27 and 30 of this law. 
If a banking institution contravenes a provision of the laws or regulations governing its 
activities, and fails to heed a warning or fails to comply with an injunction, the supervisory 
authority may impose the disciplinary sanctions (Art 52). 
Some other regulations issued by the NBC deal with problem bank, namely, Prakas 
on Standardised Procedure for Prompt Corrective Action for Banking and Financial 
Institutions, solvency ratio, liquidity ratio, large exposure, etc. 
In addition to the above-mentioned laws and regulations, the NBC set up Prakas on 
the appointment of the Consultative Committee for Banking Supervision. Th  e  Committee’s 
duties are as follow:
plan for banking supervision strategy
approve the annual report on Banking Supervision
recommend one of the following sanctions against the institutions that are in  




prohibition from performing certain operations, and any other limitations on the  
  carrying on of business;
temporary suspension or compulsory resignation of one or more of executives,    
  with or without appointment of a provisional administrator;
appointing a provisional administrator;
withdrawal of the licence and liquidation;
Recommend granting licence.
Recommend new regulations relating to the banking business. 
2.2  Roles and Responsibilities of NBC and of Administrator or 
Liquidator
2.2.1  Role and Responsibility of NBC
 
As the supervisory authority, the NBC performs its function to ensure the safety and 
soundness of the banking system by conducting off  -site surveillance and on-site examination  
to identify bank problem as early as possible in order to detect, put some prompt corrective 
actions, and fi  nd resolution. Th   e NBC is empowered to appoint a provisional administrator 
or a liquidator as an urgent administrative and protective measure. Th  e  banking  institution 
concerned must be given notice of the measure, which is enforceable immediately (Article 
53). Th   e supervisory authority decides as a last resort jurisdiction in the case of the other 
disciplinary sanctions, which are of a moral or a fi  nancial nature. Th  ese decisions are 
enforceable immediately, but may be appealed to the highest administrative jurisdiction on 
the grounds of legal fl  aw or irregularity (Article 54). If a serious and confi  rmed threat is 













funds, as provided for in Articles 14, 19, 27 and 30, remain without eff  ect, the supervisory 
authority may, on its own initiative or at request from the executives or shareholders, 
appoint, at the banking institution’s expense, a provisional administrator for an initial 
period not exceeding 3 months. If circumstances so warrant, the provisional administrator’s 
appointment can be extended for another period of 3 months (Article 57).
2.2.2  Administrator or Liquidator
 
A “provisional administrator” is a person appointed by the National Bank of Cambodia 
under Article. 57 of the Law on Banking and Financial Institutions (LBFI) to manage, direct 
and represent the fi  nancial institution. His duty (Article 59 of LBFI) is to make an assessment 
whether or not the banking institution is solvent, and to administer the current activities in 
order to preserve as far as possible the banking institution’s solvency and maintain the rights 
of depositors and creditors. As in Article 67, if a provisional administrator or a liquidator is 
in some ways hindered from performing his duty by the concerned entity, he may refer the 
matter to the court.
3.  Problem Bank Identifi  cation 
3.1  Supervisory Strategies and Methods and Early Warning System
One of the tasks of the NBC as the supervisory authority is to create a regulatory 
framework that provides a level playing fi  eld for ensuring fair competition between fi  nancial 
institutions and refl  ecting the level of risk undertaken by a specifi  c organization (depending 
on size, funding sources, governance structure, operations, growth, etc.). As based on both 
the off  -and on-site manuals, the NBC’s supervisory strategies and methods in identifying 
problem bank lie in the conduct of off  -site and on-site supervision. 
For off  -site supervision, the NBC recently introduced a guideline for the off  -site 
surveillance system (OSS). Th   e objectives of this guideline are to spot potential diffi   culties 
of banks, identify risks that threaten the banking system, keep the management informed 
on banks’ fi  nancial condition, check compliance with laws and regulations, prepare on-site 
inspections, follow up on the inspectors’ fi  ndings, and prepare the enforcement measures, 
i.e. the prompt corrective action, and sanctions. Th   e OSS consists of three tools, namely, an 
analytical tool, the Bank Performance Report (BPR), a database on prudential ratios and 
other regulatory aspects (Regulations), and a reporting tool, the Cambodian Off  -site Bank 
Report for prompt corrective Action (COBRA). All banks’ report are analysed and reported 
at least on a quarterly basis. Banks identifi  ed as weak and under alert are subject to monthly 
reporting under COBRA format. Th  e assessment criteria on banks’ condition are based 
on the CAMEL rating system Th   is uniform rating system is designed to provide an early 
warning on the banks’ condition. It assigns a bank a composite rating from 1 (low risk) to 5 
(high risk):
Rating 1: Standard risk; prescribed action: standard supervision
Rating 2: Special mention; prescribed action: early warning, close supervision
Rating 3: High risk: prescribed action: offi   cial warning
Rating 4: Situation deteriorated, breach of the regulation; prescribed action: injunction, 
sanction55
Rating 5: Critical situation; prescribed action:bank under administration, restructuring
Th   e on-site inspections allow the NBC to go on location to investigate beyond the 
fi  gures and written reports. Inspectors assess how the institution is actually managed and 
how its day-to-day practices comply with the stated policies and regulatory requirements. 
On-site inspections complements off   -site supervision. Th   e banking and fi  nancial 
institutions are normally inspected every twelve to eighteen months. Th   e assessment of the 
on-site inspector is based on six key areas of banking risk, specifi  cialy, capital adequacy, 
assets quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk (based on 
the CAMELS rating system). Each of the key areas is assigned an individual rating from 1 






Supervision will only work when the banking and fi  nancial institutions are certain 
that non-compliance with the regulations and supervisory requirements of the Central Bank 
will result in Corrective Measures  being imposed by the Central Bank. To be eff  ective, the 
corrective measures taken by the supervisor need to be adequate, appropriate, and timely. 
Th  is means that the supervisory system should be able to detect early warning signs of 
bank distress, so that the Central Bank can take quick and appropriate counter-measures to 
maintain stability of the system. 
3.2  Problem Bank Identifi  cation
 
Based on the off  -site and on-site examination reports, the examiners can identify the 
weaknesses and problems of banks and take appropriate measures to deal with the situation   
Th   e following are the major causal factors of  weak banks:
  
a.  Bank experiencing rapid growth: 
-  Capital levels are declining rapidly.
-  Funding sources are unstable or short-term.
-  Growth varies signifi  cantly from the bank’s budget
-  New products and activities are being pursued with little or no expertise or with   
    inadequate risk- management controls.
b. Management  Defi  ciencies
- Non-responsive  management
-  Increasing non-compliance with laws, regulations and internal policies and    
   procedures
- Insuffi   cient planning and response to risks.56
c.  Poor Asset Quality 
-  loan growth increase
-  increase in NPLs 
-  changes in loans loss reserve
- loan  concentration
d. Off  -balance sheet exposures
-  inadequate oversight mechanism
-  high levels of activity relative to size and risk profi  le
- accounting  errors
e.  Poor risk management
-  policies (loan policy was not well defi  ned)
- personnel  (staff   policy, ineffi   cient staff  )
-  controls (audit, MIS)
f.  Fraud and insider abuse
-  excessive salaries and bonuses
-  higher rates paid on insider deposits
-  extension of credit granted on favorable terms
-  irregularity of transaction between insiders and bank’s clients
3.3   Communications
One of the examiners’ duties is to communicate with bank management. Eff  ective, 
accurate, and frequent communication with the bank board and management is very 
important in problem bank identifi  cation and resolution. Th   e examiners must communicate 
with the board and management in a fi  rm, timely and non-threatening way in order to avoid 
compromising future cooperation and communication.
3.3.1 Th  e  Off  -site and On-site Examination Reports
On completion of the off  -site and on-site examinations, the supervisors prepare the 
examination reports on the fi  ndings, conclusions and recommendations, and communicate 
formally to the concerned banks. Th  e reports must highlight the defi  ciencies and non-
compliances, and proritise the areas of weaknesses, and bank prior commitments. Th  e  root 
causes of problems must be addressed for prompt corrective action and resolution. 
3.3.2   Potential or Signifi  cant Problems  
On identifi  cation of potential problems and issues, the examiners must keep the 
management and board regularly informed of the preliminary fi  ndings. Th   is is to update 
the management on the condition of the bank to facilitate the resolution process, and thus 
prevent “surprises” when the preliminary ratings are disclosed during the wrap-up meeting. 
When the examiners make an observation about an issue which is not a problem, but could 
be a potential problem, the examiners may choose to apply moral suasion for management 
to make the improvement. 57
3.3.3   Wrap-up Meetings
Aft  er  fi   nishing their examination, the supervisors conduct a wrap-up 
meeting with senior bank management and board to summarise the fi  ndings, 
conclusions, recommendation, corrective actions, and follow-up activity. Sometimes, the 
supervisory senior management may attend the meeting to convince, recommend, and 
add emphasis on problem bank and resolution. During the meeting the supervisors shall 
prioritise the problems in order help the bank management to understand the risks and gain 
the management commitment to implement the corrective actions within the specifi  ed time 
period.   
4.   Problem Bank Resolution and Intervention 
4.1   History of Bank Closure
4.1.1 Bank  Restructuring
In the year 2000, with the implementation of the Law on Banking and Financial 
Institutions, many essential regulations were issued with the intention of restructuring the 
banking system through the re-licensing mechanism. Th   e National Bank of Cambodia issued 
action plans with deadlines for the submission by the banking and fi  nancial institutions for 
evaluation of their licensing applications.
Th  e  fi  rst step in the re-licensing process was to diagnose banks based on the capital 
adequacy rules and other prudential ratios and measure the extent of the problems faced by 
individual banks. Th   e measurements were based on the following three elements:
1. Th  e rating based on CAMELS methodology and the information submitted in the 
bank’s business plans;
2.  Whether the new capital requirement of 50 billion riels ($13 million) has been met; 
and
3.  Whether corrective measures (prudential) are needed.
As a result, banks were classifi  ed into three categories:
4 viable and fully capitalised banks,
15 potentially viable banks that needed to increase capital and take other corrective 
measures,
16 non-viable banks, of which 11 voluntarily liquidated. Of the banks which liquidated 
voluntarily, fi  ve were insolvent.
Th   ere is no deposit guarantee scheme for depositors.
Th  e viable and fully capitalised banks were re-licensed for three years, and the 
potentially viable banks were required to sign Memorandum of Understandings (MOUs) 
with the NBC to commit additional capital and correct any errors found during critical 
diagnosis. Th   e MOUs contained schedules for the banks to complete. Th   e NBC required 





arranged a purchase transaction in which a sound second bank would pay a small amount 
to assume some combination of assets and deposits from the non-viable banks. Th  is  would 
avoid losses for depositors and create a more favorable climate for liquidation. However, such 
purchased transaction was not carried out. Th   e re-licensing process resulted in a signifi  cant 
reduction in the number of banks in the system and ensuring that those that remain are 
strong enough to make a meaningful contribution to the development of the economy. Aft  er 
the restructuring process, the licensed banks were required to implement the uniform Chart 
of Accounts (COA).
4.1.2   Reimbursement of Depositors’ Money 
Th  e Law on Banking and Financial Institutions clearly defi  ned the priority for the 
reimbursement of depositors’ money when bank liquidations occurred. Reimbursement to 
depositors is ranked fourth in the priority of claims aft  er tax expenses, employees’ salaries 
and other preferential shares.
1. A  fi  xed method where each depositor shall receive an equal amount up to two million 
riels (US$500 equivalent), and
2.  Remaining assets shall be disbursed proportionally according to international practice. 
All claims were settled in accordance to the priority provided under Article 64 of the 
Law on Banking and Financial Institutions,. Of the fi  ve insolvent banks, only one had 
suffi   cient funds to reimburse its depositors.
4.2  Prompt Corrective Actions (PCA)
Th   e supervisory process is to fi  nd and identify problems as early as possible in order 
to take remedial action that can protect serious bank deterioration. If problems are detected, 
the examiners determine the extent of the defi  ciencies as well as the timing and form of 
the corrective action required. Prompt corrective actions range from informal advice 
and moral suasion to formal enforcement actions, such as ceasure, fi  ne, and provisional 
administration. Th   e corrective measures prescribed would be appropriate to the problem 
and would be designed to correct and improve the condition of the bank. If a serious and 
confi  rmed threat is weighing on the solvency of a banking institution and if appeals for 
reconstitution of own funds, as provided for under Articles 14, 19, 27 and 30 remain without 
eff  ect, the supervisory authority may, on its own initiative or at request from the executives 
or shareholders, appoint, at the banking institution’s expense, a provisional administrator for 
an initial period not exceeding three months. If the circumstance so warrant, the provisional 
administrator’s appointment can be extended for another period of three months. 
Th  e NBC has issued and implemented a formal procedure for prompt corrective 
action (PCA) of banks and fi  nancial institutions licensed by the NBC. Prompt corrective 
action is a prescribed set of disciplinary sanctions and limitations applicable to the fi  nancial 
institutions in accordance with the Law on Banking and Financial Institutions. Capital 
Restoration Plan is a formal plan signed by a fi  nancial institution’s Board of Directors and 
submitted to the National Bank of Cambodia. Such a plan details the actions, strategies and 
commitments the Board will undertake to attain capital adequacy as defi  ned by the solvency 
ratio. Such a plan includes numerical fi  nancial goals and stipulates timetables and deadlines 
for attaining said the benchmarks. Th   e following are the main components of this Prakas:59
a.  Prompt Corrective Action: a set of disciplinary sanctions and limitations applicable to 
fi  nancial institutions 
b.  Capital Restoration Plan: a formal plan signed by the board and submitted to the 
NBC
c.  Provisional Administrator: a person appointed by the NBC to manage, direct and 
represent the fi  nancial institution.
d.  Capital Call Meeting: a formal meeting called by the NBC, where fi  nancial institution’s 
directors are notifi  ed of a capital defi  ciency and are given a specifi  ed time period to 
provide a specifi  c capital injunction amount. 
-  Under the PCA procedures, the fi  nancial institutions  will be categorised based on  
    their solvency ratio.  
  •  well-capitalised, solvency ratio ≥ 20%
  •  adequately capitalszed, solvency ratio ≥ 15% but <20%
  •  undercapitalszed, solvency ratio ≥ 10% but <15%
 •  signifi  cantly undercapitalised, solvency ratio ≥ 5% but <10%
  •  critically undercapitalised, solvency ratio < 5%
- When FI becomes undercapitalised, it must prepare and submit a Capital 
Restoration Plan (CRP) to the NBC within 30 days. Th   e NBC will notify the FI 
in writing of the CRP’s acceptability within 30 days of receipt or any delay and 
reason.
-  An acceptable of CRP must indicate the possibility of capital restoration and must  
 include:   
  •  current balance sheets and budgets, strategic plan, market analysis and other    
     relevant  information
  •  means to raise capital must address
e.  Steps to become adequately capitalised
f.  Levels of capital to be attained during each quarter of the year
g.  Types and levels of activities in which the FI will engage
h.  Any other information that the NBC may require
- Infl  uential shareholders must submit a written guarantee that the FI will comply 
with the CRP that the owner will take action required by CRP, ensure the selection 
of new management, discontinue any risky activities
-  Undercapitalised FI that fails to submit or implement an acceptable CRP, the FI 
shall face the following sanctions:  
• ask prior approval from the NBC before paying any bonus or increase 
compensation to senior executive offi   cer
•  injunction to recapitalise through sanctions and fi  nes
•  restriction transaction with affi   liates
•  other disciplinary measures may also be decided by the NBC
•  restriction on asset growth, restriction on activities
•  resignation of one or more executives
•  injunction to hire qualifi  ed senior executives
•  injunction to stop taking deposits from correspondent FIs
•  injunction for divesting subsidiaries
•  appointment of a provisional administrator
-  Critical undercapitalised FI;  a capital call meeting shall be called and the FI shall 
be ordered not to:
• sell  signifi  cant assets60
•  extend new credits to customers
•  change accounting methods, unless existing ones break the law
•  pay compensation and bonus
•  pay interest on liabilities above prevailing market rates




Apart from the closure of 16 banks resulting from the requirement of an increase in the  
minimum paid-up capital of banks to about USD13 million, Cambodia has not experienced 
any bank insolvency.  Th  ough some banks incurred losses and erosion of capital which 
resulted from poor asset quality, poor management and governance, they were prompt in 
taking corrective action, with improvement in  their fi  nancial performance. Th   us, a system 
for problem bank resolution and insolvency prevention is essential in Cambodia to pre-
empt the occurrence of bank crisis leading to bank failure.) 
Th   ere is no unique solution for problem banks. Th   ere is a broad variety of measures 
that may be taken to deal with problem banks, depending on the severity of their 
defi  ciencies, including market-based solutions (shareholders’ capitalisation and agreement 
with creditors, acquisitions and mergers) and government-based solutions, (lender of last 
resort, intervention, provisional administration, capitalisation with public funds, and bank 
closure). Cambodia should explore and be guided by international experience regarding 
the legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks for dealing with insolvent banks in 
developing an appropriate system to address problem bank resolution and insolvency. An 
eff  ective strategy for the resolution of problem banks rests on two pillars. One is having a 
strong institutional framework in place that will reduce the risk exposures of banks leading 
to bank failures as well as the costs of bank failures. Th   e components of a strong institutional 
framework consist of sound macroeconomic policies, sound banking supervision and 
regulation, good corporate governance and a well-functioning court system. Th   e other pillar 
is having a supervisory authority that has full legal authority and autonomy to enforce sound 
and comprehensive laws, regulations, and policies. It is diffi   cult to predict which banks are 
likely to fail especially in a systemic crisis. Th   us, there is a need to provide suffi   cient fi  nancial 
resources to cover their operations, and specialists in bank restructuring and resolution to 
identify root causes and take timely action. Th   e followings can be considered:
-   Diagnose problems and initiate some prompt corrective actions
based on off  -site and on-site supervision, supervisors can detect some signs of 
problem banks through fi  nancial ratios and other indicators.
supervisors can evaluate the extent of the problem and carry out resolution of 
problem bank speedily where a bank has been identifi  ed as problematic) how 
depth the problem is and fi  nd the resolution timely, if problem banks have been 
identifi  ed.
a system for surveillance of the banking sector must be in place in order to detect 




-  Law, regulations, and intervention
banking law and regulations should have clear rules governing the role in bank 
restructuring, without adversely aff   ecting market-based solution and forced 
liquidation.
banking regulation should encourage capitalisation of the problem banks by others 
or mergers.
Th   e supervisory authority’s staff   who are responsible for bank restructuring and 
resolution shall be protected by law and regulation. Lack of legal protection may 
impair banking resolution eff  orts.
In implementating bank restructuring and resolution measures for banks that are 
critically undercapitalised, illiquid or are in contravention of the applicable laws 
and regulations, the NBC has the responsibility to ensure the safety and soundness 
of the banking system, the restoration of credibility, and the building up of the 
public confi  dence. Resolution strategy should enhance public confi  dence, avoid 
disruption to payment system, minimise losses to depositors and government, ans 
well as minimise adverse macroeconomic eff  ects.
banking law and regulations shall explicitly mention the roles and the procedure 
for the operation of lender of last resort, avoiding moral hazard especially for 
a country with highly dollarised economies. If the Central Bank does not have 
suffi   cient international reserves, liquidity support under dollarised economies may 
result in a reduction of net international reserves. Th   us, the intervention should 
target problem banks that result from mismanagement and under-capitalisation.
the legal system should support timely and eff  ective resolution of bank failures 
in order to prevent systemic crisis to the fi  nancial system. Th  e legal framework 
should include clear guidelines and policies for dealing with problem banks, 
prompt corrective action, depositor payoff  , etc. A well developed legal system will 
reduce the costs associated with problem bank resolution and create for eff  ective 
governance, if the bank management, including offi     cers, managers, directors, 
internal and external auditors of a failed bank,  are liable to prosecution under the 
law. 
with the increasing fi  nancial system integration, the coordination between home-
host supervisory authorities and deposit insurers plays a signifi  cant role in dealing 
with cross-border banks failures by sharing information and action plan for 
resolution.
all concerned government agencies and the Central Bank must work closely with 










Unoffi   cial Translation
B7.02- 203 Prokor
                                             
PRAKAS
on
Standardized Procedure for  
Prompt Corrective Action for Banking and Financial Institutions 
Th   e Governor of the National Bank of Cambodia
-  With reference to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia
-  With reference to the Royal Kram NS/RKM/0196/27, dated January 26, 1996 
promulgating the Law on the Organization and Functioning of the National Bank of 
Cambodia
-  With reference to the Royal Kram NS/RKM/1199/13 of November 18, 1999 
promulgating the Law on Banking and Financial Institutions
-  With reference to the Royal Decree NS/RKT/0202/039 of February 16, 2002 on the 
reappointment of His Excellency Chea Chanto as Governor General of the National 
Bank of Cambodia
-  Pursuant to the agreement of the senior offi   cer meeting of the National Bank of 
Cambodia on September 09, 2002.
DECIDES
Article 1 
To issue formal procedure for prompt corrective action (PCA) of the banking and 
fi  nancial institutions licensed by the National Bank of Cambodia, hereaft  er referred to as 
fi  nancial institutions by pre-establishing practice formalities of fi  nancial institutions and to 
implement oversights with uniformity and fairness.
Article 2
1.  “Prompt corrective action” is a prescribed set of disciplinary sanctions and limitations 
applicable to fi  nancial institutions in accordance to the Law on Banking and Financial 
Institutions. 
2.  “Solvency ratio” refers to the calculation of capital adequacy stipulated in Prakas 
B7.00-46 relating to the Banks’ Solvency ratio.
3.  “Capital Restoration Plan” is a formal plan signed by a fi  nancial institution’s Board 
of Directors and submitted to the National Bank of Cambodia. Such a plan details 
the actions, strategies and commitments the Board will undertake to attain capital 
adequacy as defi  ned by the solvency ratio. Such a plan includes numerical fi  nancial 
goals and stipulates timetables and deadlines for attaining said benchmarks.63
4.  “Provisional Administrator” is a person appointed by the National Bank of Cambodia 
following art. 57 of the law on banking and fi  nancial institutions (LBFI) to manage 
direct and represent the fi  nancial institution. His duty (art. 59 of LBFI) is to assess 
the fi  nancial situation and administer the current activities in order to preserve as 
far as possible the covered entity’s solvency and maintain the rights of depositors and 
creditors.
 
5.  “Capital Call Meeting” is a formal meeting called by NBC, where fi  nancial institution 
directors are notifi  ed of a material capital defi  ciency at their fi  nancial institution and 
given a specifi  ed time period to provide a specifi  c capital Injection amount. 
Article 3 
Under the prompt corrective action procedures, the fi  nancial institutions will be 
categorized based on their solvency ratio, as previously defi  ned in Prakas on Solvency ratio 
of Banks. A fi  nancial institution is classifi  ed as:
a.  Well-Capitalized when its solvency ratio equals or exceeds 25 per cent. 
b.  Adequately Capitalized when its solvency ratio equals or exceeds 20 per cent, but is 
less than 25 per cent   
c.  Undercapitalized when its solvency ratio equals or exceeds 15 per cent, but is less than 
20 per cent   
d. Signifi  cantly Undercapitalized when its solvency ratio equals or exceeds 5 per cent., 
but is less than 15 per cent. 
 
e.  Critically Undercapitalized when its solvency ratio is less than 5 per cent.  
Article 4
When a fi  nancial institution becomes undercapitalized, it must prepare and submit a 
Capital Restoration Plan (CRP) to the NBC within 30 days aft  er it became undercapitalized. 
Th   e NBC will notify the fi  nancial institution in writing of the CRP’s acceptability within 30 
days of receipt or any delay and the reason for the delay.
Article 5.
An acceptable CRP must indicate the possibility of capital restoration and must 
include the following:
a.  Current balance sheets and budgets, long-term budgets, a strategic plan, market 
analysis based on realistic assumptions, and any other relevant information.
b.     Means to raise capital that must address:
- Th   e steps the fi  nancial institution will take to become adequately capitalized.
-   Th   e levels of capital to be attained during each quarter of each year of the plan.64
- Th   e types and levels of activities in which the fi  nancial institution will engage.
-  Any other information the NBC may require.
Article 6
In addition to the preparation and submission of the CRP to the NBC, the infl  uential 
shareholders must submit a written guarantee that the fi  nancial institution will comply 
with the CRP. Th  e guarantee must include the fi  nancial commitment of the infl  uential 
shareholders in the implementation of the CRP. In addition, the guarantee must include the 
assurances that the owner will:
a.  Take actions required by the CRP.
b.  Ensure the selection of new competent management.
c.  Restrict transactions between the fi  nancial institution and the owner.
d.  Discontinue any risky or inappropriate activities.
Depending on the company involved, the guarantee may also include a promissory 
note, a pledge of assets, appropriate assurances from company counsel, a company board 
of directors’ resolution, and other supervisory actions deemed necessary to ensure 
performance. 
Article 7
Undercapitalized fi  nancial institutions that fail to submit or implement an acceptable 
CRP and signifi   cantly undercapitalised fi   nancial institutions shall face the following 
sanctions:
a.  NBC approval before paying any bonus or increasing compensation to a senior 
executive offi   cer.
b.  Injunction to recapitalise
c.  Restrictions on transactions with affi   liates.
d.  Restrictions on interest rates on deposits.
 
Other discretionary measures may also be decided, at NBC’s sole decision:
a.  Restrictions on asset growth or reduction of assets.
b.  Restriction on activities.
c.  Resignation of one or more executives
d.  Injunction to hire new qualifi  ed senior executive offi   cers
e.  Injunction to stop taking deposits from correspondent fi  nancial institutions.
f.  Injunction of divesting subsidiaries that may cause a signifi  cant risk to the fi  nancial 
institution 
g.  Appointment of a provisional administrator65
Article 8
  As soon as a fi  nancial institution is known to have become critically undercapitalized, 
a capital call meeting shall be called. Th  e  fi  nancial institution shall be ordered not to:
a. Sell  signifi  cant assets or waiver customers guarantees 
b.  Extend new credits to customers
c.  Change accounting methods, unless existing ones break the law
d.  Pay compensation or bonuses.
e.  Pay interest on liabilities above prevailing market rates.




Th  e General Direction, the General Secretariat, the General Cashier, the General 
Inspection, all Departments of the National Bank of Cambodia, and all Banking and 
Financial Institutions under the NBC’s supervisory authority shall implement this Prakas.
Article 10
Th   is Prakas shall have eff  ect from the signing date.
        Phnom  Penh,  October  17,    2002
                  Th  e  Governor
        Signed  and  Sealed:  Chea  Chanto
cc:   - Th   e Members of the Board of Directors
 -  Th   e parties concerned as stated in Article 9
 -  File
  - CM “for info”
  - Administration of CM
     “for publication in the National Gazette”
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Prompt Corrective Action for Banking and Financial Institutions 
Th   e Governor of the National Bank of Cambodia
-  With reference to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia;
-  With reference to the Royal Kram NS/RKM/0196/27, dated January 26, 1996 
promulgating the Law on the Organization and conduct of the National Bank of 
Cambodia;
-  With reference to the Royal Kram NS/RKM/1199/13 of November 18, 1999 
promulgating the Law on Banking and Financial Institutions;
-  With reference to the Royal Decree NS/0904/244 of 7 September 2004 on the 
appointment of His Excellency Chea Chanto as Governor of the National Bank of 
Cambodia;
-  Pursuant to the request of the banking supervision department;
DECIDES
Article 1. 
Article 3 of Prakas No. B7-02-203 dated 17 October, 2002 relating to the standardized 
procedures for prompt corrective action for banking and fi  nancial institutions is amended 
as following:
Under the prompt corrective action procedures, the banks and fi  nancial institutions 
will be categorized based on their solvency ratio, as previously defi  ned in the amendment of 
Prakas on Solvency Ratio of Banks. A bank and fi  nancial institution is classifi  ed as:
a.  Well-Capitalized when its solvency ratio equals or exceeds 20 percent. 
b.  Adequately Capitalized when its solvency ratio equals or exceeds 15 per cent, but is 
less than 20 percent   
c.  Undercapitalized when its solvency ratio equals or exceeds 10 percent, but is less than 
15 percent   
d. Signifi  cantly Undercapitalized when its solvency ratio equals or exceeds 5 percent, but 
is less than 10 percent.  
e.  Critically Undercapitalized when its solvency ratio is less than 5 percent.  67
Article 2. 
Th   e General Direction, the General Secretariat, the General Inspection, the General 
Cashier, all Departments of the National Bank of Cambodia, and all Banking and Financial 
Institutions under the National Bank of Cambodia’s supervisory authority shall strictly 
implement this Prakas.
Article 3.
Th   is Prakas shall have eff  ect from the signing date.
Phnom Penh,  29 November, 2005
                         Th  e  Governor
      Signed and sealed: Chea Chanto
cc: -  Th   e Members of the Board of Directors
 -  Th   e parties concerned as stated in Article 2
 -  File
  - CM “for info”
  - Administration of CM
     “for publication in the National Gazette”69
CHAPTER 3
1. Introduction
Th   e Indonesian banking system has experienced structural developments3. 
Following the implementation of extensive bank reforms in October 1988, the banking 
industry grew rapidly in terms of the number of banks as well as total assets4. However, a 
lack of eff  ective supervision resulted in imprudent behaviour by the banking industry. In 
February 1991, prudential banking principles were introduced, and banks were urged to 
merge or consolidate. Furthermore, in the mid-1990s self-regulatory measures, including 
the improvement of internal controls as well as information technology and systems were 
introduced to strengthen the banks’ soundness. Unfortunately, the wide-scale banking 
consolidation and the improvement of bank control systems never took place prior to the 
recent crisis. Th   is was due to a lack of commitment by the owners of banks to strengthen 
their organisations and weak law enforcement from Bank Indonesia (BI) as the supervisory 
authority. Under the old law of 1968, Bank Indonesia lacked independence and, to a large 
extent, was unable to apply tough measures on well-politically connected banks5. 
During the pre-crisis period, besides having poor governance and control, the banking 
industry also suff  ered from fundamental liquidity management weaknesses as indicated 
by:  (i) large volatile deposits in the composition of banks’ funds (ii) a high loan to deposit 
ratio and exposure to foreign exchange risk6. As the currency crisis spread in mid-1997, this 
generated other risks. Firstly, there was an increase of liquidity risk due to a huge maturity 
mismatch of assets and liabilities7. Secondly, credit risk increased due to the inability of 
debtors to repay their foreign currency loans as the rupiah depreciated sharply.
Indonesia’s banking crisis of 1997/98 was the most severe in East Asia and one of the 
most costly crises of the last quarter of the twentieth century. Th  e  fi  scal costs of resolving the 
Indonesian banking crisis amounted to Rp654 trillion or 51 percent of its annual GDP8. It 
was the second highest in the world during the last quarter of the century aft  er Argentina’s 
55.1 percent of GDP during its 1980–1982 crisis. Th   e experience of the 1997/98 crisis in 
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Indonesia showed that excessive risk-taking combined with poor risk management and 
bad governance contributed mostly to the banking crisis. Batunanggar (2002 and 2004) 
argued that Indonesia’s crisis resolution suff  ered from two main problems: (i) a lack of 
understanding on the part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and of the authorities 
handling the crisis which resulted in inappropriate strategies both at the macro- and micro-
level; and (ii) a lack of government commitment to take consistent and objective measures. 
Th   e intense political intervention also worsened the situation. In addition, the absence of a 
clear mechanism of the crisis resolution has created costly Bank Indonesia Liquidity Support 
(BLBI) during the 1997 crisis, which in turn created a painful and very controversial case.
In line with the banking restructuring programme agreed with the IMF on July 1999, 
Bank Indonesia attempted to enhance the eff  ectiveness of banking supervision to meet 
international standards, particularly the Basel Committee’s Core Principles for Eff  ective 
Banking Supervision. Essentially, the plan covers improvement of bank entry and exit 
policies, adoption of risk-based supervision and consolidated supervision, incorporation 
of market risk in the capital adequacy, and improving market discipline by enhancing 
banks’ transparency. Bank Indonesia continues to improve the eff  ectiveness of its banking 
supervision as part of the Indonesian Banking Architecture (API) which is aimed at a strong 
and resilient banking system capable of supporting economic growth9.
During the past six years, there was voluminous research on the cause and experience 
of Asian crises, including that of Indonesia’s. However, the previous studies on the Asian 
and, especially, the Indonesian banking crisis were primarily aimed at the origin of crises. 
Th  ey outlined causes as well as lessons learned, but there was less attention given to the 
issues of problem bank management. Th   is study aims to describe and analyse a framework 
and process for dealing with problem banks in Indonesia. 
Th   is paper is organised in six main parts. Following this introduction, the Indonesian 
legal framework in dealing with problem banks is presented in Part 2. Part 3 outlines the 
development of the banking regulation and supervision of the Indonesian banking system 
during the pre- and post-crisis period of 1997/98. Th   en, the supervisory tools are presented 
in the following order: problem bank identifi  cation (Part 4), problem bank intervention 
(Part 5), and problem bank resolution, including a range of remedial measures to resolve 
the defi  ciencies of a problem bank and to resolve a failed bank (Part 6). Part 7 provides an 
outline of the crisis-management framework and policies adopted. Finally, Part 8 concludes 
with the lessons learned and proposes the policy recommendations for more eff  ective 
problem-bank management in Indonesia.
2.  Legal Framework in Dealing with Problem Bank
A comprehensive legal framework - which provides for and clearly defi  nes  the 
objectives, roles, responsibilities, powers, independence, and legal protection of supervisors 
- is essential for eff  ective banking supervision. Th   e provision of autonomy, accountability 
and legal protection of bank supervisors requires three components to be in place. First, 
operational independence to pursue the objectives set by legislation. Second, adequate 
9  Th   e API is BI’s comprehensive programme for the period of 2004-2010 for the development of a strong and resilient banking system capable of 
supporting economic growth. Among the key elements of API is the creation of eff  ective banking supervision in line with international standards.71
resources to meet the objectives of banking law and provide the framework for setting the 
minimum standards that the banks must meet as well as to allow supervisors suffi   cient 
fl  exibility to set the prudential rules and to accord them legal protection from personal and 
institutional liability for supervisory actions taken in good faith in the course of performing 
their supervisory duties. Th   ird, is the provision of a mechanism for inter-agency cooperation 
and sharing of the relevant information among the various offi   cial agencies. 
2.1   Legal and Institutional Framework
Financial safety-net players in Indonesia involve three authorities, namely, Bank 
Indonesia as the bank supervisor and lender of last resort, the Indonesian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (IDIC) responsible for insuring bank deposits as well as resolving failed banks, 
and the government who provide funds for emergency liquidity assistance and systemic 
bank resolution.
2.1.1 Bank  Indonesia
Bank Indonesia obtains its legal and operational independence with the ratifi  cation 
of its new act in 199910. Bank Indonesia is accountable to the parliament in carrying out its 
duties and authorities. To ensure transparency and accountability, Bank Indonesia should 
disclose information of its performance and plans to the public through the mass media at 
the beginning of every fi  scal year11. 
One of Bank Indonesia’s core functions is to ensure a safe and sound banking system 
through the regulation and supervision of individual banks. Bank Indonesia also plays an 
important role in maintaining fi  nancial system stability through its role as lender of last 
resort and surveillance of systemic risks that may aff  ect the entire fi  nancial sector. 
As the bank supervisor, Bank Indonesia prescribes regulations, grants and revokes 
bank license, supervises banks and imposes sanctions on a bank in accordance with the 
prevailing regulations. Bank Indonesia has a range of mandatory and discretionary tools to 
address problem banks. Th   ese tools can impact on bank’s shareholders, management and 
bank operation.
Th   ere is a plan to transfer bank supervision from Bank Indonesia to a new agency, the 
Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) to be established by the end of 2010. As promulgated 
in Article 34 of the Bank Indonesia’s Act, the FSA will act as a “mega regulator” and supervise 
all the fi  nancial institutions (excluding rural banks) and fi  nancial markets12. Th  ree  critical 
issues on the creation of Indonesia’s FSA are: (i) it status may not be fully independent since 
it is under the President; (ii) budget constraints since it will be solely funded by supervision 
10  Bank Indonesia’s Act No. 23 Year 1999, which replace Act No.13 Year 1968, where Bank Indonesia’s Governor is a member of Monetary Board, chaired 
by Finance Minister.
11  Th   e information contains its performance on monetary policies of the previous year, a proposal of monetary policy strategies for the following year as 
well as the developments in the economic and fi  nancial sectors, including bank supervision reports. Bank Indonesia should also submit a report on 
the implementation of its tasks to the House of Representatives quarterly.
12  Initially, as promulgated in BI’s Act No.23 of 1999, the transfer should be carried out by December 2002. However, due to inadequate preparation and 
diff  erences in viewpoints between Bank Indonesia and the government as well among the politicians in the parliament, the transfer date has been 
shift  ed to December 2010, as provided under the amended BI’s Act No.3 of 2004.72
levies from the fi  nancial industry; and (iii) risks and implications to banks and banking 
system stability. Th   ese issues accordingly require careful consideration by the authorities13.    
2.1.2  Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (IDIC)
Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation was established in September 2005 under 
Act Number 24 of 200414. Th  e IDIC is an independent institution accountable to the 
President. To ensure its eff  ective governance and the coordination of the IDIC with Bank 
Indonesia and the Ministry of Finance, high-level offi   cials from Bank Indonesia and the 
Ministry of Finance are represented (as ex-offi   cio) in its Board of Commissioners.   
Th  e major functions of the IDIC are to insure customers’ deposits and to resolve 
failed banks. Th   e IDIC is responsible for the overall management and implementation of 
the deposit insurance program. Operationally, it covers three main tasks: (i) to determine 
deposit insurance policies; (ii) to determine and implement the resolution policy for failing 
banks that do not have a systemic eff  ect; and (iii) to handle a failing bank15 that has a systemic 
eff  ect.
To ensure eff  ective resolution of failing banks, the IDIC is empowered to: (i) take 
over control of the failing bank and exercise all the rights and powers of the shareholders; 
(ii) possess and manage the assets and liabilities of the bank; (iii) review, annul, terminate 
and/or alter any contracts between the bank and third parties; and (iv) sell and transfer the 
failing bank’s assets and liabilities without debtor or creditor consent.
Legal protection for the regulator and supervisor is provided under the Central Bank 
act. Bank Indonesia’s offi   cials are protected against prosecution, if they act in a good faith. 
Th  erefore, Bank Indonesia is insulated against unnecessary legal suits from third parties 
when its offi   cials exercise their duties and responsibilities appropriately.  
Th   e challenge is ensuring the consistency of practicing those laws and regulations.   
Th   is is crucial since the bank supervisor is required to make an objective assessment based 
not only on quantitative measures, but also on qualitative criteria or judgment.
2.1.3 Th  e  Government
Th  e government, which is represented by the Ministry of Finance, is responsible 
for providing the legal framework for the fi  nancial sector and public funds for systemic- 
emergency-liquidity assistance and banking crisis resolution.
13  Abram and Taylor (2000), and Goodhart (2001) provide excellent discussions on the issues in the unifi  cation of fi  nancial sector supervision. Goodhart 
argues that banking supervision in less developed countries is better to be retained within the central bank because it will be better funded, is more 
independent and will be performed with greater expertise and reliability. Currently, discussions are on-going among high-level offi   cials from Bank 
Indonesia and the Ministry of Finance to change the plan – for bank supervision is to be retained by BI and for an independent agency to supervise 
non-bank fi  nancial institutions and capital market to be established. In addition, the establishment of the Financial System Stability Forum (consisting 
of high-level offi   cials from the Ministry of Finance, BI and the IDIC) will facilitate eff  ective coordination and regulatory harmonisation among the 
institutions involved in dealing with systemic issues. However, a formal decision regarding this issue remains to be taken.
14  Bank Indonesia was actively involved in the establishment of the IDIC, including the preparation of the IDIC Act, organisation and regulations as well 
as the assignment of several of its personnel to the IDIC.
15  As stipulated in the IDIC Act, a failing bank is a bank that experiences fi  nancial diffi   culties and endangers the continuation of its business, and is 
declared by Bank Indonesia as beyond rescue.73
2.2  Coordination and Information Sharing          
Th   e maintenance of fi  nancial system stability is a public policy which involves BI, the 
IDIC and the Ministry of Finance. Th   erefore, sound coordination and cooperation among 
these authorities is a necessity. Th  e coordination and cooperation will usually consist of 
information-sharing, harmonisation of policy issues, and prompt strategic response to 
potential instability and systemic crises16. 
With the establishment of the IDIC, coordination between Bank Indonesia and the 
IDIC is vital to ensure eff  ective problem bank resolution. Bank Indonesia and the IDIC 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2006 which covers regular information-
sharing for normal and problem banks as well as cooperation in the closing of insolvent 
banks. 
Basically, there are three possibilities for Bank Indonesia regarding the resolution of 
problem banks:
(1)  In the case of failing banks without systemic eff  ect, Bank Indonesia will transfer the 
bank to the IDIC for resolution. Prior to the transfer, Bank Indonesia will inform and 
discuss with the IDIC the bank’s problem and condition. 
(2)  If Bank Indonesia identifi  es that the problem bank is beset with a liquidity problem 
which carries a contagion risk, it will convene a meeting with the Finance Minister to 
decide on the extension of emergency liquidity assistance. 
(3)  In case where the problem bank is insolvent with a systemic eff  ect, Bank Indonesia 
will convene a meting with the Coordinating Committee to determine the resolution 
measures for the failing bank. As provided under the IDIC Law, the Coordinating 
Committee consists of the Finance Minister, the Governor of Bank Indonesia and the 
Chief Commissioner of the IDIC. 
A joint task force from the Ministry of Finance, Bank Indonesia and the IDIC has 
draft  ed the Indonesian Financial Safety Net (FSN) Act. Th  e FSN purposes to establish a 
strong legal framework providing the policies and coordination mechanisms to facilitate 
the work of the authorities responsible for maintaining fi  nancial system stability, including 
crisis management.
Th   ere are, at least, two issues emerging from this new regulatory framework. First, 
the bank supervisor is challenged to be more transparent and eff  ective in performing 
its job. Once a bank becomes problematic, the supervisor should share the relevant data 
and information on the bank’s problems with the IDIC. Second, diff  erences in perception 
and perspective arising on certain issues between the two institutions could hinder the 
eff  ectiveness of coordination. Th  erefore, the two institutions should foster the culture of 
cooperation and mutual understanding through open dialogues. So far, the coordination 
and cooperation between Bank Indonesia and the IDIC has been eff  ective. A regular staff  -
exchange programme is one of the good ways to enhance the working relationship of the 
two institutions. 
16  Santoso, Wimboh and S. Batunanggar (2007).74
3.   Prudential Banking Regulation and Supervision   
3.1   Pre-Crisis (1991 to 1997)
Banking regulatory and supervisory framework, strategies and process adopted by 
Bank Indonesia have also undergone signifi  cant improvement corresponding with the 
development of the banking system (See Figure 1). 
In response to the swift   development of the banking industry following the post-
banking deregulation of October 1988, Bank Indonesia initiated prudential regulatory and 
supervisory reforms in 1991. An early warning system (EWS) was also developed as a tool to 
assist bank supervisors in assessing and monitoring the condition of the banking institutions. 
Self-regulatory measures comprising the improvement of internal controls and technology 
& information systems were also introduced to strengthen the soundness of the banks.
In general, the progress of the regulatory and supervisory improvement initiatives 
taken in the pre-crisis period was very slow. Th   e long-term plan and detailed action plans 
which had been clearly and comprehensively formulated in the BI’s Strategic Plan were not 
executed consistently17. Th   erefore, the weaknesses of banking supervision persisted due to 
the poor development of organisational capabilities (including of human resources) and 
weak law enforcement in the banking industry. Central to this issue was active political 
intervention and a lack of strong and visionary leadership18. 
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Source: Bank Indonesia (various reports) and Batunanggar (1996)
• Introduction of prudential regulations in line with international
 standards – capital adequacy requirement, asset quality 
  classification and provision for classified assets.
• Adoption of CAMEL rating. 
• Development of technical guidelines for on-site examination. 
• Development of database (“Sistem Data Dasar/SDD”) and early 
  warning system (“Sistem Pemantauan Dini Bank Indonesia/       
 SPDBI”) as a tool for bank supervisors in assessing and    
  monitoring the condition of banks. 
• Decentralisation of supervision of bank with headquarters in  
  branch office’s area.
• Improvement of internal controls and technology & information
  systems to strengthen banks’ soundness.
• Reorganisation of the banking supervision structure into a 
   “dedicated team” by merging the on-site and off-site supervision  
 units.
• Capacity building for the bank supervisor, including the
  development of specialist bank examiners, e.g. IT examiners. 
17  In its Strategic Plan of 1994 to 2004, BI declared its vision as a centre of excellence in its core functions (monetary policy, banking supervision and 
payment system) and a role model in its supporting function. Th   e Strategic Plan clearly outlined sound strategies called “strategic thrusts” for each 
area. See Batunanggar (1996) for a critical analysis of Bank Indonesia’s strategic management framework and process.
18  See Batunanggar (1996 and 2002) for a detailed analysis on these issues.75
3.2   Post-Crisis (1998 to Present)          
As part of the policy for the restructuring of the banking sector, Bank Indonesia 
introduced a number of programmes to enhance the eff  ectiveness of banking supervision 
(see Figure 2). Th   e improvement of banking supervision is intended to meet the following 
objectives: (i) provide fl  exible and responsive supervision; (ii) foster consistency, coordina-
tion, and communication among bank supervisors; (iii) provide comprehensive and objective 
assessment of the bank’s risks and performance; and (iv) promote the safety and soundness 
of the banking industry.      
To meet the above objectives, Bank Indonesia carried several initiatives, including the 
adoption of a risk-based supervisory approach and prudential regulations that encourage 
banks to enhance their risk management practices; development of risk assessment system 
to encourage judgment and analytical thinking as well as provide consistent results; and 
the introduction of a framework to assess fi  nancial system stability. Th  e new risk-based 
framework focuses on supervisory activities to assess the adequacy of banks’ risk management 
– in identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling risks – particularly in respect of the 
high risk areas in the bank operations. 
Since July 2000, Bank Indonesia carried out intensive surveillance of the major 
banks by placing an on-site supervision team in each of the banks to ensure that they were 
well managed and did not pose a high risk to the stability of the banking system. Th  e  “on-
site presence” teams apply a risk-based approach in analysing and monitoring the banks’ 
condition19. 
Eff  ective risk management has always been central to the conduct of safe and sound 
banking activities. It becomes even more important as product innovation, and the size and 
complexities of fi  nancial transactions transform the fi  nancial landscape and the nature of 
banking markets. Th   e regulation and guidelines for commercial banks on risk management 
were issued in mid-2003 to improve the eff  ectiveness of bank’s risk management and to 
ensure that bank’s business is conducted in a safe and sound manner. Th   e introduction of the 
risk management initiative is in line with the implementation of the new Basel Accord.
To integrate and reinforce the various regulatory and supervisory improvement 
initiatives, Bank Indonesia developed the Indonesian Banking Architecture (IBA) in 
2004. Th  e IBA is a comprehensive framework for the Indonesian banking system which 
sets direction and structures for the banking industry over the next fi  ve to ten years. Th  e 
IBA’s action plans include the improvement of bank’s risk management, infrastructure and 
customer education as well as improvement of banking supervision (see Figure 20 in the 
Appendices).
Th   e risk-based supervision guidelines for bank supervisors were also issued in mid- 
2003. Th   e guidelines are aimed at assisting bank supervisors in applying the new approach, 
especially in planning and scoping the examination according to the size, risks and 
complexities of bank’s activities as well as in focusing attention and resources on the higher 
risk areas of the bank’s operations. Furthermore, a risk assessment system was developed in 
19  See Batunanggar, et al (2001) for detailed information on “On-site Supervisory Presence”.76
December 2003. Central to this new approach is changing the bank supervisors’ paradigm 
and behavior from a compliance-based approach toward a risk-focused approach. 
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Source: Bank Indonesia (various reports) and Batunanggar (1996) for pre-crisis period.
• Reorganisation of the banking supervision units from “dedicated    
   teams” to a separate structure of on-site and off-site supervision 
  units. The rationale of this change was a belief, under the 
  previous structure, the bank supervisor was too close to the 
  bank, that it could create moral hazard. 
• Bank restructuring programme, including closure of unviable  
   insolvent banks and recapitalisation of “systemically important” 
  and viable insolvent banks.
• Introduction of prudential measures included bank business
   plan, fit and proper test for bank’s management and controlling 
    shareholders, improvement of bank’s asset quality classifications 
   and provisioning, financial disclosures, legal lending limit,capital 
  adequacy requirement, and bank exit policy.
• Intensive surveillance on major or “systemically” important   
  banks by placing On-site Supervisory Presence Team at each   
   bank to assess and monitor bank’s risks as part of the efforts in 
  maintaining banking system stability.
• Introduction of risk management for banks to ensure that bank’s 
  business is conducted in a safe and sound manner.
• Development of RBS framework, risk assessment system and 
 guidelines.
• Improvement of supervisory CAMELS rating.
• Introduction of a compulsory risk-management-certification 
  programme for bank's managers and supervisors.
• Training and certification programme for bank supervisors and 
 bank  researchers. 
• Set direction and framework for the banking industry over the 
   next five to ten years. It is aimed in building a sound and    
  efficient banking system to create financial system stability for 
  the promotion of national economic growth.
• Development of implementation plan, consultative papers and 
 regulations, performing Quantitative Impact Studies, and 
  formation of Working Groups with banks. Gradual 
  implementation by all banks, starting 2008 with the simplest 
 methods. 
• Establishment of Investigation and Mediation Directorate       
  responsible for investigating indication bank’s criminal cases, e.g. 
 fraud.
• The separate on-site teams and off-site teams were integrated 
   back into “dedicated teams” to improve coordination, resource 
  allocation and supervisors’ understanding of bank.
•  A group of Specialist Bank Supervisors responsible for examining 
  specific areas, such as market risk, credit risk, and IT.77
3.3  Organisational Structure of Banking Supervision 
A proper organisational structure is necessary to support an eff  ective  banking 
supervision. Th   erefore, it is useful to survey the development of the organisational structure 
of banking supervision in Bank Indonesia. In 1994, Bank Indonesia reorganised the structure 
of its banking supervision units into a “dedicated structure” which integrated on-site and 
off  -site supervision units. Central to the integrated structure was the importance of capacity 
building for bank supervisors, including the development of specialist bank examiners, e.g. 
IT examiners. 
Th   e integrated structure was changed in 1998 on the belief that, under this structure, 
bank supervisors became too close their banks with the consequent loss of objectivity. 
However, the separate structure has inherent fundamental weaknesses, including ineff  ective 
coordination of off  -site units with on-site units – which were coordinated under diff  erent 
Deputy Governors – and ineffi   cient human resource allocation. Th   is condition hinders bank 
supervisor to know their bank better since the number of bank supervisors was limited 
compared to number of banks. 
Recently, aft   er careful reconsideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
supervisory approaches, Bank Indonesia reorganised its the bank supervision structure and 
brought back the integrated model to improve the effi   ciency and eff  ectiveness of coordination 
and human resource allocation as well as facilitate the bank supervisors’ understanding of 
the condition and problems of the banks under their supervision. A group of Specialist 
Supervisors responsible for examining specifi  c areas, such as market risk, credit risk, and 
information technology, was also created. It remains to be seen whether the close proximity 
to the banks would re-emerge as a problem. Th   is potential problem could be alleviated by 
more frequent staff   rotation and establishment of an independent review function. 
However, the reorganisation still taps only the structure (the “hard” elements) while 
other important other elements, namely, staff  , skills, styles and culture not yet developed. 
To be eff ective, the “soft  ” elements of the organization, including organisational culture and 
incentive systems, should be developed through a comprehensive and consistent change 
management.
4.  Problem Banks Identifi  cation
One of the most challenging tasks of the bank supervisor is identifying and responding 
rapidly to the symptoms and root-causes of problems that may not yet be obvious to the 
bank management. As part of its on-going supervisory strategy, Bank Indonesia adopted 
several instruments, including off  -site analysis, on-site examination, early warning systems 
(EWS) and external auditors, for the purpose. However, the EWS was developed later in 
1991, while the external auditors mainly functioned only aft  er the crisis. 
4.1  Supervisory Risk Assessment Systems 
Th   e framework for risk-focused supervision contains a series of supervisory activities 
that center on the supervisor’s understanding of the bank and dialogue with the bank’s 
management. Th   e key activities are illustrated in Figure 3.78
At any stage of the supervisory cycle, the bank supervisor can initiate prompt corrective 
action, especially if they should fi  nd the existence of potential problems endangering the 
viability of the bank.
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Bank Indonesia utilises two complementary supervisory rating systems to assess the 
overall health of the individual banks, and the quality of their risk management practices. 
Th   ese rating systems are CAMELS and Risk Assessment System outlined below.
4.1.1  CAMELS Rating System  
CAMELS – stands for Capital, Assets Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, 
and Sensitivity – is a uniform rating system commonly used by bank supervisors. Th  is 
rating system provides an overall composite rating score for a bank as well as separate 
rating scores for each of the six areas of assessment on a scale of 1 (best) to 5 (worst). Th  ese 
indicators provide the bank supervisors a set of standard criteria with which to conduct 
bank examination and to categorise banks and diagnose their weaknesses on the basis of 
the assessment.
Bank Indonesia adopted the CAMEL rating system in 1991, and subsequently 
upgraded the rating system to CAMELS in 2004, adding sensitivity to market risk. Th  e 
CAMELS rating framework is illustrated in Figure 4. 
Th  e CAMELS rating is normally performed annually since a bank is generally 
examined once a year. In the case of problem banks, i.e. banks with CAMELS ratings of 4 or 
5, their ratings may be assessed more frequently, as these banks are subject to more frequent 
on-site examinations. However, the CAMELS rating tends to be prescriptive and sets the 
boundaries for risk analysis. In addition, it is oft  en based on off  -site supervisory information 
which usually has a time lag and its accuracy is highly dependent on the integrity of the 79
bank’s data and management information system. Th   us, the challenge is developing a system 




























 4.1.2  Risk Assessment System    
In line with the implementation of risk management for commercial banks in 2003, 
Bank Indonesia developed a Risk Assessment System (RAS) as an integral part of a risk-
based supervision cycle. Th   e RAS provides an enhanced method of identifying, measuring 
and communicating the degree of bank’s risks (low, moderate, high), the quality of risk 
management (weak, acceptable, strong) as well as the direction of risks (decrease, stable, 
increase). Th  e RAS encourages bank supervisor’s judgment. It is a forward-looking tool 
which provides not only the bank’s current risk profi  le, but also the direction of the bank 
risks that is valuable in developing supervisory plans for problem banks.
Th   ere are some interesting issues regarding the application of CAMELS rating and 
the RAS by bank supervisors. First, at the outset of its implementation, the bank supervisor 
tended to use the quantitative measures and avoid making judgments. Th   is was mainly due to 
the lack of knowledge and skills as well as information on the bank’s condition. Consequently, 
eff  orts have been made to enhance the bank supervisors’ capability in performing qualitative 
analysis and making judgment by improving their capability and supervisory core processes, 
including the reorganisation of the banking supervision unit which integrated off  -site with 
on-site examination in 2006. However, there are still fl  aws in the current CAMELS rating 
and the RAS. As mentioned above, CAMELS tends to be prescriptive and information 
delayed. Th   e RAS, on the other hand, is too focused on quantitative indicators, and tends 
to be mechanistic. In addition, both systems are repetitive which result in ineffi   cient use of 
resources and a potential cause of confusion. 80
Bank Indonesia has reviewed its risk-based supervision and developed plans to en-
hance its risk-based supervisory framework and process, including measures to consolidate 
the CAMELS and RAS, develop and equip supervisors with the skills and expertise to conduct 
risk assessment, create a more robust infrastructure to support supervisory process, reduce 
redundant and burdensome administrative supervisory tasks, and improve the training and 
development programme for bank supervisors.
4.2  Early Warning Systems and Other Indicators 
Th   e use of early warning systems and other indicators are essential in bank supervision. 
Th   e early warning systems assist supervisors to monitor trends that may signal problems 
and trigger plan and target supervisory activities.
Th   e bank supervisors have been using early warning signals and other monitoring 
tools since 2002. Bank performance analysis and stress testing of the bank’s business plan are 
the predictive tools used for assessing the implication of bank loan growth on bank solvency. 
Bank Indonesia is currently developing a model for projecting bank performance to identify 
potential problem banks. 
4.3 Macro-Prudential  Surveillance
To complement its supervisory approach to individual banks (micro-prudential 
supervision) since 2002, Bank Indonesia has also developed a framework to assess risks 
of the overall fi  nancial system (macro-prudential surveillance). Micro-prudential analysis 
focuses on the individual banks, promoting their soundness and protecting depositors, whilst 
macro-prudential analysis focuses on the systemic risks bearing on the fi  nancial system as a 
whole. Th   e macro-prudential framework will be described in greater detail in Section 6. 
Surveillance is part of the fi  nancial stability unit’s task aiming at measuring the 
potential threats and vulnerabilities to the fi  nancial system. Th   is will enable the appropriate 
actions and policies to be taken timely to minimise their negative impact on the fi  nancial 
system as a whole20.
Th   e analysis and assessment are carried out based on the series of aggregate fi  nancial 
and economic data gathered from various sources, both internally and externally. Th  e 
tools applied consist of the Financial Soundness Indicators (see Figure 5), stress tests, 
and econometric model, which are more forward-looking. Th   e threats to fi  nancial system 
stability is analysed focusing on the risk factors originating from inside and from outside 
the fi  nancial system. 
Stress testing is used to analyse the potential impact of adverse macroeconomic 
shocks on fi  nancial stability by examining the tolerance levels of fi  nancial institutions under 
various economic scenarios. Th  e methods are being refi  ned and improved continuously 
in relation to developments in the domestic condition, policies and regulations, to ensure 
better outcomes21.
 
20  Batunanggar (2002).
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4.4   Communicating Concerns  
Communication between the bank supervisor and the bank’s management is very 
important in problem bank supervision. An eff  ective and frequent communication will 
facilitate an open and positive dialogue on bank’s problems and condition, thus encourage 
common understanding of the bank’s problems and how to solve them properly and in 
timely manner.
Th   e bank supervisor can, at any time, if necessary, conduct prudential meetings with 
the bank senior management. Th   e bank appoints central points of contact, who are usually 
the compliance senior offi   cer, chief risk offi   cer and internal auditor. Th   e frequency of the 
meetings increases when the bank’s condition gets worse, depending upon the result of the 
monitoring and on-site examination. 
5.   Problem Bank Intervention 
Th   e problem bank intervention is based on the development of a specifi  c and viable 
plan for corrective actions of the problem bank and on subsequent monitoring to ensure 
the bank’s adherence to the plan. If the corrective actions are successful, the bank returns to 
sound condition. If the circumstance of the bank worsens, the situation requires resolution. 82
Under Bank Indonesia Regulation concerning the subsequent action for supervision 
and designation of bank’s status under the framework of risk-based supervision, Bank 
Indonesia classifi  es the supervision status of the banks in three levels, depending on a bank’s 
risk profi  le and other indicators. 
 
5.1 Normal  Supervision
Bank Indonesia exercises normal supervisory oversight for all banks that are rated 
sound, or are well capitalised with eff  ective risk management. Currently, the vast majority of 
banks in Indonesia fall under normal supervision. Th   e framework for normal supervision 
is illustrated in Figure 4.
Bank Indonesia has also conducted CAMELS ratings quarterly, and as of December 
2006, around 7 percent of commercial banks are categorised as poor and unsound, as 
illustrated in Figure 7. Banks with composite ratings of 4 (poor) and 5 (unsound) must 
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5.2   Intensive Supervision
Bank Indonesia will apply intensive supervisory measures for banks that are deemed 
to have potential diffi   culties endangering their business operations, for instance, if there is 
any signifi  cant deterioration of performing loans. Banks falling into this category meet one 
or more of the following criteria:
(a)  have net non-performing loans in excess of 5 percent of total credit;
(b)  are rated poor (composite rating of 4) or unsound (composite rating of 5);
(c)  are in breach of the legal lending limit and the bank’s action plan is unfeasible;
(d)  violate the net open position and the bank’s action plan is unacceptable;
(e) suff  er from structural liquidity problem; and
(f) fundamental  profi  tability problem.
In addition, major banks with total assets above IDR10 billion are also under intensive 
supervision considering their signifi  cance to the fi  nancial system stability.83
From a total of 130 commercial banks, including three shariah banks, there are 16 
banks (13 percent) classifi  ed as under intensive supervision. Two of these banks are state-
owned with net non-performing loans above 5 percent, but the trend is improving. At the 
end of 2007, the NPLs of the two state-owned banks are projected at below 5 percent. 
 
5.3 Special  Surveillance 
Bank Indonesia conducts special surveillance of banks that are facing diffi   culties 
endangering the continuity of their business. A bank will also fall into special surveillance 
under the following conditions: if it does not show improvement post intensive supervision; 
the bank’s fi  nancial conditions deteriorate; the management is incapable of turning the bank 
around; and, most importantly, when the bank has diffi   culties endangering the continuity 
of its business. 
Based on Article 37, paragraph (1) of Banking Act: “Th   e term bank condition deemed 
to have potential diffi   culties endangering its continued operation if based on Bank Indonesia 
assessment, the bank’s conditions become worst such as decreasing of capital, asset quality, 
liquidity and profi  tability, and also the management of bank will not meet basic safety and 
soundness principles of a healthy bank”.  Th   is paragraph lays the legal basis for designating 
banks as having diffi   culties endangering their existence. 
Bank Indonesia has the power to place banks under special surveillance. It will 
designate a problem bank for special surveillance if, in its assessment, the condition of the 
bank is deteriorating and the sustainability of the bank’s business is at risk. Bank Indonesia 
could use both rule-based and discretion criteria for bank intervention. However, in practice, 
the bank supervisors oft  en use rule-based criteria to avoid challenge and appeal by bank’s 
owners and management. 
Banks designated for special surveillance fall under one or more of these criteria. First, 
if there is an insolvency problem where its capital adequacy ratio is persistently less than 8 
percent. Second, the bank has fundamental and persistent liquidity problems jeopardising 
its operations with an indication of a worsening condition in the near future, or is considered 
by bank supervisor as undergoing a fundamental liquidity problem.
Banks under special surveillance are mandated by BI to undertake prompt corrective 
action (PCA), which includes: (i) submission of a Capital Restoration Plan (CRP) by the 
bank and/or the shareholders of the bank; (ii) compliance with its Mandatory Supervisory 
Actions (MSA); and (iii) performance of certain actions by the bank and/or the bank 
shareholders, such as:
(a)  changing the board of commissioners and/or the board of directors;
(b) writing  off   credit and calculate Bank loss with the Bank capital;
(c)  conducting a merger or consolidating with other bank(s);
(d)  selling the bank to investors willing to take over all liabilities of the bank;
(e)  delegating the management of part or all of the bank’s activities to a third party;
(f)  selling part or all of the assets and liabilities of the bank to other bank (s) or other 
investors; and/or
(g)  suspending certain business activities of the bank.84
Bank Indonesia will also exercise cease-and-desist order (CDO), like for instance, 
issuing a prohibition to the problem bank from distributing any dividend, or from 
conducting any transactions with a related party, and imposing restrictions on bank asset 
growth, and on the payment of salary, compensation, or any other form of similar payment 
to the management of the bank, and/or compensation for related parties. 
Under the CDO, Bank Indonesia has also legal authority to forbid the bank from 
undertaking any change in ownership. Shareholders that retain shares equal to, or greater 
than, 10 percent, and controlling shareholders, including the controlling parties of the bank, 
cannot sell their stakes until they obtain the prior approval of Bank Indonesia. If Bank 
Indonesia considers the failing bank as facing serious diffi   culties jeopardising its business 
and/or posing threats to the stability of the fi  nancial system, or endangering the economy, 
Bank Indonesia can revoke the bank’s operating license.
With the implementation of this exit policy, ten commercial banks were designated 
for special surveillance. Based upon their progress, six of the banks were closed due to 
insolvency problems, while other banks were rescued with capital injection by shareholders 
and change of new management.
Th  e bank’s problem and corrective action plans may not always conform to the 
detailed procedures stipulated in the exit policy guideline. Consequently, the supervisor 
must make speedy decisions to ensure that the bank’s problems are handled appropriately 
and in a timely manner. Nevertheless, there have been instances when the bank supervisors 
have been brought to court for closing the bank before the deadline for corrective action. 
In some cases, the bank supervisors encounter diffi   culty in enforcing the controlling 
shareholders of the problem bank to carry out the agreed actions. Th   is is mainly due to the 
issue of legal authority of the bank supervisor to exercise the letter of comfort issued by the 
controlling shareholders of the problem. 
In addition, the bank supervisors face a signifi  cant challenge of law enforcement to 
minimise moral hazard by bad bankers. Bank Indonesia has established a dedicated unit to 
investigate the signs and symptoms of criminal acts, such fraud and other violations against 
the law. Th   e investigation is conducted in cooperation with the Police Department and the 
Offi   ce of the Attorney General. However, given the prevailing weaknesses of the legal and 
criminal justice system and law enforcement, many of the criminal and bank fraud cases are 
not followed up consistently.
Figure 8 illustrates Bank Indonesia’s intervention process for weak banks.85
Figure 8 







1) Major bank with total assets significantly large to the banking system.
2) Banks deemed to have difficulties endangering its business operations which meet
  the following criteria.
  • net non-performing loans in excess of 5% of total credit
  • rated poor (4) or unsound (5)
  • has actual or potential problems pursuant to an assessment of composite risk
  • excess the legal lending limit and the bank's action plans are unfeasible
  • violate the net open position and in the bank's action plans are unfeasible
  • has a structural liquidity problem
  • has fundamental profitability problem
Bank Indonesia is entitled to take the following supervisory actions:
• to demand the bank to submit a report or particular issues to Bank Indonesia
• to ask the bank to revise its business plan and review it
• to ask the bank to prepare action plans for correcting the problems
• to conduct an on-site examination
• to conduct CDO, if the bank requires certain recovery
INTENSIVE SUPERVISION
Banks deemed to have potential difficulties endangering its continued operation
and existence and that meets one or more than one criteria: CAR -8%; and or ratio
of statutory reserves in Indonesia currency is less than the required ratio, with an
indication of worsening condition in the near future or considered by Bank Indonesia
as undergoing a fundamental liquidity problem.
Bank Indonesia demands bank to undertake the following prompt corrective actions:
a.  order the bank and/or the shareholders to submit Capital Restoration Plan;
b.  order the bank to comply with its Mandatory Supervisory Actions;
c.  order the bank and/or the shareholders to carry out certain actions such as:
 •  to change the board of commisioners and/or the board of directors;
 •  to write off loans and calculate loss with the bank's capital;
 •  to conduct a merger or consolidate with other bank(s);
 •  to sell the bank to investors willing to take over all liabilities of the bank;
 •  to hand-over the management of part or all of  bank activities to third party;
 •  to sell part or all of the assets and liabilities of the bank to other bank(s) or other
      investors; and or










6.  Problem Bank Resolution
Prior to the 1997 crisis, Bank Indonesia adopted an open-bank-resolution strategy 
in solving bank problems through the provision of emergency loans for both liquidity 
and capital purposes. It was premised on the belief that bank closure would reduce public 
confi  dence in the banking system, cause bank runs, and endanger fi  nancial system stability. 
Due to the weaknesses of enforcement and bank supervision, this strategy proved ineff  ective 
and created moral hazard problems. Th   e relaxed policy on bank entry since 1988 and the 
absence of a bank exit policy, combined with weak banking regulation and supervision, 
increased the fragility of the banking system22.
Bank Summa was the only unsound commercial bank actually liquidated in 1992 - 
two decades prior to the 1997 crisis. At the time, Bank Indonesia provided a limited ad-hoc 
deposit guarantee of Rp20 million (US$8,000), while the bank’s owners shared the resolution 
costs. Th   e liquidation process of Bank Summa was protracted. It refl  ected the inadequacies of 
the procedures and powers at the disposal of Bank Indonesia for dealing with a failed bank. 
Th   is experience reinforced Bank Indonesia’s view that bank closures should be avoided at 
all costs23.
Since 2005, the resolution of failing banks is managed by the IDIC. Th  e  resolution 
of failing banks is classifi  ed in two categories: failing bank without systemic eff  ect or risk, 
and one with systemic eff  ect. Th  e resolution measures for failing bank without systemic 
eff  ect is determined and carried out by the IDIC under the least-cost method. Th  e  resolution 
for failing bank with systemic eff  ect is determined by the Coordinating Committee. Th  e 
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22  Batunanggar (2002 and 2004).
23  See Batunanggar (2002 and 2004) and Santoso (2000).87
Subsequently, the resolution of a failing bank without a systemic eff  ect is carried 
out, with or without rescue, based on least cost method. Whereas the resolution of a failing 
bank with systemic eff  ect is carried out by rescuing the failing bank, with or without the 
participation of the existing shareholders.
6.1  Resolution of Failing Banks without Systemic Risks       
When a bank without systemic risk is considered insolvent – its capital adequacy 
ratio is less than minimum requirement (8 percent) – and the corrective actions fail, Bank 
Indonesia will transfer the bank to the IDIC to be resolved on the basis of the least-cost 
method. Th   e IDIC may take over control of the bank, or may allow the bank’s shareholders and 
management to execute a restructuring program, or will close the unviable bank. However, 
the bank closure is carried out carefully to ensure it does not aff  ect public  confi  dence in the 
banking system. Th   e IDIC and Bank Indonesia cooperate closely prior to and following the 
closure to minimise the negative impact of the closure on fi  nancial systemic stability.
6.1.1  Rescuing a Failing Bank 
Th  e decision whether or not to rescue a failing bank is determined by the IDIC, 
weighing, at a minimum, the estimated costs of rescuing and the costs of not rescuing a 
failing bank. Th   e estimated costs of rescuing a bank include the capital injections required  to 
return the bank to solvency and restore its liquidity, while the estimated cost of not rescuing 
include the cost of payment of the insured deposits, advances for employee remuneration, 
advances for employee severance, and the projected recovery from the sale of the failed 
bank’s assets.
Th   e decision of the IDIC to rescue a failing bank that does not have a systemic risk 
is determined by the following parameters. First, the estimated cost of rescuing the bank 
is signifi  cantly lower than the estimated cost of not rescuing the aforementioned bank. 
Second, aft  er the rescue, the bank should exhibit good business prospects. Finally, there 
is a statement from the General Shareholders Meeting (GSM) of the bank that, minimally, 
exhibits agreement to: (i) surrender the rights and powers of the GSM to the IDIC; (ii) 
surrender the management of the bank to the IDIC; and (iii) not to press charges against 
the IDIC or other parties appointed by the IDIC, if the rescue process is not successful, as 
long as the IDIC or any of the other parties appointed by the IDIC carry out their duties in 
due faith.
Th   en, the bank provides the IDIC with the documents pertaining to the utilisation of 
the funding facilities from Bank Indonesia, the fi  nancial data of debtors, the capital structure 
and composition of shareholders for the past three years, and other relevant information 
that is related to the assets and liabilities, including bank capital. Aft  er all the requirements 
are fulfi  lled, the GSM hands over all its rights and powers to the IDIC. 
Th   e IDIC then initiates the following course of action. Th   e IDIC will occupy, manage 
and foreclose the assets that belong to, or become the subjective rights and/ or liabilities 
of the bank; make temporary capital placements; and sell and/or transfer the assets of the 
failing bank, without debtor consent, and/or the bank’s liabilities without creditor consent. 
Additionally, the IDIC will hand over the management of the bank to other parties; merge 88
or consolidate with other banks; transfer the bank’s ownership; and review, annul, terminate, 
and/or alter any contracts between the failed bank and third parties that are burdensome to 
the bank.
Further, all funds injected by the IDIC to rescue the bank will become the IDIC’s 
temporary capital placement in the bank. If, at the time of surrender to the IDIC, the bank’s 
equity is positive, the IDIC and the former shareholders will sign an agreement that governs 
the proceedings of the sale of the rescued bank’s shares. If the bank’s equity is zero or negative 
at the time of surrender to the IDIC, the former shareholders’ have no rights upon the sale 
of the rescued bank’s shares. Its agreement determines the use of the proceeds from the sale 
of the rescued bank’s shares.
6.1.2  Closure a Failing Bank  
In the event the bank fails to meet the agreed terms and conditions, or if the IDIC   
decides not to continue with the bank rescue, the IDIC will request Bank Indonesia to revoke 
the licence of the bank in accordance with the prevailing laws and regulations. Hence, the 
IDIC will pay the insurance claim to the depositors of the bank whose licence was revoked.
6.2  Resolution of Failing Banks with Systemic Risks 
6.2.1  With Capital Injection by the Shareholders  
Th  e IDIC handles a failing bank with systemic risk by involving the shareholders 
participation (open-bank assistance). Th  is measure may only be implemented if the 
shareholders of the failing bank injects a minimum of 20 percent capital of the estimated 
handling cost, and provides a GSM agreement to surrender to the IDIC the rights and 
powers of the GSM and the management of the bank, and not to press charges against the 
IDIC or any other parties appointed by the IDIC in the event the resolution is unsuccessful, 
as long as the IDIC and any of the other parties appointed by the IDIC have performed their 
duties in good faith.
In the event that a bank’s equity is positive, aft  er the former shareholders inject 
temporary capital, the IDIC and the former shareholders will sign an agreement to govern 
the proceeds of sale of the bank’s shares. Meanwhile, in the event that the bank’s equity is 
zero or negative aft  er the former shareholders inject capital, the former shareholders have no 
rights upon the sale of the bank’s shares.
6.2.2  Without Capital Injection by the Shareholders
If the failing bank on its own is unable to achieve a turnaround to recover its position, 
the IDIC will intervene without the shareholders’ participation. It will take over all the rights 
and powers of the GSM, the title of ownership, management, and/or other interests on the 
bank. Th   e IDIC, or any other parties appointed by the IDIC for the rescue operation, are 
accorded protection under the law from any legal suits by the shareholders and the bank 
management in the event of unsuccessful resolution, as long as the IDIC and the other 
parties appointed by the IDIC have carried out their duties in good faith.89
Aft  er the IDIC has taken over all the rights and power of the GSM, the title of 
ownership, management, and/or other interest on the bank, it can carry out the resolution 
actions. Further, all the funds injected by the IDIC to handle the failing bank will become 
the IDIC’s temporary capital placement in the bank.
6.3   Liquidation of Failing Banks 
Th   e primary objectives of bank liquidation are to ensure the maintenance of fi  nancial 
system stability, the preservation and optimal collection of the liquidated bank’s assets, and 
recovery by creditors of as much of their investments or deposits as possible. A clear legal 
framework and procedures are required for eff  ective bank liquidation. Th   e absence of an 
eff  ective legal framework could cause disorderly closure and increase the risk of contagion 
with systemic implications.
As illustrated in Figure 10, in liquidating a failed bank whose license has been 
revoked, the IDIC will undertake the following course of action, including the provision 
of advance payment for the accrued and unpaid staff   remuneration and separation pay, 
initiation of the  necessary actions in order to preserve the asset of the bank prior to the 
liquidation process, decision to dissolve the bank’s legal entity, appointment of a liquidation 
team, and announcement of the bank’s status as under liquidation. Th   e IDIC must dispose 
of banks’ shares within a period of two years for a bank that is not systemically important 
and three years for problem bank with systemic risk. It could be renewed for no more than 
two additional years.
Figure 10
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7. Crisis  Management24 
Th   e experience of Indonesia in problem bank resolution and crisis management can 
be studied through three periods. First, was the period prior to the 1997 crisis, where open 
bank resolution and emergency liquidity facility assistance were practiced. Second, was the 
period during the 1997 crisis, in which there was system-wide banking restructuring. Th  ird, 
is the current period since 2004, with the introduction and development of fi  nancial safety 
nets and crisis management. Th   e key measures taken during those periods are summarised 
in Figure 11.
7.1  Financial Safety Nets Prior to 1997-1998 Crisis
Prior to the 1997 crisis, Bank Indonesia adopted an open-bank-resolution strategy 
in solving bank problems through providing emergency loans both for liquidity and capital 
support. Th   e support was not based on any pre-existing formal guarantee mechanism, but 
rather on a belief that some of the banks that needed support were too big to fail, or the 
failure of a bank could cause contagion25. However, the open bank resolution strategy proved 
ineff  ective and created moral hazard problems. Th  e absence of a clear bank exit policy, 
combined with weak law enforcement and banking supervision, increased the fragility of 
the banking system.
7.1.1 Deposit  Insurance
Th   e plan for establishing a deposit insurance scheme was discussed quite intensively 
since the early 1990s. However, the authorities declined the proposal because they considered 
that it would create moral hazard. A limited deposit guarantee in Indonesia was fi  rst applied 
when the authorities closed down Bank Summa at the beginning of the 1990s. Th   e case was 
considered unsuccessful26. 
7.1.2  Lender of Last Resort
Under its old Law of 1968, Bank Indonesia was authorised to provide emergency loans 
to banks facing critical liquidity problems27. However, there were no well-defi  ned rules and 
procedures to regulate the operation of this function. 
24  Th   is section is drawn largely from Batunanggar (2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006)
25  Before the 1997 crisis, none of the East Asian crisis countries except the Philippines, which was least aff  ected by the crisis, had an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme
26  Th   e plan for establishing a deposit insurance scheme has been discussed quite intensively since the early 1990s. However, the authorities declined the 
proposal because they considered that it would create moral hazard.
27  Th   e previous BI’s Law (1967) set BI’s status as a “dependent” agency providing assistance ot the Government in carrying out monetary, banking and 
payment system policies. Th   e current BI’s Law (1999) establishes its independence from political intervention.91
Figure 11
Problem Bank Resolution and Crisis Management in Indonesia
Period and Measures Features
Source: Batunanggar (2007)
Prior to the 1997 crisis
•  Open Bank Resolution 
•  Liquidity and Solvency  
 Support
During the 1997 crisis
•  First Round Closures of  
  16 Small Banks
•  Establishment the  
 Restructuring  Agency
• Blanket  Guarantee
•  Special Surveillance of  
 54  banks
•  First round take over of 
   7 banks and  round  
  closure of 7 banks
•  Third Round closure of  
  3 banks formerly taken- 
 over
•  Second Round Taken  
  Over of Bank Central  
 Asia  (BCA)
•  Due Diligence of 119  
 banks
•  Mega Merger 4 state- 
 owned  banks
•  Recapitalisation  
 Programme
2004 - present 
•  Exit Policy
•  Financial Safety Nets  
  and Crisis Management
• Bank Indonesia (BI)  supported either illiquid or insolvent banks 
  to avoid bank closure
•  BI encouraged banks to consolidate and or merge
•  Government, including BI provided limited deposit guarantees
•  The closure criteria and the process was not communicated well 
  to the public
•  Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA) is established 
    to restructure problem banks and to act as an assets management 
 company
•  IBRA took over 54 problem banks
•  IBRA suspended shareholders’ rights and changed their 
 management
•  The operations of these banks were frozen while their deposits   
  transferred to selected state-owned banks
• IBRA frozen three banks taken over while their deposits 
  transferred to selected state-owned banks
• BCA, the largest domestic private bank, was taken over by IBRA
•  IBRA suspended shareholders’ rights and changed their 
 management
• Diagnostic review of bank’s condition; banks are categorised by 
  their capital adequacy ratio to be Bank “A”, “B”, “C”.
• Bank Mandiri was established as result of merger BBD, BNI, 
  Bank Exim and BAPINDO
• Business Plan Preparation and Business Plan Review
•  Fit and Proper Tests
•  Lender of the last resort, for normal times and systemic risk
•  Establishment of IDIC and adoption of limited insurance scheme
•  Exit policy for unfeasible failing bank
•   Interagency Coordination (Coordinating Committee and 
  Financial Stability Forum: Bank Indonesia, MoF, IDIC).
7.2  Crisis Management during the Banking Crisis
7.2.1 Emergency  Liquidity  Support
During the 1997 crisis, Bank Indonesia provided liquidity support to problem banks 
in order to prevent the collapse of the banking system and to maintain the payments system. 
Th   e deterioration of confi  dence in the banking system, coupled with political uncertainties 
and social unrest, caused severe bank runs with the contagion spreading from perceived 
unsound banks to sound ones. As the crisis intensifi  ed, the amount of overdraft   facilities 
increased from Rp31 trillion in December 1997 to Rp170 trillion in December 1998. Th  e 92
large budgetary cost that this entailed created tension and distrust between Bank Indonesia 
and the government, particularly over the accountability of Bank Indonesia in providing the 
emergency liquidity support.
7.2.2  Bank Closures and Deposit Guarantee
With the closing of Bank Summa in 1992, there were no bank closures until the 
authorities closed down 16 banks in November 1997 and introduced a limited guarantee. 
Th   e initial bank closures, unlike in Korea and Th   ailand, failed to regain confi  dence in the 
government and the banking sector and even prompted a more intensive bank-run.
To maintain public confi  dence in the banking system, the government issued a blanket 
guarantee on 27 January. It covered all commercial banks’ liabilities (rupiah and foreign 
currency), including both depositors and creditors. 
Several observers [Nasution (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1999), Batunanggar (2002 and 
2004)] argued that the fi  rst bank closure was poorly managed, and thus, failed. Th  ey  argued 
that the bank closures should not have been made in the middle of a panic without a detailed 
plan for restructuring the fi  nancial system. Th   e IMF’s initial programme failed to include 
provisions for deposits insurance, management of the performing and non-performing 
assets of these banks, or measures for securing and strengthening the rest of the banking 
system. Th   is was apparently admitted later by the IMF in an internal document28.
From November 1997–2000, there were six major rounds of intervention taken by 
the authorities, including both “open bank” resolutions and bank closures: (i) the closure 
of 16 small banks in November 1997; (ii) intervention into 54 banks in February 1998; (iii) 
the take over of 7 banks and closure of another 7 in April 1998; (iv) the closure of four 
banks previously taken over in April 1998 and August 1998; and (v) the closure of 38 banks 
together with a take over of 7 banks and joint recapitalisation of 7 banks in March 1999; and   
(vi) a recapitalisation of six state-owned banks and 12 regional banks during 1999 – 200029.
7.2.3 Th   e Bank Restructuring Programme
Th   e main objective of the bank restructuring programme was to overhaul the banking 
system and enable the fi  nancial intermediation of banks to function as effi   ciently and quickly 
as possible. Th   e resolution of fi  nancial crises is typically carried out in three sequential steps: 
(i) a diagnostic review; (ii) a resolution of non-viable institutions and recapitalisation of 
viable ones; and (iii) a resolution of non-performing loans.
Essentially, bank restructuring consists of two elements: (i) fi  nancial restructuring, 
including capital injection and loan restructuring; and (ii) operational restructuring 
comprising the improvement of a bank’s internal organization, such as its operational 
effi   ciency, governance, risk management and control. Generally, the approaches adopted in 
Korea, Th   ailand, Indonesia (Figure 13), and Malaysia are similar.
28  “IMF Now Admits Tactics in Indonesia Deepened the Crisis”, New York Times, 14 January 1998.
29  See Batunanggar (2002 and 2004) for detailed information and analysis.93


































As an initial step in the bank restructuring programme, Bank Indonesia, assisted by international 
auditors, performed due diligence (a financial review) on all Indonesian-owned banks in order to 
determine the solvency and the costs of recapitalisation. It was started in August 1998 and 
completed in December 1998. An examination of all foreign-exchange commercial banks 
including state-owned banks was performed by international auditors, while the non-foreign 
exchange banks were examined by Bank Indonesia’s supervisors. These assessments focused on 
the banks’ portfolio to determine solvent (good) and insolvent (bad) banks, based on strict loan 
quality assessment and provisioning. It was followed by a discussion with the banks’ directors 
and commissioners in order to communicate the findings as well as the banks’ status and follow-
up actions that the banks should be take in line with the recapitalisation programme.
The due diligence exercise categorised banks into three groups, according to their capital-
adequacy ratio (CAR): (i) solvent “A” banks with CARs of 4 percent or more; (ii) insolvent “B” 
banks with CARs from -25 percent up to less than 4 percent; and (iii) highly insolvent “C” bank 
with CAR less than -25 percent. The B and C banks were required to prepare and submit 
business plans to Bank Indonesia as part of a joint recapitalisation programme. In addition, their 
shareholders were also required to inject a minimum of 20 percent of required capital to meet 
CARs of 4 percent. While the “A” banks could operate normally, they were required to prepare a 
business plan in order to improve their performance. The viability of a bank for a joint 
recapitalization programme was determined by committees with representative members from 
Bank Indonesia, IBRA and the Ministry of Finance.
Figure 12:  Diagnostic Review - Good Bank, Bad Bank
The Result of Due Diligence on Commercial Banks (13 March 1999)
As part of the bank restructuring programme, the government announced a 
bank recapitalisation programme. Th  ere were two types of bank recapitalisation: self-
recapitalisation carried out by the bank owners alone or with new strategic investors; and 
joint recapitalisation between the bank owners, investors and the government. Th  e latter 
required some criteria that must be met by the banks, including the obligation to inject 
additional capital (minimum of 20 percent of required capital to meet capital-adequacy ratio 
(CAR) of 4 percent), a viable business plan, and fi  tness and probity of the banks’ controlling 
shareholders and management (Figure 13).
Further, if an insolvent bank was considered to have a signifi  cant role in the economy30 
it was taken over by the government (IBRA), and/or merged with another bank. Th  e 
objectivity of this additional criterion in practice, however, is debatable. Insolvent banks 
that failed to meet these criteria were frozen and then later liquidated. Th   en, the government 
announced the results of the due diligence review and assessment on the viability of banks 
to be included in the joint recapitalisation programme.
30  Mainly based on the number of deposit accounts.94
Source: Batunanggar (2002 and 2004)
The eligibility of a bank for joint recapitalisation was primarily based on two main aspects: (1) 
the viability of a bank’s business plan; and (2) the fitness and probity of bank’s management and 
controlling shareholders. The assessment was conducted by several committees (Technical 
Committee, Evaluation Committee, and Policy Committee) representing Bank Indonesia, 
Ministry of Finance and IBRA. To ensure transparency and objectivity, independent observers 
representing the IMF, World Bank, and the ADB were invited to the meeting, but without any 
rights over the decision-making process.
I.  Business Plan Review
a. Main  criteria, included:
  •  ability of bank’s shareholders and/or new investors to inject minimum of 20 percent funds  
    to meet a 4 percent CAR,
 •   compliance with the existing regulations (legal lending limit, net open position, etc.),
 •   bank’s viability to meet CAR of 8 percent at end of 2001, based on a stress test model. 
b. Additional  criteria, included:
 •   asset rehabilitation plan, business development plan, franchise values (networks, IT/IS)  
    and significance to the economy, projected ROE 15 percent at the end of 2001.
  •  A bank will pass the business plan review if it meets at least all these main criteria.
II. Fit and Proper Test
The fit and proper test was conducted on the banks’ controlling shareholders (owners of more 
than 25 percent of the shares), board of commissioners, and board of directors. The fit and 
proper test consists of:
  •  Fitness Test – the competence and independence of bank’s board of commissioners and  
  directors.
  •  Propriety Test – integrity, fulfillment of commitment to BI, enlistment of bad debts and/or  
    other imprudent fraudulent actions committed by the bank’s management and controlling  
  shareholders.
Figure  13: The Criteria of Recapitalisation Programme
Indonesia’s banking crisis was the most severe in East Asia and one of the costliest of 
the last quarter of the twentieth century. Figure 14 shows that the fi  scal costs amounted to 
Rp654 trillion or 51 percent of GDP to rehabilitate Indonesia’s banking system.
Source: Batunanggar (2002 and 2004), Bank Indonesia
Figure 14
Indonesia’s Fiscal Cost of Banking Crisis Resolution











Batunanggar (2002 and 2004) argued that the crisis resolution suff  ered from two main 
problems: (i) a lack of understanding on the part of the IMF and on the part of the authorities 
in handling the crisis, which resulted in the adoption of inappropriate strategies both at 
the macro and micro level; and (ii) a lack of government commitment to take consistent 
and objective measures. To be eff  ective, the resolution process should be carried out in an 
objective, transparent, and consistent manner in order to restore the health of the fi  nancial 
system and of the economy. Batunanggar derived ten key lessons learned from Indonesia’s 
banking crisis. Th   ey are summarised in Figure 15.
Source: Batunanggar S. (2002 and 2004)
(1)   Open bank resolution strategy and implicit guarantees (are not effective measures for bank 
 resolution. 
(2)   Political intervention and a lack of commitment to resolve the crisis disrupts the resolution        
    process and aggravates the situation, where inconsistent policies and a reluctance to 
    address the core problems and take tough decisions hinder the effectiveness of crisis 
 resolution.
(3)  Bank closure should be executed rapidly but with a well-devised strategy, including a 
         contingency plan consisting of a worst-case scenario and risk-mitigation strategy to prevent 
  and/or to resolve the problems.  
(4)  Bank restructuring policies should be transparent, uniform and implemented consistently. 
(5)   A blanket guarantee is important, but should only be used as temporary measure in crisis 
 resolution. 
(6)   A transparent and clearly defined lender-of-last-resort (LLR) policy and procedures are 
  required for crisis management, in particular, in a systemic crisis environment. 
(7)   A combination of micro and macroeconomic policies is required for an effective crisis 
  management, in particular, if the currency crisis and banking crisis occur simultaneously. 
(8)  Effective cooperation between the related institutions is necessary for effective crisis 
  prevention and resolution. 
(9)  Institutional capacity is an important aspect of crisis management. The ability to 
  acknowledge the extent of a crisis early and to devise proper resolution strategies is essential.
(10) Prudential banking regulation and supervision is a principal element in creating and 
  maintaining financial system stability.
Figure 15: Key Lessons Learned from Indonesia’s Banking Crisis Resolution
7.3   Banking Crisis Management in the Post Crisis        
Based on the Central Bank Act, Bank Indonesia is permitted to perform only a very 
limited role as lender of last resort. Bank Indonesia can only provide limited LLR in normal 
times to banks (for a maximum of 90 days) that have high quality and liquid collateral. Th  e 
collateral could be securities, or claims issued by the Government, or other highly-rated legal 
entities, which can be readily sold in the market. In practice, government recapitalisation 
bonds and Bank Indonesia Certifi  cates (SBIs) are the only eligible assets currently available 
to banks. Th   e facility serves like a discount window, which the central bank routinely opens at 
all times to handle normal day-to-day operational mismatches which might be experienced 
by a bank. However, the facility does not constitute a LLR function typically used to provide 
emergency liquidity support to the fi  nancial system during crisis periods (i.e. when banks 
usually do not have high quality collateral).96
Two strategic measures have been adopted as part of a comprehensive crisis 
management strategy. Th   e government blanket guarantee is replaced with an explicit deposit 
insurance scheme, and the lender of last resort (LLR) facility redesigned.
7.3.1  Explicit and Limited and Deposit Insurance Scheme  
Th  e government blanket guarantee programme, which came into eff  ect because of 
the crisis, has indeed been successful in recovering public confi  dence in the banking sector. 
However, research shows that the blanket guarantee has contributed to moral hazard by 
bank managers and customers, and has the potential to create crises in the long-run.
In order to prevent any negative impact on fi  nancial stability, the implementation 
of the deposit insurance scheme was made in stages. Th  e entire liabilities of banks were 
guaranteed by the IDIC up to March 2005. Th  en, starting from March 2007, the deposit 
insurance was limited to up to Rp100 million per customer per bank. In the event of bank 
failure, the IDIC will insure customer deposits up to a certain amount, while non-insured 
deposits will be resolved through the bank liquidation process. Th  e IDIC is expected to 
preserve public confi  dence in the Indonesian banking industry.
A Memorandum of Understanding between Bank Indonesia and IDIC is being 
prepared to facilitate eff  ective coordination and information exchange between the two 
organizations. As mentioned earlier, deposit insurance is one element of fi  nancial safety 
nets. For it to be implemented eff  ectively, it must be supported by other nets, especially 
eff  ective banking supervision.
7.3.2  Emergency Liquidity Assistance for Systemic Crisis
Bank Indonesia (BI) in its capacity as lender of the last resort may provide a loan to 
a bank to resolve a short-term funding diffi   culty. Th   e lender-of-last resort policy is part of 
the fi  nancial safety net essential to fi  nancial system stability. As a lender of last resort, Bank 
Indonesia may give loans to commercial banks for both normal times and systemic crises, 
in order to solve liquidity problems. In principle, liquidity facility could only be provided to 
solvent banks.
Th   ere are two types of lender-of-last resort facilities extended by BI to commercial 
banks. First, is the Short-Term Funding Facility (FPJP), which is extended to banks 
experiencing liquidity diffi   culties at end of the day (overnight) to resolve liquidity diffi   culty 
under normal conditions. Provision of the FPJP must be backed by provision of liquid, high 
value collateral by the bank to Bank Indonesia. Second, is the Emergency Financing Facility 
(EFF) for a problem bank that is facing liquidity diffi   culty that has systemic impact, but still 
meeting the level of solvency prescribed by Bank Indonesia. 
Th   e EFF is a facility for addressing systemic impact or risk in an emergency in order to 
prevent and resolve a crisis. Th   e extension of this facility is jointly decided by the Minister of 
Finance and the Governor Bank Indonesia, and is funded at the expense of the government. 
Th   e decision to extend the EFF shall be based on the assessment of the potential threat of 
systemic risk to fi  nancial system stability and the negative impact on the economy, if the 
EFF is not extended to the bank. Th   e funding for the EFF is charged to the state budget 97
through the issuance of government securities. However, the requirements on solvency and 
collaterals, with several exceptions, are still applicable.
A Memorandum of Understanding between the Minister of Finance and the 
Governor of Bank Indonesia has been signed spelling out the stipulations and procedures 
for decision making in the handling of problem bank that has systemic impact, provision 
of the emergency fi  nancing facility, and for the fi  nancing source from the state budget. In 
implementing the guidelines, the Ministry of Finance and BI issued regulations governing 
the extension of the EFF for commercial banks that was incorporated into the Minister of 
Finance Decree and BI regulation.
Th   e key challenge relating to the extension of EFF is ensuring consensus that Bank 
Indonesia and the Ministry of Finance reach agreement about the systemic risks and the 
prompt and appropriate action to take.
7.3.3  Strengthening the Financial System Stability 
Maintaining the stability of the fi  nancial system requires concerted eff  orts from the 
various authorities. Th  erefore,  eff  ective coordination and cooperation is urgently required 
in response to potential instability and systemic crises that frequently require mutual policy-
making and harmonisation of policy issues.
In line with its mission of maintaining monetary stability, Bank Indonesia plays an 
active role in maintaining fi  nancial system stability. In maintaining fi  nancial system stability, 
Bank Indonesia adopts four major strategies (i) implementing regulations and standards, 
including the fostering of market discipline; (ii) intensifying research and surveillance on 
the fi  nancial system; (iii) improving eff  ective coordination and cooperation between the 
relevant institutions; and iv) establishing fi  nancial safety nets, including lender of last resort, 
both for normal times and systemic crisis, explicit and limited deposit insurance scheme, 
and crisis management. (See Figure 16)
To bolster fi  nancial system stability, the government and Bank Indonesia have prepared 
a comprehensive Financial Safety Net (FSN) framework. Th   e FSN framework clearly defi  nes 
the objectives and elements of the FSN, roles and responsibilities of the relevant authorities, 
and a coordination mechanism linking the authorities. Th  e FSN has four elements: (i) 
eff  ective supervision and regulation; (ii) lender of last resort; (iii) deposit insurance; and 
(iv) eff  ective crisis management. Currently, a task force comprising the staff   members of the 
Ministry of Finance, Bank Indonesia, and the IDIC, is draft  ing the FSN Law. Th  e  law  will 
provide a solid legal framework empowering the respective authorities to perform crisis 
management to preserve fi  nancial stability.98
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On 30 December 2005, the Minister of Finance, the Governor of Bank Indonesia, 
and the Chairman of the DIC signed a joint decree to establish the Financial System 
Stability Forum (FSSF), a vehicle for the coordination and sharing of information among 
the authorities. Th   e FSSF is expected to improve coordination between the authorities and, 
consequently, bolster eff  orts to preserve fi  nancial system stability. 
Th   e main responsibility of the FSSF is to provide recommendations to the Coordinating 
Committee – consisting of the Finance Minister, the Governor of Bank Indonesia and the 
Chairman of IDIC – who is responsible for determining the resolution  measures for failing 
bank with systemic risk31. 
Th   e  FSSF has four main functions: (i) support the responsibilities of the joint committee 
in the decision-making process for failing banks that has systemic risk; (ii) coordinate and 
share information to synchronise the prudential rules and regulations in the fi  nancial 
sector; (iii) discuss the problems of fi  nancial institutions that have systemic risk, based on 
the information from the supervisory authority; and (iv) coordinate the implementation 
initiatives in the fi  nancial sector, for instance, the Indonesian Financial Sector Architecture 
(IFSA) and the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).
Th   e FSSF consists of three tiers: the Steering Forum, the Executive Forum and  the 
Working Group (Figure 17).
31  According to Th   e Deposit Insurance Company, No. 24 of 2004.99
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8.   Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
8.1   Conclusions
Th   e twin “banking and currency” crisis, which struck Indonesia severely in 1997/98, 
was a very costly and painful experience.  Th   e crisis episode has taught us hard but very 
important lessons. It has also brought about the awareness of the importance of eff  ective risk 
management and good governance as well as eff  ective banking supervision and fi  nancial 
system stability. 
Learning from the crisis experience, Bank Indonesia and the government have taken     
measures to reform the banking system, including banking restructuring and improving the 
eff  ectiveness of banking supervision. Signifi  cant progress has been achieved through the 
execution of various initiatives to improve the banking supervision framework, including 
problem bank management. 
Th   e resolution of problem banks has been enhanced with the establishment of the 
IDIC and the gradual introduction of an explicit and limited deposit insurance scheme. 
Furthermore, Indonesia has developed a framework of fi  nancial safety nets and procedures 
for dealing eff  ectively with crisis prevention and resolution. Among the key measures 
introduced are emergency liquidity assistance to contain systemic liquidity risk and 
development of a crisis management policy and protocol. In addition, the coordination and 
cooperation among the fi  nancial safety net players – Bank Indonesia, the IDIC and Ministry 
of Finance – have been improved with the establishment of the Coordinating Committee 
and Financial System Stability Committee.100
To enhance the resilience of the fi  nancial system, Bank Indonesia performs macro-
prudential surveillance to assess and monitor developments and risks to the fi  nancial system 
as a whole. Th   e Financial Stability Review is published regularly to foster understanding and 
stimulate discussions among the stakeholders on issues related to fi  nancial stability.     
However, there are still some key issues and fl  aws in Bank Indonesia’s current problem 
bank management, including: (i) CAMELS supervisory rating and risk assessment systems 
are redundant and markedly quantitative. Th   ese limitations hinder analytical thinking and 
supervisory judgment aff  ecting the quality of the supervision work; (ii) the need for bank 
supervisors to improve their skills in line with the implementation of risk-based supervisory 
framework and risk management; (iii) there is still redundancy in the bank supervision 
process deterring the effi   ciency of bank supervisors and limiting their time and attention 
to strategic issues of problem bank management; and (iv) the need for strong enforcement 
a c t i o n  a g a i n s t  w e a k  b a n k s  t o  b e  e x e c u t e d  p r o m p t l y  i n  o r d e r  t o  f o s t e r  g o o d  c o r p o r a t e  
governance and market discipline in the banking industry.
In addition, under the current human resource management system, there is no 
incentive for bank supervisors to enhance their capability and improve their performance. 
Th  e main culprit behind this issue is the adoption of a standard or “one-size-fi  ts-all” 
performance appraisal system. Th   ere are no specifi  c job values and career development plan 
for employees, particularly for bank supervisors which require specialisation. Currently, 
a job value system, which assigns diff  erent values for diff  erent jobs, according to the   
complexity and risks of the work performed, has been developed and is being discussed at 
the top level.
Th  e adoption of risk-based rules set expectations for the banking industry and 
provides a frame of reference for the supervisor. Th   is approach will foster more transparent 
and prudent behavior on the part of the bank owner and management and will promote 
awareness of the importance of risk management and good governance, which is the fi  rst 
line of defense in the banking system. 
8.2   Policy Recommendations
Various tools are needed for problem bank resolution, including a strong legal 
framework that contains a combination of rules versus discretion to allow for fl  exible and 
speedy decisions. Th   is new approach should be supported by the development of fl  exible 
risk-assessment methodologies for individual banks and for the banking system as a whole. 
It is recommended that Bank Indonesia should improve its risk assessment systems.
Th   e following are among the priority initiatives: First, is the need to improve the risk-
based supervisory framework and systems. One obvious step is to integrate the CAMELS   
supervisory rating system and the risk assessment system (RAS) – since they overlap and 
result in some duplication of work eff  ort, and to improve its methodology in order to 
promote bank supervisor’s analytical thinking and judgment. 
Second, is to enhance the capability of bank supervisors consistently and continuously. 
With the implementation of Basel II starting 2008, bank supervisors are required not only 
to assess the adequacy of the bank’s risk management in general, but also the feasibility of 101
the bank’s internal model for calculating capital charge. Th   is is a new area which requires 
advance knowledge, skills and experience. Th   erefore, bank supervisors should be provided 
training and development to enhance their capability and motivation to gear them up for the 
more challenging supervisory tasks they have to perform. 
Th  ird, in line with global fi  nancial integration and a rapidly changing fi  nancial 
landscape, the bank supervisor has to be able to eff  ectively measure both the endogenous and 
exogenous risks to the individual banks and the banking system. Th   e current information 
technology and information systems for bank supervisors need further improvement. 
Fourth, the bank supervisory process should be reviewed and streamlined to eliminate 
administrative overlaps, remove work duplication and reduce the number of unnecessary 
reports. Improvement in the effi   ciency of the work process will allow bank supervisors to 
focus more on risk analysis and follow-up on banks’ problems.
Fift  h, is the need to carry out comprehensive organisational development, with 
particular attention to integrating the “soft  ” elements, namely, the skills, styles and culture 
for meeting the challenging and growing complexity of banking supervision. Th  is  initiative 
should be driven by consistent change management, including the development of leadership. 
To be eff ective, the organisational development should be supported by the appropriate 
training and development, human performance appraisal, and incentive systems. 
Sixth, a strong and comprehensive legal framework is essential to confer the necessary 
legal powers as well as legal protection for supervisors in carrying out bank supervision 
under a risk-based and judgmental supervisory regime.
Th  e  swift   development of banking business and fi  nancial globalization bring higher 
and more complex risks to the banks, which require the bank supervisor to be more hands-on 
and pro-active. Th   erefore, the key words in view for the bank are: eff  ective risk management 
and stronger capital. For the bank supervisor, they are eff  ective risk-based supervision and 
profi  cient human capital.
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❑  Performing a Diagnostic Review
As an initial step, a financial review (“due diligence”) was carried out by the BI supervisors and international 
auditors to determine the banks’ solvency and the recapitalisation costs, based on stricter criteria of asset 
classification and loan loss provisioning. Based on the result of this due diligence, banks were categorised into 
three categories according to their capital adequacy ratio (CAR): “A” banks with CAR of 4 percent or more, 
“B” banks with CAR from –25 percent up to less than 4 percent, and “C” banks with CAR less than –25 
percent.
The “A” banks were not required to adopt the recapitalisation programme. However, they had to prepare 
business and action plans to improve their performance. While the “B” bank had to increase their capital to 
meet a CAR of at least 4 percent either by self-recapitalisation or by applying for joint-governmental 
recapitalisation. 
❑  Recapitalisation Programme
The eligibility of a bank for the joint recapitalisation programme was primarily based on two aspects: (1) the 
viability of a banks’ business plan; and (2) the fitness, and probity of banks’ management and controlling 
shareholders. The assessment was conducted by several committees (Technical Committee, Evaluation 
Committee, and Policy Committee) representing Bank Indonesia, Ministry of Finance and IBRA). To ensure 
transparency and objectivity, independent observers representing the IMF, the World Bank, and the ADB 
were invited to the meeting, but without any rights in the decision making process.
❑  Business Plan Preparation
Viability for the joint-recapitalisation programme was based on two main criteria: (1) the business prospect 
measured by the viability of the bank’s business plan, and (2) the fitness and propriety of management and 
owners. Other criteria were the bank’s contribution to the economy measured by networks and number of 
depositors. In particular, “C” category banks had to increase their capital to the minimum level of “B” banks in 
30 days in order to be considered for the recapitalisation programme. The bank’s business plan comprised:
a. Current condition -  identification of a bank’s core problems and areas for improvement
b. Economic assumptions used for the projections
c. Asset Rehabilitation Plan - action plans to reduce non-performing loans (NPLs) 
d. Compliance Plan with the regulations - action plans to settle Legal Lending Limit (LLL) and net open   
  position (NOP) violations, and to improve the loan quality to affiliated debtors 
e. Business Development Plan - bank strategies to improve performance and soundness comprising risk   
  management, governance, operational efficiency.
f.  Settlement plan of Bank Indonesia Liquidity Support (BLBI) 
g. Divestment Plan of government shares within three years
h. Financial Projections - detailed financial projections including financial targets: CAR of minimum 8 
  percent and RoE minimum 15 percent by 31 December 2001.
❑  Reviewing the Business Plan 
a. Main criteria, included:
-  capability of shareholders and/or new investors to inject min. 20 percent funds to meet a 4 percent CAR, 
-  compliance with the existing regulations (legal lending limit, net open position, etc.),
-   bank’s viability to meet CAR of 8 percent by the end of 2001. The bank’s projected CAR in December 2001   
  was based on a stress test model developed by international consultants.
b. Additional criteria, included:
-  asset rehabilitation plan, business development plan, franchise values (networks, IT/IS) and significance to  
  the economy, projected RoE 15 percent by the end of 2001. 
A bank would pass the business plan review if it met at least all the main criteria.
❑  Performing a Fit and Proper Test
The fit and proper test was conducted on a bank’s shareholders (those owning more than 25 percent shares or 
the controlling shareholders), board of commissioners, and board of directors. The fit and proper test 
consisted of:
a. Fitness Test - assessment of the competence and independence of bank’s board of commissioners and   
 directors.
b. Propriety Test - assessment of integrity fulfillment of commitment to BI, enlistment of bad debts and or 
  delinquent people in the banking sector, other imprudent and fraudulent actions. 
❑  Recapitalisation
The recapitalisation process involved several key steps including:
  ■ Transferring a bank’s bad loans to IBRA;
  ■ Signing the recapitalisation agreement (contract) between the government, BI and the bank’s  
  management.   
  ■ Injecting additional capital by bank owners (fresh fund) and the government (government bonds).
Figure 18:  Bank Restructuring Process in Indonesia106
Source: Batunanggar (2002 and 2004)
Figure 19:  List of Liquidated Banks, Banks Taken Over (BTO), 
Frozen Banks (BBO) and Recapitalised Banks
1st Round Closures - Liquidated Banks  (16):
1 November 1997
3rd Round Closure - Frozen Banks (38):
13 March 1999
2nd and 3rd Round
Taken-over (9)
1. Bank  Andromeda
2. Bank  Anrico
3.  Bank Astria Raya
4.  Bank Harapan  
 Sentosa
5. Bank  Citrahasta 
6. Bank  Dwipa 
 Semesta
7.  Bank Guna Int’l
8. Bank  Industri
9. Bank  Majapahit
10. Bank  Mataram 
11. Bank  Jakarta
12. Bank  Kosagraha
13. Bank  Pacific 
14. Bank  Pinaesaan
15. Bank  SEAB
16. Bank  SBU
1. Bank  Sewu
2.   Bank Papan Sejatera
3.   Bank Indonesia Raya
4.   Bank Ficorinvest
5.   Bank Central Dagang
6.   Bank Dharmala
7.   Bank Ciputra
8.   Bank Sembada 
 Artanugroho
9.   Bank Aken
10.  Bank Intan
11.  Bank Alfa
12.  Bank Dewa Rutji
13.  Bank Kharisma
14.  Bank Umum Servetia
15.  Bank Arya Panduarta
16. Bank  Sino
17. Bank  Danahutama
18.  Bank Budi Internasional
19. Bank  Orient
20.  Bank Sahid Gajah 
 Perkasa
21.  Bank Dana Asia
22.  Bank Yakin Makmur
23.  Bank Asia Pacific
24.  Bank Putra Surya  
 Perkasa
25.  Bank Pesona Kriyadana
26.  Bank Bepede Indonesia
27. Bank Mashil Utama
28. Bank Dagang Industri
29. Bank Indotrade
30. Bank Bumiraya Utama
31. Bank Baja 
32. Bank Tata
33. Bank Lautan Berlian
34. Bank Uppindo
35. Bank Metropolitan 
 Raya
36. Bank Hastin Int’l.
37. Bank Namura  
 Internusa
38. Bank Bahari
2nd Round Closures - 
(10) Frozen Banks
1st Round Taken- 
over (8)
4 April 1998
 1.  Bank  Centris
 2.  Bank  Deka
 3.  Bank  Hokkindo
 4.  Bank  Istimarat
 5.  Bank  Pelita
 6.  Bank  Subentra
 7.  Bank  Surya
21 August 1998
  8.  Bank Umum  
   Nasional*
  9.  Bank Dagang  
   Nasional  Ind.*
 10. Bank  Modern*
4 April 1998
 1. Bank  Danamon
  2.  Bank FDFCI
  3.  Bank Tiara
  4.  Bank Umum  
   Nasional*
  5.  Bank Dagang  
   Nasional  Ind.*
 6. Bank  Modern*
  7.  Bank Ekspor Impor  
   Ind
29 May 1998
  8.  Bank Central Asia
2nd Round
March 13, 1999 
 1.  Bank  Duta 
  2.  Bank Nusa Nasional
  3.  Bank Pos Nusantara
 4.  Bank  Jaya
 5.  Bank  Tamara,
 6.  Bank  Rama
  7.  Bank Risyad Salim  
   Int’l 
3rd Round
21 April 1999
 8.  Bank  Niaga
23 July 1999
 9.  Bank  Bali
1st Round (7) 
21 April 1999 
  1.  Bank Lippo, Tbk.
  2.  Bank Int’l Indonesia
 3.  Bank  Bukopin
 4.  Bank  Universal
  5.  Bank Prima Ekspress
 6.  Bank  Artamedia
 7.  Bank  Patriot
4th Round (3) 
March 2000 
 1.  Bank  Danamon,
    Merged with 7 BTOs 
  • Bank  Duta 
  •  Bank Nusa Nasional 
  •  Bank Pos Nusantara 
  • Bank  Jaya 
  • Bank  Tamara, 
  • Bank  Rama 
  •  Bank Risyad Salim Int’l
June 2000
 1.  Bank  Bali 
 2.  Bank  Niaga
2nd Round (12)
28 May 1999 
Regional development 
banks
  1.  BPD DI Aceh
 2.  Bengkulu
  3.  BPD Sumatera Utara
 4.  BPD  Lampung
  5.  BPD DKI Jakarta
  6.  BPD Jawa Tengah 
  7.  BPD Jawa Timur 
 8.  BPD  NTB 
 9.  BPD  NTT
  10. BPD Kalimantan  
   Barat
  11. BPD Sulawesi Utara
 12.  BPD  Maluku
3rd Round (4)
(March - July 2000) 
 State-owned  banks
 1.  Bank Mandiri* 
 2.  Bank BNI
 3.  Bank BRI
 4.  Bank BTN 
 *a new established bank,  
 merger of 4 state-owned  
 banks: 
 •  Bank Ekspor Impor  
   Indonesia
 •  Bank Bumi Daya, 
 •  Bank Dagang Negara 
 •  Bank Pembangunan  
   Indonesia
Recapitalisation of 
Private Banks
Recapitalisation of Regional Development
and State-owned Banks107
 
In performing its duties, the IDIC is authorised to determine and collect insurance premiums, as 
well as to determine and collect contributions from banks’ upon becoming a member of the IDIC 
and to manage the IDIC assets and liabilities. 
In line with its mandate, the IDIC has legal authority:
(1) to obtain customers’ deposit data, the bank’s soundness report, the bank’s financial 
  statement, and the bank examination report, as long as it does not violate the bank’s secrecy; 
(2) perform reconciliation, verification and/or confirmation on those data; 
(3) determine the terms and conditions, procedures, and requirements on claim payments; 
(4) appoint, delegate, and/or assign other parties to act in the interest and/or on behalf of the 
  IDIC, to perform tasks; and 
(5) carry out public awareness programs among the banks and the general public on deposit 
  insurance as well as impose administrative sanctions.
With regard to the resolution and handling of failing bank, the IDIC has legal authority to: 
(1)  take over and exercise all the rights and powers of the shareholders, including the rights and 
  powers of the general shareholder meeting; 
(2) possess and manage assets and liabilities of the failing bank that is rescued; 
(3)  review and terminate and/or alter any contracts between the failing bank that is rescued and 
  other parties that are burdensome to the bank; and 
(4) sell and or transfer failing bank assets without debtor permission and/or failing bank 
  liabilities without creditor permission.
In the meantime, when a bank is predicted to be a failing bank, the IDIC is responsible to do the 
following: 
(1) estimate the cost of closed bank where the cost of resolution is the least; 
(2) to provide recommendations for the rescuing or closing of non-systemic effect bank, 
  appoint an intervention manager; 
(3) appoint a rescue bank manager or to form a  liquidation team; and  
(4) plan and organise intervention arrangements on top of implementing intervention, including  
  redeeming deposits, or assuming the business’ of the failing bank.
Figure 20:  The IDIC Authorities and Responsibilities
Source: The IDIC Law No.24 of 2004109
CHAPTER 4
1. Introduction
Bank Negara Malaysia - the Central Bank of Malaysia - has the primary responsibility 
for maintaining the stability of the Malaysian fi  nancial system and for supervising fi  nancial 
institutions licensed under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA) as 
well as Islamic banks licensed under the Islamic Banking Act 1983 (IBA). Globalisation and 
liberalisation as well as fi  nancial innovation and technological advances have resulted in a 
fast changing fi  nancial landscape leading to a signifi  cant transformation of the operating 
environment. Managing the risks emanating from these changes is a key supervisory 
challenge. Supervisors are left   with the imperative of designing a suitable regulatory and 
supervisory framework which will allow the supervisor to pursue developmental objectives, 
encouraging greater effi   ciency and competition in the fi  nancial system, and to ensure the 
attainment of the fi  nancial stability objectives at the same time. 
 
Malaysia, like many other South-East Asian countries, went through a process 
of fi  nancial liberalisation aft  er the Asian fi  nancial crisis of 1997. Although Malaysia had 
embarked on fi  nancial as well as prudential reforms since the early 1990’s, the Asian 
crisis quickened the pace for the implementation of various measures for addressing the 
vulnerabilities that had manifested in the banking system at that time. Th   e crisis heightened 
the need for building a fi  nancial sector that would be resilient, effi   cient and responsive to 
the changing economic structure. Th   e Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) formulated by 
Bank Negara Malaysia in early 2001 outlined the medium and longer-term strategies for 
the development of the fi  nancial sector, including conventional, Islamic and investment 
banking. 
Bank Negara Malaysia’s regulatory philosophy remains unchanged as it seeks to 
maintain a balance between fostering effi   ciency and promoting innovation whilst preserving 
fi  nancial stability through, amongst others, the promotion of sound risk management 
practices. Th  e role of the bank supervisor is to ensure that banks have risk management 
systems in place and hold adequate capital that commensurate with their risk profi  le, with 
the supervisor having authority to review and intervene when necessary. Th  e  supervisory 
regime is required to be supported by a comprehensive set of regulatory and supervisory 
powers, enacted by legislation and combined with eff  ective enforcement of the appropriate 
legislation. Th  e institutional framework includes having strong and eff  ective  banking 
supervision and regulation with suffi   cient authority to enforce prompt corrective action 
measures to contain banking crises and avoid contagion, a structured intervention approach, 
and an eff  ective judicial system for failed bank resolution processes.
 
PROBLEM BANK IDENTIFICATION, INTERVENTION
AND RESOLUTION IN MALAYSIA
by Uma Rajoo1
1  Author is Senior Executive of the Bank Supervision Department of Bank Negara Malaysia. Th   e views expressed in this paper are those of the 
author’s which do not necessarily refl  ect those of Bank Negara Malaysia or Th  e  SEACEN  Centre.110
2.  Legal and Institutional Framework
Bank Negara Malaysia was established under the Central Bank of Malaysia Act, 1958 
(CBA) which, among other things, provided for the licensing and regulation of the banking 
business. Th   e Banking and Financial Institutions Act (BAFIA), introduced in 1989, extended 
the powers of Bank Negara Malaysia for the supervision and regulation of the institutions 
engaged in deposit-taking and extension of fi  nance and credit facilities. Th   e BAFIA repealed 
the Finance Companies Act, 1969 and the Banking Act, 1973 which only granted the Bank 
supervisory and regulatory powers over deposit-taking institutions. While the Minister of 
Finance retains the authority for licensing of fi  nancial institutions, Bank Negara Malaysia 
recommends the entry criteria for licensed institutions. Under BAFIA, the Bank is able to 
prescribe comprehensive protective regulations to protect depositors’ and creditors’ interests. 
Th   e supervisors are conferred legal authority to institute investigations and prosecution of 
illegal deposit-taking activities, and they are accorded legal protection from prosecution in 
the course of carrying out their supervisory activities.
Currently, the three main regulators of the Malaysian fi  nancial system are: (1) Bank 
Negara Malaysia, which as the central bank, regulates the banking institutions, insurance 
companies and selected development fi  nancial institutions; (2) Th   e Securities Commission 
of Malaysia (SC) which regulates the capital markets; and (3) Th   e Labuan Off  shore Financial 
Services Authority (LOFSA) which regulates the off  shore fi  nancial services.
Additionally, the Malaysia Deposit Insurance Corporation (Perbadanan Insurans 
Deposit Malaysia or PIDM), was established in 2005 with the enactment of the Malaysia 
Deposit Insurance Act 2005, to provide least-cost resolution options when dealing with 
problem banks. Deposit insurance represents an added safety net for the promotion of 
fi  nancial stability. However, Bank Negara Malaysia remains the principal regulator, having 
the sole authority to declare whether a bank has failed and transfer the bank to PIDM 
for determining the appropriate resolution method. Th  is clear legal division of duties 
and responsibilities is important for all the fi  nancial safety-net participants in the crisis-
resolution framework as it serves to minimise the regulatory burden of dual reporting on 
the banks as well as prevent premature intervention. 
3.  Communication and Coordination of Activities
Eff  ective communication and coordination between the stakeholders is also crucial. 
A formal division of duties and responsibilities can be reached by legal arrangement 
or administrative regulation. Bank Negara Malaysia has in place a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the SC and LOFSA which allows it to address the supervision of all 
entities as part of its consolidated supervision. With the PIDM, Bank Negara Malaysia has 
entered into a Strategic Alliance Agreement to facilitate cooperation between both parties. 
Th   ese agreements provide for a structured collaboration between the Bank and the other 
agencies to share information on key issues and developments to facilitate the surveillance 
operations. Both formal and informal information-exchange mechanisms have been put 
in place to facilitate timely data and information exchanges that can be leveraged upon 
to support and enable the other agencies to fulfi  l their mandated roles. Th  is has proven 
particularly successful as it has enabled all the parties to identify overlaps and duplication 
of eff  orts, rescinded unnecessary formalities and harmonised the surveillance function over 
institutions.111
4.  Prudential Regulation and Supervision
Bank Negara Malaysia is empowered to issue regulations as provided for under 
Section 126 of BAFIA,2 thus making them legally enforceable. Regulations need to be 
reviewed to ensure they remain eff  ective, i.e. they accord banks suffi   cient fl  exibility to 
operate and yet ensure the banking system remains resilient and sound. Th  e banking 
reformation measures put in place throughout the last decade have created larger entities 
through mergers and consolidation of the banks. Th   e regulatory and supervisory framework 
should provide suffi   cient incentives for greater market discipline, stakeholder activism, 
and accountability amongst the board of directors, senior management and shareholders 
of fi  nancial institutions, depositors and other market participants. With a continuously 
evolving operating environment, it is essential that liberalisation and deregulation initiatives 
are accompanied by appropriate measures to strengthen the capacity and capabilities of the 
banks.
 
Bank Negara Malaysia introduced prudential and regulatory reforms progressively, 
which included regulations on risk-management capabilities, governance standards and 
transparency, to further enhance the strength of the banking system. Th   is was in tandem 
with developments in the international scene, which saw a shift   in regulatory focus trending 
away from rule-based regulation to principle-based regulation, and placing greater reliance 
on a bank’s internal controls and risk-management systems.
4.1   Problem Bank Identifi  cation - Supervisory Regime and Rating 
Framework
Th   e regulatory framework needs to be supported by an eff  ective supervisory framework 
which will include the evaluation of the overall performance and fi  nancial condition of each 
player in the banking system. Th   e supervisory approach must be dynamic to allow for the 
early detection of weaknesses or defi  ciencies that could potentially destabilise the fi  nancial 
system. As the rapid changes taking place in the banking system saw the emergence of larger 
entities, more complex operating structures and products, the approach for monitoring the 
safety and soundness of banks also evolved as Bank Negara Malaysia opted for a enhanced 
risk-based approach in 2007. 
4.1.1  Risk-based Approach Using CAMELS3 Framework
Prior to 2007, Bank Negara Malaysia adopted the CAMELS framework which focused 
on key risks of the banks portfolio which would threaten the safety and soundness of banking 
institutions which included a forward-looking approach in assessing the banks’ risk profi  le 
and risk-management systems. Under this approach, the Bank accorded greater supervisory 
focus in evaluating the banking institutions’ credit, market and operational risks. 
 
Structure-wise, this approach consists of two functions for monitoring banks, an off  -
site and on-site function. 
2  Section 126 of the BAFIA reads: “Th   e Bank or the Minister may generally in respect of this Act, or in respect of any particular provision of this Act, 
or generally in respect of all or any of the licensed or scheduled businesses, issue such guidelines, circulars or notes as the Bank or the Minister may 
consider desirable.”
3  Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management capability, Earnings performance, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk.112
Th  e  off  -site surveillance function served as a mechanism for early identifi  cation of 
problems in the banking institutions through the review of periodic reports and information 
submitted by the banking institutions. Off  -site surveillance complemented the on-site 
examination function through routine of the fi  nancial health of banking institutions by means 
of rigorous fi  nancial analysis. Additionally, on-site examinations would be customised to suit 
the size, activities and risk profi  les of the banking institutions. Based on their supervisory 
ratings, banks would be subjected to reviews within one to three-year cycles. More frequent 
visits would be imposed upon problematic institutions, whereas those with less supervisory 
concerns would be examined within the three year cycle.
Bank Negara Malaysia used CAMELS as its supervisory-rating system to assess the 
fi  nancial soundness of the banking institutions. Th  e rating derived from the CAMELS 
assessment would form the basis of how a bank would be supervised. Th  e rating covers 
both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the fi  nancial and operating conditions of 
the banking institutions and implicitly assesses the banking institutions’ risk profi  le and 
adequacy of risk-management systems. Based on the assessment of the key risks encountered 
by the banking institutions and their capacity to manage these risks, a supervisory plan 
was formulated for each banking group so that the supervisory resources can be optimally 
allocated to areas of highest risk. Th  e  fi  nancial and operating conditions of all the entities 
within a banking group were also taken into account to ensure that these do not adversely 
aff  ect the banking group or pose a systemic threat to the banking system as a whole. 
However, with the increased complexity of products, IT systems and valuation 
models, the use of CAMELS rating systems for banks posed a challenge to supervisors. 
Firstly, although the rating system was premised on both quantitative and qualitative 
assessment factors, there was a tendency for it to be driven by mapping quantitative ratios 
to the rating. Th   e higher the ratios, the better the rating accorded to the bank. Experience 
has shown that high ratios do not necessarily provide suffi   cient buff  er in times of economic 
distress. Second, planning supervisory visits based on cycles left   lengthy gaps in between 
on-site visits. With the fi  nancial landscape evolving and new developments forcing banks to 
compete at a higher level with more risk- taking activities, continuous engagement with the 
banks is necessary. Th  e  off  -site function, while providing for the monitoring of key ratios, 
would not provide suffi   cient monitoring of the changes in governance and risk-management 
processes. Th   ird, the operating structure to facilitate supervision and the conduct of separate 
on-site and off  -site supervision, did not allow the business knowledge of the bank to be 
retained in one common repository. As the banks progressively enhanced their internal 
systems and employed more sophisticated risk-management systems, there was a greater 
need to understand the banks in order to anticipate changes in their risk profi  les.
As the environment evolved and the complexities in banking activities increased 
through progressive liberalisation of prudential standards, direct regulation became 
increasingly diffi   cult. Th  e supervisory function needed to evolve to allow the regulators 
to shift   emphasis to indirectly regulating banks by improving the banks’ risk-management 
processes. Increasingly, the focus will be on assessment of methodologies and models used for 
estimating risks, and bank-specifi  c stress tests conducted to adjudge the adequacy of capital. 
Given the complexity and rapidity of balance-sheet changes and the limited availability of 
regulatory resources, continuous surveillance of banks is a formidable undertaking. Th  e 
need for market discipline is driven by the realisation that supervisors have limited time to 
devote to each bank, whereas eff  ective market discipline requires continuous watch. 113
4.1.2  Enhanced Risk-based Supervisory Approach
Bank Negara Malaysia adopted an enhanced risk-based supervisory approach in 
early 2007 with the objective of providing a more systematic and eff  ective process to assess 
the safety and soundness of the fi  nancial institutions. With the implementation of the new 
risk-based approach, Bank Negara Malaysia discontinued the use of the CAMELS rating 
system. Under the new supervisory approach, a bank is accorded a Composite Risk Rating 
(CRR) based on the assessment of the impact of the risks of the bank on its earnings and 
capital aft  er taking into consideration the eff  ectiveness of its operational management and 
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Assessment on Capital & Earnings
Th   e assessment of the risk begins with the identifi  cation of key activities that aff  ect 
the stability and soundness of individual institution and its group. By assessing the core 
activities, the supervisor is able to obtain an understanding of how the activities are 
organised along its business lines, employing the level of granularity and generally following 
the lines of accountability and reporting within the institution to ensure that the information 
necessary for assessing the activity is readily available. Greater emphasis and responsibility 
is also placed on the institution to appropriately manage risks in line with the Bank’s move 
towards principle-based regulations. As such, the oversight functions within the institution 
are assessed by the supervisor to determine the extent to which Bank Negara Malaysia can 
place reliance on those functions to ensure the appropriate risk management controls are in 
place within the institution. Th   e overall net risk is then off  set against the capital and earnings 
positions to arrive at the supervisory rating, the CRR.114
Th   e supervisory rating is subjected to review annually, but the rating can be changed 
at any time. Th  e new framework recognises the increased complexities in the fi  nancial 
industry and the need for greater collaboration with the banks to provide assurance on the 
eff  ectiveness of their risk management capabilities. Th  e new framework provides greater 
clarity on the bank’s signifi   cant activities, material-risk exposures and quality of risk 
management as well as emphasising the role of the bank’s board of directors and senior 
management in managing its risks.
 
Under the new framework, supervisory teams would undertake a “relationship 
management” approach. Banks would be assigned a “relationship manager” (RM) who 
is responsible for keeping track of the current assessment of the institution and is the 
bank’s main point of contact. Monitoring of the banks would be on a continuous basis, 
and with the supervisory rating subject to review at any point in time during the process. 
Relationship Managers would continuously engage the banks to monitor any change in their 
core activities as well as changes in its governance and risk-management functions. Any 
issues of supervisory concerns would be communicated immediately and the banks would 
have to implement the appropriate corrective action. Th   e outcome of the implementation 
of the enhanced RBSF has translated into the supervision departments in Bank Negara 
Malaysia being restructured internally. Specialist risk units were also established to facilitate 
deeper assessment of the bank’s more technical areas such as validation of risk models and 
information technology. Re-skilling of supervisors was also required as the new approach 
required supervisors to become more proactive in seeking out more detailed information 
from the banks and be more explicit in their assessment.
4.1.3 Surveillance  Activities
A key precondition for eff  ective identifi  cation of problem banks is obtaining suffi   cient 
information to formulate an assessment of the banks’ soundness and identify areas of 
vulnerability. Both fi  nancial and non-fi  nancial data provide the key indicators not only 
for monitoring the banks’ risk profi  les but also for tracking the banks’ rate of growth and 
concentration profi  les, and will allow the supervisor to identify the risk areas early.
4.1.4  Statistical Data Submission 
Under Bank Negara Malaysia’s statistical reporting requirements, banks are expected 
to submit periodic returns through the Financial Institutions Statistical Systems to capture 
the major categories such as capital adequacy, profi  tability and liquidity ratios. Th   e use of 
statistical data submissions through periodic returns provides comparative data for analysis. 
Th   e foundation of the monitoring process is the regulatory database that has been developed 
from the series of regular statistical reports submitted to Bank Negara Malaysia by all 
institutions licensed under BAFIA. Th  ese institutions submit weekly, monthly, quarterly, 
and annual reports to the Statistical Services Department of Bank Negara Malaysia. Th  e 
statistical database is also utilised by the banking supervision function to provide additional 
monitoring reports for the off  -site surveillance of banks. A series of reports is generated 
monthly to provide comparative information to survey trends on an institution-by-
institution basis and on an industry basis. 115
4.1.5 Macro-prudential  Surveillance
Th   e key to understanding the areas of vulnerability of banks is critical as threats can 
emanate from the inter-linkages between the fi  nancial system and the real sector, as well 
as from the increased integration with the external sectors either via trade or investment 
channels. Th  erefore, to complement bank-specifi  c surveillance, the supervisors also need 
to be aware of external threats that could impact fi  nancial stability. Macro-surveillance 
aims at early identifi  cation of the potential risks and emerging vulnerabilities that could 
threaten fi  nancial stability and the smooth functioning of the fi  nancial sector. Th   e 1997 crisis 
revealed that a clear correlation exists between the performance of banks and the economic 
conditions of the markets in which they operate. A negative shock that hits the balance 
sheets of corporate borrowers is also likely to hit a bank’s capital. Th  e  fi  nancial accelerator 
eff  ect working through the deterioration in the quality of the borrowers is likely to enlarge 
the negative eff  ect on the bank’s capital.
In Bank Negara Malaysia, macro-prudential surveillance is undertaken by a separate 
department from the supervision function. Bank Negara Malaysia has improved its methods 
of assessment and surveillance tools, and currently uses techniques that involve the analysis 
and assessment of both quantitative and qualitative information, using static and trend 
analyses, scenario and sensitivity analyses as well as forward-looking analytical tools such as 
stress testing. Th   ese tests are used to gauge and assess the capacity of the individual banking 
institutions and of the system as a whole to withstand the direct impact of adverse economic 
and fi  nancial shocks, e.g. property-market adjustment, changes in bond yields and prices, 
etc. 
 
Additionally, the supervisors engage with the banks to obtain pertinent information on 
their risk profi  les, business strategies and direction as well as their risk management control 
processes. Apart from both the fi  nancial and non-fi  nancial data submitted by the fi  nancial 
institutions to Bank Negara Malaysia, information is also obtained from the interactions and 
deliberations with economists, other regulators, market players, as well as from other sources 
of market intelligence and information service providers. Th   is collection of information is 
used as part of the assessment and is translated into the supervisory rating. 
4.2  Problem Bank Intervention
It is crucial for the regulators to have the authority to intervene and impose actions 
or assume control of the operations of problematic banking institutions before the situation 
deteriorates and thus aff  ecting the stability of the banking system. Bank Negara Malaysia 
has broad supervisory powers to intervene and direct banks to take the necessary corrective 
action. Th  e supervisory assessment process enables the Bank to identify problems early 
for pre-emptive action to prevent any deterioration in a problem bank’s condition. Th  e 
supervisory rating dictates the appropriate supervisory response. By linking the supervisory 
rating to the supervisory response, supervisors are able to focus resources on the problem 
banks. However, in some circumstances, there is a presumption for formal action, regardless 
of the bank’s capital level and supervisory rating. 116
From the supervisory perspective, given the complexity and rapidity in which the 
fi  nancial position of a bank can change, the traditional capital standards are no longer 
adequate as a regulatory tool. Consequently, greater assessment is now needed on the risk-
management processes and incentive mechanisms in place for risk taking. Although a 
“hardwire” approach makes intervention by banking supervisors more objective and less 
discretionary and minimises supervisory forbearance (delay or failure to take appropriate 
action against a problem bank) by imposing the mandatory provisions, this approach does 
not lend enough fl  exibility to the banks and to the regulator. Th  e soft  -trigger approach 
allows Bank Negara Malaysia to employ a selection of corrective measures specifi  cally 
tailored to the bank to correct identifi  ed weaknesses, improve its overall condition, and 
return the bank to a safe and sound condition as quickly as possible. It grants regulators the 
discretion to devise the appropriate strategy to keep banks in business rather than imposing 
the mandatory provisions.
Formal enforcement actions are executed pursuant to Section 73 of the BAFIA. Th  e 
BAFIA empowers the Bank to exercise formal enforcement actions over the bank, bank’s 
directors, offi   cers and related companies should the need arise. As formal actions are legally 
binding, non-compliance could result in penalties as provided under the specifi  c provisions 
of the BAFIA. Th   e ultimate sanction against an institution is revocation of the bank’s licence 
and winding up of the bank. Depending on the circumstance, formal enforcement actions 
are normally initiated with the issuance of a written order outlining the actions to be taken 
by the bank and its management and the time frame for compliance.
Th   ese actions are intended to restore and strengthen the banking institution’s fi  nancial 
and operating condition to return the bank to a safe and sound footing. In this regard, the 
bank may be required to dispose off   certain assets or problem loans, remove a director or 
offi   cer from offi   ce, employ qualifi  ed offi   cers, or take any other action as deemed necessary 
by the Bank to correct the defi  ciencies. Th   e Bank may also order a bank to cease from doing 
any act which is detrimental to the fi  nancial and operating condition of the bank. Th  is 
includes restrictions on credit growth, borrowings by the bank and payment of dividends. 
If a bank’s fi  nancial condition continues to deteriorate, the bank could be subjected to 
more intensifi  ed supervision. Th  e measures include more frequent and detailed reviews, 
increased engagement with the management of the bank, obtaining commitment from the 
management and Board of Directors, submission of rehabilitation plans as well as other 
formal actions such as directives to cease certain activities and to increase the holding of 
additional capital.
 
Th  e statutory powers accorded to Bank Negara Malaysia under BAFIA provide 
supervisors with the fl  exibility to take action in a wide range of circumstances where there is 
evidence that a bank is operating in a detrimental manner, is insolvent, or is in contravention 
of any legal provision. Under Section 73 of BAFIA, Bank Negara Malaysia can intervene if a 
bank informs Bank Negara Malaysia, or Bank Negara Malaysia fi  nds a bank insolvent- that 
it is likely to be unable to meet its obligations or is likely to suspend payments. Bank Negara 
Malaysia may remove any offi   cer, or director of the bank, appoint a director to the bank, 
take control of the bank’s business, appoint a receiver or manager, or petition to wind up the 
bank. Th   is is done with the prior approval from the Minister of Finance.117
Th  e statutory powers accorded to PIDM, allows it to to lend to its member 
institutions5, guarantee deposits, loans or advances to a member institution enabling it to 
provide short-term liquidity support. It can borrow, acquire assets and non-performing 
loans from member institutions to avert risks to the fi  nancial system or a loss to PIDM (the 
powers of the PIDM are similar to the powers accorded to Danaharta during the crisis), 
and can override and prohibit caveats. Th   e PIDM’s full range of intervention and resolution 
powers will be invoked upon Bank Negara Malaysia notifying it that a member institution 
has ceased or is likely to cease to be viable. PIDM is charged with a “least cost” mandate 
when administering the deposit insurance system, i.e. to ensure the exit of banks that are 
not fi  nancially viable from the banking system is resolved with minimal disruption to the 
fi  nancial system. PIDM is solely responsible for the selection of options and is accountable 
for results of resolution process. 
4.3  Problem Bank Resolution
 
If a bank’s continued viability becomes doubtful, regulators must consider and prepare 
to implement bank-failure-contingency scenarios. As mentioned above, the supervisory 
duties for problem banks lie with Bank Negara Malaysia. Th  e Bank is responsible for 
supervising the resolution of critical problem banks through rehabilitation or orderly 
resolution management. Th  e on-going supervision of the problem bank will include 
increased monitoring and the regular review of the bank’s fi  nancials for movements in the 
balance sheet or for further depletion of capital levels. On-site visits are increased while 
reporting from the bank is enhanced to monitor the development of on-going remedial 
plans and provide input into the development of various strategies for turning the bank 
around.
Bank Negara Malaysia has the responsibility and the authority to appoint a receiver 
and to place a bank into receivership before the bank becomes critically undercapitalised if 
one or more of the specifi  ed grounds under the relevant section of the BAFIA exists.
Critical to the resolution process is collaborating and coordinating the supervision 
activities to reduce the duplication of eff  orts and regulatory burden on the banks. Th  is 
requires increased communication and coordination among both the primary and 
functional regulators to ensure an orderly resolution of the bank. Supervisors assigned to 
problem banks must communicate with the other regulators early in the resolution process. 
Consistent with their respective statutory mandates, the PIDM and Bank Negara Malaysia 
both have important roles in problem bank supervision and resolution. Th   e deposit insurance 
legislation requires the Bank to notify PIDM when a member institution has ceased or, in 
the opinion of the Bank, is likely to cease to be viable in accordance with Section 73(1) of 
the BAFIA, 1989, or, in the case of Islamic Banks, Section 37(1) of the Islamic Banking 
Act, 1983. Bank Negara Malaysia has the ultimate discretion given the circumstances as to 
whether to pass on the resolution of a member institution to the PIDM.
5  Features of Deposit Institutions in Malaysia:
•  Membership: All commercial banks, fi  nance companies and Islamic banks; Mandatory by law
•  Coverage of up to RM60,000 for all depositors.
Conventional and Islamic depositors (separate coverage).
Annual premiums assessed against member institutions. A fl  at premium rate for fi  rst two years; risk-based diff  erential premium system from the 
third year onwards.118
As mentioned above, Th   e MDIC Act grants the PIDM enforcement authority over 
member institutions that are in an unsafe or unsound condition or otherwise pose a risk to 
the deposit insurance fund. Further, under the Act, PIDM has special examination authority 
over its member institutions and may cite such authorities to seek direct participation in 
Bank Negara Malaysia’s examination activities of problem banks. PIDM’s goal is to resolve 
an institution in a manner that avoids or minimises losses to the deposit insurance fund 
and ensuring that failing institutions are resolved at the least cost to the banking system. 
PIDM has extensive resolution powers which include asset-management powers allowing 
the institution to purchase NPLs, appoint receivers, or even assume control of the bank. 
Malaysia’s experience in problem bank resolutions has largely been institutionalised with 
the establishment of PIDM. PIDM, a fi  nite life agency, has been accorded the powers of 
the two special purpose vehicles established during the crisis of 1997, namely Pengurusan 
Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta) and Danamodal Nasional Berhad (Danamodal).
5.  Crisis Management - Th   e Malaysian Experience6
Th   e 1997 crisis which began as a currency crisis eventually escalated into an economic 
crisis which adversely aff  ected the domestic economy and consequently, the corporate sector. 
Th   e ability of corporate sector to service their debt obligations was seriously impaired and 
this resulted in rising NPLs in the banking sector. Th   e banking institutions became cautious 
in granting loans and began to focus on managing the increasing non-performing loans 
portfolio. Th   ere was a sharp decline in the annual growth of loans from nearly 30% in July 
1997 to only 7.5% in August 1998. Th   e deterioration in asset quality led to the weakening of 
the banks’ balance-sheet positions and the threat of insolvency emerged.
 
Short-term measures were needed to ensure that the banking system continued to 
play its role in the smooth functioning of the intermediation process, while the long-term 
strategy to strengthen and consolidate the sector were initiated through the rationalisation, 
consolidation and reform of the fi  nancial and banking sector. 
In July 1998, the government, through the National Economic Action Council 
(NEAC), announced a comprehensive National Economic Recovery Plan (NERP) to bring 
about stability and expedite economic recovery. Th   e NERP stressed, among other things, 
the urgency of reforms within the corporate and banking sectors of the economy. Th  e 
strategy involved the setting-up of an asset management company, Danaharta, the setting 
up of a special purpose vehicle, Danamodal, and the establishment of a joint public and 
private Committee, the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC), to restructure 
corporate debt.
5.1  Resolution of Non-Performing Loans (NPL) 
Danaharta was established with the task of acquiring NPLs from banking institutions 
at discounted prices, fi  nancing them with zero-coupon bonds and managing these NPLs. 
Th   is was to allow the banks to focus on lending activities to support economic growth. In 
establishing Danaharta, it was decided that an asset management company approach would 
be adopted. Danaharta would carve-out the NPLs in the banking system by making off  ers 
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to all fi  nancial institutions. However, only NPLs valued at RM5 million and above would be 
acquired. Th   is addressed almost 70% of the total NPLs in the banking system. Th  e  number 
of accounts with loans exceeding RM5 million were relatively small, numbering between 
2,000 to 3,000 accounts. Th   is made it feasible to manage the NPLs in its portfolio on an 
account-by-account basis, thereby enabling Danaharta to choose the recovery strategy that 
would reap the best recovery value in each case. Under the Danaharta Act, Danaharta 
were accorded with three special powers to enable it to undertake its activities to meet its 
objectives expeditiously:
Th   e ability to buy assets through statutory vesting. Th   is was essential to enable 
Danaharta to acquire assets with certainty of title and maximise value. Danaharta 
would have the same interest and priority as the selling fi  nancial institution, subject 
to registered interests and disclosed claims.
Th   e ability to appoint Special Administrators to manage the aff  airs of distressed 
companies. Th   e Special Administrator would work with an independent Adviser 
to prepare a workout proposal and arrange for legal documentation and regulatory 
approval while helping to preserve the assets of the company, allowing it to remain 
as a going-concern. Th   e appointment of the Special Administrators provided for the 
employment of skilled specialists to turn around distressed companies.
Th   e ability to sell foreclosed assets quickly without going through the court process 
(National Land Code was amended to facilitate the implementation of this act). Th  e 
Act also allowed Danaharta to sell underlying collateral via private treaty, which 
was either by auction, tender or private contract. Th   is provided the fl  exibility for 
Danaharta to enhance the sale of the foreclosed properties.
Other than the acquired NPLs, Danaharta were also to manage NPLs which were 
handed over by Bank Negara Malaysia. During the fi  nancial crisis, two large banking 
institutions, namely, Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad and Sime Bank Berhad had 
experienced large losses resulting from the provisioning requirements for huge NPLs. Th  e 
operations of these two banks were merged with two other stronger institutions. Bank 
Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad was absorbed by Bank of Commerce Malaysia Berhad while 
the operations of Sime Bank were taken over by RHB Bank Berhad. Danaharta Managers 
Sendirian Berhad and Danaharta Urus Sendirian Berhad (wholly owned subsidiaries of 
Danaharta) were established to manage the loans of Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad and 
Sime Bank Berhad respectively. 
Table 1
Results of Danaharta’s Carve-out
By December 1998 
By June 1998 
30 June 2005










Source: Danaharta Final Report 2005.
By the end of June 2005, Danaharta had acquired and managed loans amounting 
to RM47.7 billion from the fi  nancial system, representing 2,902 loan accounts. As at 30 




RM30.35 billion of the RM52.42 billion NPLs (including interest accrued on these loans). 
Th   e winding up of Danaharta in December 2005 marked the successful completion of the 
fi  nal chapter in the fi  nancial sector restructuring eff  ort undertaken in the aft  ermath of the 
Asian fi  nancial crisis. In total, the cost incurred by the Government for the fi  nancial sector 
restructuring eff  orts through Danaharta and Danamodal accounted for 2.5% of the nation’s 
GDP.
5.2   Recapitalisation of Banking Institutions
Danamodal, was set up to address capital erosion in the banking institutions by 
injecting capital into the institutions. Danamodal provided funds to the fi  nancial institutions 
which required additional capital to meet their capital-adequacy requirements, but were 
unable to raise them on their own given the drastic changes in market conditions and 
sentiment. Central to the recapitalisation and investment process were the negotiations with 
the stakeholders to arrive at the fi  nal terms and conditions of the contractual agreement 
between Danamodal and the shareholders of the banking institutions that received 
Danamodal’s injection of capital. Th  e Defi  nitive Agreement (DA) spelt out in detail the 
structure of Danamodal’s investment and various enabling provisions to allow Danamodal 
to achieve the above-mentioned objectives.
To achieve the immediate goals of strengthening the fi  nancial position and operations 
of the recapitalised banking institutions, Danamodal continuously monitored the banks’ 
plans for corporate recovery and restructuring, and the eff  ective implementation of such 
plans. Danamodal’s exit strategies and plan are founded on the following basic principles:
Danamodal seizes the earliest opportunity to exit.
Danamodal exits aft  er it is satisfi  ed that it has achieved the objectives of 
recapitalisation, or if it is satisfi  ed that its exit has enhanced the prospects of 
achieving the objectives.
In exiting, Danamodal aims at full recovery of its investments with expected 
minimum return of 12 percent per annum on equity and 10 percent per annum on 
debt instruments.
Th   e economic recovery may help restore market-based solutions to solvency issues 
among the banking institutions, which may reduce the need for Danamodal’s 
continued roles and accelerate its exit.
During its operations, Danamodal injected a total of RM7.6 billion into 10 banking 
institutions, which was much lower than the initial budget allocation of RM16 billion. 
Danamodal recovered RM6.6 billion of the capital investment, and prior to the winding-
down in 2003, Danamodal had redeemed its entire RM11 billion 5-year zero-coupon 
unsecured redeemable bonds on 21 October 2003. Th  e role of Danamodal in providing 
capital injections to weakened but still viable banking institutions was critical in ensuring 
that these institutions resume their lending activities. Danamodal’s early action and strict 
adherence to the “fi  rst-loss” principle where the existing shareholders absorbed all the losses 






5.3  Alleviating Debt Servicing Capacity of the Corporate Sector
Th   e CDRC was established to address the weakening fi  nancial position of the corporate 
sector. As the health of the banking sector was also dependent on a strong and stable 
economic environment and, particularly, a viable corporate sector, it was important that both 
fi  nancial and corporate restructuring be implemented simultaneously. A committee under 
the auspices of Bank Negara Malaysia was formed in August 1998. Th   e CDRC had no legal 
powers and was a voluntary workout mechanism. It served to facilitate discussions between 
borrowers and fi  nancial institutions to enable expeditious and voluntary restructuring of 
debts. A Steering Committee provided the oversight function while a Creditors’ Committee 
led the restructuring process.
To be eligible to participate under the CDRC, a borrower would have to be a viable 
entity, with aggregate debts of RM50 million or more, and with more than three creditors. 
For the debt restructuring, the banks would initially attempt to restructure the NPLs on 
their own or through the CDRC. If a consensus could not be reached among the banks, 
Danaharta would assist by buying over the NPLs from the dissenting banks. Banks which 
did not sell to Danaharta would be required to write-down the loan to the collateral value 
and make adequate provisions.
In its four years of operations, CDRC successfully resolved 48 cases involving debts of 
RM52.6 billion. 32 of the 48 cases, with debts totaling RM36 billion, were fully restructured. 
Th   e closure of the Corporate Debt Restructuring Committee (CDRC) on 15 August 2002 
represented an important conclusion of the debt restructuring eff  orts undertaken since 
1998.
5.4 Th   e Bank Restructuring Programme
As part of the restructuring reforms introduced by Bank Negara Malaysia, consolidation 
was promoted to further strengthen the banking sector and address the highly fragmented 
domestic banking sector. 122
In January 1998, a merger programme for fi  nance companies was announced to 
consolidate and strengthen the industry. Th   is segment of the banking system was the most 
vulnerable to the adverse eff  ects of the economic downturn with four main fi  nance companies 
dominating 70 percent share of the sector. Additionally, a subsequent consolidation exercise 
was undertaken where 52 out of a total of 54 institutions were consolidated into ten banking 
groups. Th   is was followed by the rationalisation of merchant banks, stock-broking companies 
and discount houses within the banking groups to create investment banks. 
In November 2000, Bank Negara Malaysia announced the increase in the minimum 
amount of capital funds, unimpaired by losses, for banking institutions to take eff  ect from 31 
December 2001. Th   e new minimum capital funds requirement were raised to RM2 billion 
for domestic-banking groups and RM300 million for the locally-incorporated foreign banks.  
Th   e larger and stronger capital base is aimed at strengthening the resilience and the capital 
position of the banking institutions to absorb any destabilising eff  ect of shocks to the system. 
To encourage the banking institutions to accelerate the consolidation process, various tax 
incentives were granted by the government, namely, exemption from stamp duty and real 
property gains tax and recognition of losses of the acquiree institutions for tax purposes. In 
2008, the banking industry is dominated by 9 domestic banking groups, 13 foreign banks, 
14 Islamic banks and 6 investment banks. 
5.5  Key Lessons From the Crisis
Th  e  fi  nancial crisis challenged and stimulated the resilience of the fi  nancial landscape. 
It demanded immediate and prompt action by all the stakeholders, simultaneously requiring 
the actions taken to be eff  ective and achieving the desired outcome of preserving fi  nancial 
stability. In retrospect, several key lessons can be drawn from this experience.
First is the need for comprehensive strategies in addressing the instability that was 
spreading across the fi  nancial system. In Malaysia’s experience, complementing measures 
were introduced to stimulate the economy and create an environment conducive for the 
resumption of economic activities. Bank Negara Malaysia set up special funds to ensure 
continued access to fi  nancing by the small and medium-sized enterprises at reasonable rates. 
A merger and consolidation programme was introduced to improve the overall effi   ciency of 
the banking sector. Th   e Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP) launched in 2001 rolled out the 
programme for the reformation of the banking sector with detailed plans for strengthening 
domestic capacity, enhancing access to fi  nancing, and improving consumer activism, as well 
as maintaining fi  nancial stability.
Second, swift   and timely response to a crisis is crucial. During the fi  nancial crisis, the 
Malaysian government put in place the institutional framework in less than six months. In 
addition, the Danaharta Act 1998 was passed within two months to facilitate the process. 
Although existing laws were suffi   cient, this would involve lengthy legal proceedings. For 
eff  ective management of the increasing NPLs and the possibility of managing thousands 
of accounts, Danaharta needed to work quickly to relieve the banking system of NPLs and 
prevent a systemic failure. In the interest of time, it was decided that some of the crucial 
operational activities would be done outside of the court process. 123
And fi  nally, the commitment by all the stakeholders, including the government and 
political masters, is important to ensure the expedient and eff  ective implementation of 
proposed strategies so as to minimise the risks of a crisis from deepening and becoming 
prolonged. Th  e government was committed to the fi   nancial restructuring programme 
as evidenced by the speed of the enactment of the Danaharta Act (within two months), 
provision of fi  nancial assistance in the form of the necessary funding for the institutional 
set-ups and tax incentives, as well as provision of the implicit guarantee on deposits of the 
banking sector. Th  e banking institutions also supported the restructuring initiatives by 
committing their resources to implement the eff  orts. 
6.  Conclusions and Recommendations
Th  e Malaysian economic and fi   nancial landscape has undergone signifi  cant 
transformation since the Asian fi  nancial crisis. A supervisory regime is vital in identifying 
problem banks. Th  e supervisory process involves holistic diagnosis of the economic and 
environmental factors which could impact the fi  nancial industry and the individual banks. 
Based on the experience, actions and policies taken, it can be concluded that further 
measures need to be taken to be ready for the next crisis. Having gone through a fi  nancial 
crisis, supervisors and banks alike have learnt critical lessons concerning the importance 
of early detection of points of vulnerabilities. Th  ese lessons will be institutionalised and 
will translate into improved or enhanced policies and practices. However, implementing 
corrective measures for past mistakes does not prepare the supervisor or the banks for new 
emerging risks that will be brought about by innovation and the ever-changing fi  nancial 
landscape. Supervisors should focus on prevention, i.e. identifying and preventing banks 
from turning into problematic banks, rather than on crisis management.
Th  e supervisory regime must be continuously reviewed to ensure that it remains 
eff  ective in identifying and detecting the emerging risks. As Bank Negara Malaysia continues 
to liberalise the banking sector with the issuance of principle-based regulations, which would 
encourage a more competitive environment, banks that demonstrate the ability to manage 
risk well will be accorded greater fl  exibility to innovate. Th  is diff  erentiated-regulation 
approach provides an incentive for banks to continuously improve their risk management 
and controls. However, it is important that supervisors balance the liberalisation of rules 
with prudential re-regulation to ensure there is a mechanism to address new and emerging 
risks. 
Greater collaboration and information exchange is needed among supervisors, 
especially in the case of complex banking groups and cross-border supervision. Th  e  increasing 
sophistication by which banks organise themselves in complex fi  nancial structures, with 
operations spread across various jurisdictions, has resulted in fi  nancial institutions looking 
to innovative ways to manage their operations. Th   erefore, there is a need for regulators of 
the home and of the host countries as well as for the regulators of the jurisdictions where the 
centralised functions reside to establish closer networking and ensure eff  ective supervision 
of these institutions. With increasing inter-linkages between fi  nancial markets, banks are 
no longer insulated from the transmission of risk created in one industry. Th  is  heightens 
the need for close cooperation and coordination of the surveillance eff  orts to pre-empt 
emerging threats.124
Finally, with the increasing complexity of the fi  nancial landscape and new and rapid 
developments unfolding in the market place, supervisors need to continuously hone their 
skills to stay a step ahead of the changes taking place. Th  e risks arising from fi  nancially 
innovative products pose new challenges for supervisors to understand how risk is created 
and managed and how the adequacy of capital allocation is determined. In meeting these 
challenges, the skill sets of supervisors need to be enhanced and larger pools of specialists 
created. Developing supervisors with specialised skills, macro perspective, in-depth industry 
knowledge, sound judgment and experience in identifying and managing risk issues and in 
detecting emerging problems in a timely manner, is a must. It is also critical to develop 
supervisors who can think strategically and who possess eff  ective communication skills and 
can play a pro-active role in shaping the banking environment.
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CHAPTER 5
1.   Introduction 
Many aspects should be considered together for the management of the banking 
system. Basically, the entry, operational and exit modalities are the major areas to be 
considered by the supervisory authorities. Hence, documented policies should be in place 
for the proper management of the banking system. Th   e entry point of banks and fi  nancial 
institutions are managed and administered through the licensing policy. Th   is is the fi  rst step 
whereby only the appropriate banks which pass through all the screening tests set by the 
supervisory authorities, are allowed to enter the system Th   e second aspect is operational, 
which relates to the adequacy of prudential rules, regulations and the supervision system, 
whereby the sustainability and soundness of the banking institutions and their operations 
are assured at all times. When a bank is unable to function properly, or is illiquid, or its 
sustainability is in doubt, the intervention and resolution aspects come into view. Th  erefore, 
problem resolution is also one of the major areas to be considered by the supervisory 
authorities in the management of the banking system. 
Th   e Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB), as the central bank of Nepal, has sole responsibility 
for the regulation and supervision of the banking system. Th   e NRB was established in 1956 
under the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB) Act, 1955. Th   e NRB Act, 1955 has been replaced by the 
Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 2002. Th   e NRB Act, 2002, accords legal authority to the NRB to deal 
with problem banks and to initiate corrective and resolution actions on problem banks in a 
timely manner.  
1.1  Objectives of Nepal Rastra Bank
Aft  er the enactment of the NRB Act, 2002, the roles, responsibilities and objectives of 
the NRB have been redefi  ned. Th   e Act specifi  es the following: 
1.  Formulate monetary and foreign exchange policies in order to maintain the stability 
of price and balance of payments for sustainable development of the economy;
2.  Promote stability and liquidity required in the banking and fi  nancial sector;
3.  Develop a secure, healthy and effi   cient system of payment;
4.  Regulate, inspect, supervise and monitor the banking and fi  nancial system; and
5.  Promote the entire banking and fi  nancial system of Nepal and enhance its public 
credibility.
Th   e Act clearly specifi  es that the NRB shall, without any prejudice to these objectives, 
extend co-operation in the implementation of the economic policies of the government. 
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In order to meet its objectives, the NRB issues licences to banks and fi  nancial 
institutions, carries out inspection and supervision, initiates and takes over control of   
banking and fi  nancial institutions in the best interest of depositors and shareholders, if 
necessary. It has the power even to revoke a banking licence in the event of material non-
compliance of various prudential norms and relevant laws and regulations, or to liquidate a 
loss-making bank.  
1.2 Classifi  cation of Banks and Financial Institutions
Th  e banks and fi   nancial institutions have been classifi   ed into four groups. Th  e 
requirement of minimum paid-up capital diff  ers as to the category of banks and fi  nancial 
institutions. Th   e Figure 1 depicts the minimum capital requirements for banks and fi  nancial 
institutions to obtain a licence from the NRB and Figure 2 shows the categorisation of banks 
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Figure 1
Requirements of Minimum Paid-up Capital to Obtain Licence
from NRB

































Categorisation of Banks and Financial Institutions in Nepal
Bank and Financial Institution Act, 2006 (BAFIA) has categorised banks and financial 






This type of institution is known as Bank. They are given large access 
to undertake banking transactions and unlimited deposit collection 
and mobilisation of resources
This type of institution is known as Development Banks. Their scope 
and functions are as determined by BAFIA and NRB Act.
This type of institution is known as Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
popularly known as Finance Companies. Their scope and functions are 
as determined by the BAFIA and the NRB Acts.
This type of institution is known as Micro-Finance Institution. Their 
scope is Determined by the BAFIA and the NRB Acts. They are 
involved in micro-credit and group lending.
1.3   Banks and Financial Institutions under NRB’s Jurisdiction
Th   e total number of banks and fi  nancial institutions licensed by the NRB has stood at 
208 in mid-July 2007. Th  e  classifi  ed details are given in the Figure 3 below:
Figure 3











Micro Finance Development Banks
NGOs Licensed by NRB 
Co-operatives (Licensed by NRB)
2.   Legal Framework in Dealing with Problem Banks in Nepal
Principally, a problem bank is defi  ned as the one whose liquidity or solvency is, or 
will be impaired, unless there is a major improvement in its fi  nancial resources, risk profi  le, 
strategic business direction, risk-management capabilities and/or quality of management. 
Th  is  defi  nition centers on a bank where there are potential or immediate threats to liquidity 
and solvency, rather than one with observable weaknesses that are isolated or temporary 130
in nature, and which can normally be corrected by appropriate remedial action. However, 
all the weaknesses in a problem bank warrant due care for them to be sorted out as soon as 
possible. 
Th   e weaknesses of a problem bank include, but are not limited to, poor management, 
inadequate fi  nancial resources, absence of long-term sustainable business strategy, weak 
asset quality, poor internal-control system, and poor governance. A problem bank, at its 
initial stage is, principally, subject to the direct supervision of the NRB. If the defi  ciencies 
persist even aft  er taking the necessary corrective steps under various modalities, the bank is 
subject to insolvency action and fi  nally liquidated in accordance with the applicable laws.  
Th   e following Acts and Regulations deal with the remedial actions for the problematic 
banks:
 
Th   e Bank & Financial Institution Act, 2006
Th   e Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 2002
Th   e Company Act, 2006
Th   e Insolvency Act, 2006
Th  e Unifi  ed Directives, 2005 (the prudential norms and regulations issued by the 
NRB to banks)
Th  e diff  erent acts contain various legal frameworks in relation to dealings with 
problematic companies, but the provisions of the NRB Act, 2002 and the BAFIA, 2006 
supersede all the provisions over other laws in the case of banks and fi  nancial institutions. 
Exercising its supervisory intervention powers, the NRB can declare a bank as a  problematic 
bank (Section 86B of the NRB Act), initiate restrictive and compelling actions (Section 86C), 
take control of the bank (Section 86D), initiate corrective measures (Section 86E), initiate 
curative measures (Section 86F), appeal for liquidation (Section 86G), reduce the level of 
capital to refl  ect the actual level (Section 86H), transfer the asset and liabilities of problem 
bank to other banks and fi  nancial institution (Sections 86J, 86K, & 86L).
2.1  Roles and Responsibilities of Diff  erent Agencies in the Resolution 
of Problem Banks 
2.1.1  Role of Nepal Rastra Bank 
Th   e role of the NRB is to identify the problems early, ensure preventive or corrective 
measures are in place, and formulate the resolution strategy in the event the preventive 
actions fail. It is worthwhile to state here that there are some problem banks in Nepal which 
are undergoing rehabilitation and restructuring, but no banks and fi  nancial institutions have 
failed and are subjected to liquidation to date. 
Th  e BAFIA, 2006 and the Insolvency Act, 2006 incorporate the provisions for the 
liquidation action. Liquidation process cannot be initiated by a problem bank acting on its 
own. Only the sound banks can voluntarily initiate liquidation. Voluntary liquidation of a 
bank is not a practical option because the prior approval of the NRB is mandatory under the 
provision of the BAFIA for voluntary liquidation. Section 76 of BAFIA, 2006, states clearly 






the banking institution, and only aft  er being assured of the fi  nancial capability of the bank 
in discharging all its liabilities. It follows only banks that are sound can opt for voluntarily 
liquidation not the problematic ones. It is observed that sound banks do not normally opt 
for liquidation.
In case of problem banks and fi  nancial institutions, when NRB initiates liquidation 
action by appealing in the court, the liquidation can be regarded as a mandatory 
A banks can be forced into liquidation if, in the assessment of the NB, the fi  nancial 
position of the problem bank is irrecoverable and cannot be restored in any situation.     
Th   is could arise where there have been signifi  cant and persistent non-compliances to the 
prudential norms and regulations, and the bank resulting from the liquidity crisis is incapable 
of discharging its obligations to its depositors and creditors, and its position cannot be 
improved or restructured even when the necessary steps are undertaken by the NRB. A bank, 
in this state, cannot be forced into liquidation straightaway. Proceedings have to be initiated 
to resolve the bank’s problems through various corrective and restructuring processes. Th  e 
NRB Act, 2002 has incorporated essential provisions in relation to the declaration of a bank 
as a problematic bank and the action steps that needed to be taken to protect the bank from 
being insolvent or from going into liquidation. All aspects of bank resolution fall under the 
jurisdiction of the NRB. 
(i)  Declaration as a Problem Bank
Under the provision of Section 86A of the NRB Act, if any banking and 
fi  nancial institution comes under the circumstance of insolvency or liquidation as per 
the prevailing laws, or is unable to discharge its payment obligations, or is materially 
incapable of meeting some or all of its liabilities, the banking institution shall report 
itself to the NRB within 15 days of such condition arising.
Th   e Section 86B of the NRB Act, 2002, specifi  es the conditions for declaring a 
banking and fi  nancial institution as a problematic, and also provides the NRB with the 
legal authority to take control over such banking and fi  nancial institutions.  Pursuant 
to the provision of this Act, upon the receipt of such report from the bank, as stated 
above, or if the NRB from the inspection reports or from any means is confi  dent that 
the bank comes under the following condition, the NRB then can declare the bank as 
a problematic bank.
1.  Not functioning in the interest of depositors, shareholders, creditors or general 
public.
2.  Unable to make payments or unable to discharge its fi  nancial liability or possibility 
of being unable to discharge its fi  nancial liability.
3. Suff  ering from materially economic problem or being under the condition of 
insolvency.
4.  Non-compliance to the relevant/prevailing laws, rules and directives, circulars or 
orders of the NRB and violation of the conditions as prescribed in the licence.
5.  Submission of false or fraudulent documents and information during the course 
of obtaining a licence.
6.  Unable to maintain minimum capital fund as prescribed by the NRB.
7.  If the action has been initiated for liquidation or insolvency under the prevailing 
law.132
8.  Unreasonable delay in completing the voluntary liquidation process, if it has 
gone under the voluntary liquidation process.
9.  If the foreign parent of the bank and fi  nancial institution goes into liquidation, 
is insolvent or is restricted to carry on transaction in their respective foreign 
countries. 
10.  If the NRB is confi  dent that the bank and fi  nancial institution is unable to 
discharge its liabilities or is under such problem that it aff  ects the  discharging of 
the functions and responsibilities of the concerned bank. 
Basically, the evaluation of the condition for declaration of a problem bank is 
based on the supervision reports and banks reports. For this purpose, the fi  ndings of 
the on-site inspection reports or the off  -site supervision reports can be used. Banks are 
rated yearly under the CAMELS rating system and quarterly under the CAELS rating 
system.
(ii)  Role of NRB in the Resolution of Problem Bank/Insolvent Bank 
Corrective Action and Restructuring
  
Th   e NRB can initiate a number of steps for the resolution of a problem bank. 
In general, the defi  ciencies of the banking institution are fi  rst uncovered through 
the regular off  -site supervision and on-site inspections. Accordingly, the supervisory 
concerns in the reports are addressed. Th   e corrective actions are prescribed and the 
bank is instructed to comply within the implementation timeframe of such reports.   
Th   e bank is allowed suffi   cient time to take the corrective action with adequate plans and 
policies. In the meantime, the NRB conducts discussion with the Board of Directors 
of the bank.
If the measures fail, the NRB can, on its own, undertake various restructuring 
steps only aft  er declaring the bank as a problematic bank (in order to save it from falling 
into insolvency and fi  nally liquidation). When the NRB declares a banking institution 
as problematic, it can initiate two types of modalities for correction and one type of 
modality for liquidation:
1. Corrective  Actions:  Th  e NRB initiates corrective actions for the banking and 
fi  nancial institution (pursuant to Section 86 (c) of the NRB Act, 2002).
2.  Restructuring Actions: Th   e NRB can initiate restructuring actions by taking over 
control of the bank on its own (as per Section 86 d & e).
3.  Liquidation Action: If all the corrective / restructuring measures fail, the NRB 
can appeal in Appellate Court for liquidation. For this purpose, the NRB has 
to comply with some of the requirements as specifi  ed by the Act, which are 
elaborated below.
(iii)  Corrective Action for Problem Bank
       
When the NRB declares a bank as a problematic bank in accordance with Section 
86 (c) of the NRB Act, 2002, it can issue an order to the bank to carry out any or all of 
the following actions: 133
1.  Increase the paid-up capital of the bank;
2.  Cease the voting or other rights of the shareholders;
3.  Restrict the dividend payments and other payments to shareholders;
4.  Set limitations in the distribution of bonuses, remunerations, compensations to 
the board of directors and high offi   cial; 
5.  Put in place good governance, internal controls and risk management in the 
institution;
6.  Restrict acceptance of deposits, credit lending, investments or set limits for it;
7.  Compel to maintain the liquidity and capital adequacy at high level or restrict to 
do commercial transaction; 
8.  Limit the volume of transactions, sale of assets or branch expansion or instruct 
to close domestic/foreign branches;
9.  Minimise the risks of less qualitative assets, inappropriately valued collaterals 
and other assets;
10.  Stop the functions that incur a loss to the institution or stop unbenefi  cial 
activities;
11.  Stop any permitted activities for a certain period;
12.  Obtain prior approval from the NRB to purchase heavy capital assets or enter 
into commitments for such purchases or make expenses on existing contingent 
liabilities;
13.  Order the removal one or more directors, managers or employees, and if bank 
fails to comply with the instruction, the NRB will take action on its own to 
remove them;
14.  Suspend all the board of directors and appoint a new management team to run 
the bank;
15.  Compel to de-list the shares in the stock exchange;
16.  Restrict the payments on subordinated term debts; and
17.  Initiate any appropriate actions as deemed necessary by the NRB.
(iv)  Restructuring Actions under Section 86 (d & e) of the NRB Act, 
2002.
  
Th   e NRB will take over a problem bank as a last resort to save the failing bank. 
When NRB takes control of the bank, it appoints a management team comprising 
either its own staff   or professionals from the market. Th   e restructuring the NRB can 
undertake during the control period is clearly spelled out in the NRB Act. If the NRB 
takes control of the bank, the appointed offi   cers can exercise all the powers of the 
shareholders, board of directors, and offi   cials of the bank. Th   ey will have the functions 
and power of the annual general meetings (AGM) and special annual general meetings 
to carry on any activities. Within this situation the management team can perform the 
following functions:
Suspend or cease any transactions operating in domestic or foreign market;
Transfer the assets of the bank to other banking and fi  nancial institutions as per 
the prescribed guidelines of the NRB;
Remove existing employees of the bank and appoint new personnel in their 
place;
If deemed necessary, merge with other banking and fi  nancial institution or transfer 





Under the prescribed standard of NRB, issue shares to new shareholders in order 
to reduce existing ownership structure or restructure through re-constituting the 
board of directors;
Reduce capital or reduce the face value of share proportionately suitable to the 
existing capital of the bank. Th  e process and modality are also specifi  ed in the 
Act;
Initiate management restructuring and corporate restructuring of the bank; and
Initiate other necessary measures as prescribed by the NRB.
Generally, the NRB can take over control of the management of a problematic 
bank initially for a maximum period of two years. But this period can be extended 
until the bank is restored to a stable and strong footing. If the NRB is be confi  dent that 
the bank could be operated in a sound manner, the NRB can hand over the bank back 
the same board of directors (BOD) who were managing the bank before, or it may 
constitute a new BOD capable of operating the bank. In the Nepalese experience, some 
banks/fi  nancial institutions were controlled for a shorter period, while some are under 
control for a period of more than fi  ve years.
Figure 4 
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(v)  Transfer of Assets and Liabilities
One of the restructuring steps undertaken by the NRB in order to protect the 
depositors from possible bankruptcy and liquidation is transferring any or all the 
assets and liabilities to another banking and fi  nancial institution within the prescribed 
framework. Such assets and liabilities can also be merged with another banking and 
fi  nancial institution accordingly. However, the transfer of assets and liabilities could 
not be initiated where:
 
Such a transfer is against the interest of depositors, shareholders, creditors, or 
general public.
I f  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  t h e r e  w i l l  b e  a  l a c k  o f  p r o p e r  m a n a g e m e n t  o f  a s s e t s  a n d  
liabilities.
If the banking and fi  nancial institution that is willing to take over the assets and 
liabilities disagrees to follow the guidelines as framed by the NRB to manage the 
assets and liabilities.
 Th  e banking and fi  nancial institution or any other entity purchasing the assets 
and taking over the liabilities of a problematic bank would be entitled to exclusive 
rights over such assets and liabilities even though the title deed to the assets reside 





Nepal Bank Limited (NBL): The NBL, founded on 15 November 1937, is the first 
commercial bank to be established in Nepal. This bank began to face operational, management, 
and financial problems following the financial liberalisation of the mid-1980s. The problems 
were first identified and corrective actions were taken during the CBPASS report 
implementation period in the 1990s. Again, several problems were identified in the KPMG 
report of 2000. The report pointed out several weaknesses: Several governance and management 
shortfalls, extremely poor information system, dysfunctional lending processes, poor strategic 
planning, business planning and budgeting, low moral of employees and numerous human 
resource issues, a negative net worth, and bank technically insolvent. Therefore, the bank 
required more surveillance and focused restructuring. This bank was among the two largest 
banks in Nepal operating a large branch network and undertaking government transactions in 
various districts of the country. The bank was taken over by the NRB on March 14, 2002. 
Subsequently from 22 July 2002, the bank was run by a foreign management team selected 
through a bidding process under the financial sector reform programme of the government. The 
bank is under a restructuring programme, with the bank management currently under the 
control of the NRB. Within a period of four years of restructuring, the bank achieved a 
turnaround. However, there remains a capital shortfall, but the shortfall has been reduced from 
Rs.13.09 billion as of July 2003 to Rs. 7.86 billion as of July 2006. The capital adequacy ratios are 
still negative. The cumulative loss has been reduced from 10.88 billion to Rs. 6.68 billion, with 
the Bank making profit regularly each year from 2004. The NPA level has been reduced from 
60.47 percent to 14.60 percent. In July 2007, cash recovery from NPA accounted to 6.8 billion 
out of Rs. 10 billion NPLs. The staff head-count has been reduced from 5652 to 2960 during the 
restructuring period of four years. The salary structure of the Bank was revised upwards, and 
several manuals and bye-laws (e.g. budget, credit, IT, operation, treasury, strategic, employee 
bye-law, problem loan guide and loan write-off guidelines, etc.) have been documented and 
implemented. Although the bank succeeded in achieving a turnaround, the capital injection and 
completep rivatisation issues remain to be resolved. 
Rastriya Banijya Bank Limited (RBBL): The RBBL, the second commercial bank in Nepal, 
was established as a fully-owned government bank on 23 January 1966. From its inception the 
RBBL functioned as the intermediary of the government to launch government programs in the 
rural and non-profit areas. The RBBL suffered from deficiencies in governance, regulatory 
compliance, capital adequacy, credit risk management since 1980s. During the CBPASS report 
implementation period in the early 1990s, the government injected some capital into the Bank, 
initiated recovery activities, installed a new management team, but it could not sustain the Bank 
over the long term. The bank was making loss continuously from 1990 to 1993. Thereafter, for 
two years the Bank operated in the black, but it again begun to incur losses. The annual losses 
were high from the year 2000, and the cumulative losses amounted to Rs. 24 billion in 2003. The 
RBBL is the largest bank in Nepal operating a wide branch network and providing extensive 
banking services to the rural and urban areas. It is imperative for the authorities to act and 
prevent the Bank from failing. A financial sector reform programme was launched by the 
government with the technical support of the World Bank. The programme not only covered the 
restructuring of the two big banks (NBL & RBBL), but it also addressed a comprehensive reform 
of the financial sector, including the strengthening of the Nepal Rastra Bank and capacity 
building of the financial system.
This bank remains fully owned by the government. It is still under restructuring by the NRB, the 
implementing authority for financial sector reform. The NRB emplaced a foreign management 
team in January 2003 in RBBL, adopting the international bidding process. Under restructuring, 
the Bank saw improvements in its financials, governance and operations. The staff head-count 
decreased from 5583 in 2002 to 3301 in 2006. The capital fund is still negative, but the level of 
negative capital has been reduced. The Bank reported profitability continuously from 2004 
onwards. The annual audit of the Bank is being  completed each year. Its systems and procedures 
are being improved. The bank has computerised its branch banking operations in 44 branches 
(out of 114), and the Bank introduced its ATM service in 2007. The level 
of NPLs has decreased from 60.15 percent as of July 2003 to 26.43 percent as of July 2007. 
Figure 5 
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Aft  er a bank is taken over, the management committee appointed by the NRB 
is required to appoint an independent auditor to conduct a management and fi  nancial 
audit of the bank, and this report is to be disclosed publicly within one year from the date 
of the takeover. If the problems could not be resolved without ownership restructuring, 
such activities could also be initiated. For this purpose, the NRB should issue an order, 
by way of public notice, to arrange for the sale and transfer of the existing ownership. 
Within this process, the NRB can instruct to sell the share of the existing 
shareholders at the price set by a professional committee, to any appropriate party 
approved by the NRB. Accordingly, the NRB can instruct to transfer or merge any or 
all of the assets and liabilities to any bank or fi  nancial institution or to other agency. 
Th  e NRB can also initiate to incorporate a new bank or fi  nancial institution under 
government ownership in order to acquire the assets and liabilities of the problematic 
banks and fi  nancial institutions.
 
Nepal Bangladesh Bank Limited (NBBL): NBBL was suffering from deficiencies in 
governance, regulatory compliance, capital adequacy, credit risk management from the 
beginning of year 2000.  There was conflict of interest in the Bank’s lending. A large amount was 
disbursed to the promoters. The Bank was making losses and the NPA was increasing. Several 
initiatives were made by the NRB to correct the deficiencies, but the efforts were unsuccessful 
due to lack of timely fulfillment of the commitments made by the Bank’s management. The Bank 
also obtained a Court stay-order to prevent intervention by the Central Bank. Immediately, the 
Bank encountered heavy withdrawals from its public depositors on 6-10 November, 2006, and 
faced a severe liquidity problem. Almost a quarter of its total deposit was withdrawn within 
three days, and long queues remained in front of the Bank to withdraw their money. Almost all 
the liquid assets of the Bank were liquidated to pay the depositors. This was the first bank-run in 
Nepalese banking history. The stay-order was subsequently lifted by the Court upon the request 
of the Bank management. This was followed by the resignation of almost the entire Board of 
Directors. To handle the situation, the NRB took over control of the Bank on 12 November, 
2006. Within nine months of restructuring, the level of NPA was significantly reduced from 46 
percent to 39 percent. The management and governance began to improve. The promoters 
began to make repayments on the outstanding loans which accounted to Rs.500 million. The 
management team has prepared a new capital plan. The Bank has restored public confidence and 
regained its profitability. The Bank remains under the control of the NRB, and is undergoing 
restructuring by the management team, appointed from the NRB. A separate desk has been 
created in the Bank Supervision Department of NRB to provide more focused surveillance to 
problem banks, as practiced in the prudent financial markets.
Figure 6
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(vi)  Appeal for Liquidation
If a problematic bank cannot be rescued, or if it is not in a position to discharge all 
its liabilities aft  er all attempts to turn it round through corrective action or restructuring  
fail, the NRB can make a Court appeal for mandatory liquidation. 
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2.1.2  Role of the Ministry of Finance
Th  e Ministry of Finance (MoF) plays a facilitating role to improve the overall 
soundness of the fi  nancial system. Th   e Ministry is not required to be directly involved in the 
resolution or restructuring of individual problem banks in Nepal. 
 
At the macro-level, its major role is supporting and helping to build and create a sound 
fi  nancial system in Nepal, notably, enacting banking laws, assisting in the establishment of 
supportive institutions in the fi  nancial system, and initiating fi  nancial sector reforms at its 
own cost. Th   e government has formulated many policies and initiated actions to deal with 
the willful loan defaulters, too.  
At the micro-level, the specifi  c role of the MoF is towards improving the soundness 
and health of the problem banks which are owned and operated by the state. 
Th  e MoF has contributed signifi  cantly to the improvement of the overall fi  nancial 
system of Nepal from the beginning. In the early years, there were only two commercial 
banks in Nepal, which were both owned and operated by the government – Th   e Nepal Bank 
Limited (NBL) and Rastriya Banijya Bank Limited (RBBL). From the mid-1980s, with the 
entry of private banks into the fi  nancial system, the role of the government-owned banks 
began to wane gradually. To date, both RBBL and NBL remain state-owned, with the RBBL 
being fully owned and the NBL, partially owned by the government. It is the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Finance to inject capital, establish good management and operate these two 
banks professionally. In order to improve the fi  nancial and operational health of these two 
banks and render them attractive for privatisation, both banks are being restructured under 
a comprehensive Financial Sector Reform Programme (FSRP), which was initiated in 2001. 
Th   ere are other fi  nancial institutions as well which are regulated by the government, such as 
the Citizen Investment Trust and the Employee Provident Fund. 
Non-performing loans (NPLs) in the banking system was nearly 36 percent in 2000. 
Th   e level of NPLs is around 10 percent as of July 2007. Poor governance, bad credit culture, 
and fraudulent lending contributed to this problem in the past. Th   erefore, to address the 
problems of the fi  nancial system, the MoF has taken various actions against willful defaulters, 
like seizure of passports and denying the willful defaulters use of certain state facilities. 
2.1.3  Role of Deposit Insurance Agency
Nepal does not have any deposit insurance agency to date. However, the Nepal Rastra 
Bank, through the monetary policy for the fi  scal year 2006-2007, has clearly announced its 
intention to insure deposits of small investors through the Deposit Insurance and Credit 
Guarantee Corporation (DICGC). Th  e DICGC operates a credit guarantee scheme for 
directed lending, but it is not yet involved in providing deposit insurance.
2.1.4  Role of Assets Management Companies
Nepal does not have any Assets Management Companies (AMCs) at present, nor does 
it have related laws and regulations in this regard, though the NRB Act, 2002 provides for 139
the transfer of assets to such companies. However, work for the formation of such laws and 
regulations have started. Th   e NRB has been working with the government to create AMCs.  
2.1.5  Role of Debt Recovery Tribunal
An institutional framework was introduced in 2002 to address the complex and 
lengthy legal processes in recovering the NPLs of banks and fi  nancial institutions. Under 
the FSRP, the government established a Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) to deal with the loan 
recovery cases. Th   e DRT is empowered with the legal authority to acquire the borrowers’/
guarantors’ additional assets which are not pledged to the concerned bank, and to dispose 
these acquired assets through auction in order to recover the bank’s loan. Problem banks 
have brought many cases before the DRT and are seeing some results. Th   e performance of 
the DRT as of July 2006 is shown in Figure 7.
Th   e problem of NPLs can be resolved quickly if the courts can provide timely support 
to the banking and fi  nancial institutions. Unless and until the banks can recover their 
loans, their ability to meet the claims of their depositors will be impaired. In order to deal 
with the loan recovery cases, adequate and skillful commercial lawyers are needed to do 
litigation work. Moreover, there should be special courts to deal with commercial cases. Th  e 
establishment of the Debt Recovery Tribunal in the fi  nancial system is a step in the right 
direction.
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2.2  Mechanisms for Inter-agency Cooperation and Information 
Sharing Among Domestic as well as Foreign Offi   cial Agencies
With the enactment of the NRB Act, 2002, it has become possible for the NRB to 
share information with foreign central banks and supervisors in the areas of monitoring, 
inspection, and supervision of banking and fi  nancial institutions. Th   e NRB has been sharing 
information with various foreign offi   cial agencies, like the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Bank 
Negara Malaysia, Reserve Bank of India, SEACEN Centre, South East Asia New Zealand and 
Australia (SEANZA), Financial Stability Institute (FSI), International Monetary Fund, Asian 
Development Bank, and the World Bank. 
Th  e NRB has also constituted a high-level co-ordination committee to coordinate 
the sharing of information and solve the issues related to the scope and jurisdiction of the 140
regulators of the system. Th   e committee is headed by the Deputy Governor of the NRB and 
the membership includes the Registrar from Company Registrar Offi   ce, the Chairman of the 
Stock Exchange Board, and the Chairman of the Insurance Board.
2.3   Mechanisms to Ensure Autonomy of Bank Authorities and Legal 
Protection to the Regulators
Th  e NRB Act, 2002 establishes the autonomy of the central bank and defi  nes its 
responsibilities and areas of jurisdiction. One of the objectives of the NRB is to monitor, 
supervise and inspect banking and fi  nancial institutions licensed by the NRB. Th  e NRB 
believes that this objective can be fulfi  lled only if full authority and autonomy are granted to 
the supervisors. Th   e NRB Act enacts various provisions in this regard, some of which can be 
summarised as follows: 
a)  Provisions for inspection, supervision and monitoring of banking and fi  nancial 
institutions.
b)  Authority to issue necessary directives, guidelines, circulars and orders to banking 
and fi  nancial institutions and ensure they are complied with.
c)  Requirement for banking and fi  nancial institutions to provide information regarding 
banking transactions as deemed necessary by the NRB.
d)  Power to dissolve the management of the banking and fi  nancial institution and take 
over the management.
e)  Prior permission of the NRB required for banking and fi  nancial institutions to raise 
capital and subordinated term debt and issue bonds.
f)  Requirement for banking and fi  nancial institutions to provide written information in 
relation to their banking transactions.
g)  Provision for issuance of directives and orders by inspectors during the course of on-
site inspection of banking and fi  nancial institutions.
h)  Authority  to  take  stringent  and  stern  actions  (which  can  also  include  imprisonment                
and monetary penalty) against the banking and fi   nancial institutions and their 
employees for failure on their part to comply with the NRB directives and applicable 
rules and regulations, and for carrying out any transaction which is detrimental to the 
interest of depositors, shareholders, creditors and the general public.
2.3.1  Legal Protection to the Regulators/Supervisors
Th   e Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 2002 accords legal authority to the NRB to regulate the 
functions and activities of commercial banks and fi  nancial institutions. Th   e NRB may frame 
rules and by-laws and issue orders, directives and circulars as deemed appropriate, for the 
NRB to carry out its regulatory and supervisory work. It shall be the duty of the banking 
and fi  nancials institution to abide by such orders, rules, by-laws, directives, and circulars. In 
case of voluntary as well as compulsory liquidation of the banking and fi  nancial institution, 
the concerned banking and fi  nancial institution is required to obtain the prior approval of 
the NRB. 
Section 107 the NRB Act, 2002 stipulates that the “governor, deputy governor, director 
or any offi   cial or employee of NRB shall not be personally or collectively liable for any act 
done in good faith under the NRB act and under the regulations or bye-law or under an 141
order or directives issued there under.” In such cases the bank shall bear all the expenses, in 
case of a lawsuit. Th   erefore, there is some kind of protection to the supervisors.
2.3.2  Mechanisms to Ensure Accountability of Bank Authorities and 
Judicial Review
As mentioned above, the NRB has exclusive authority to issue directives to banking 
and fi  nancial institutions operating in Nepal and it shall be the duty of the offi   cials of the 
concerned institutions to comply with such directives. In the case of non-compliance, the 
NRB Act and the Bank and Financial Institution Act, 2006 further empowers the NRB to 
initiate necessary actions against such banking and fi  nancial institutions. Actions in this 
regard can be a written warning, prohibition on providing remuneration, imprisonment and 
a penalty that can extend up to the amount related to such violations. Th   e NRB also reserves 
the right to remove an offi   cial or management personnel from the bank if the NRB has good 
ground to believe that such offi   cial has been involved in fraudulent practice. 
3.  Problem Bank Identifi  cation
3.1 Supervisory  Strategy
Th   e NRB has prepared and enforced a supervision bye-law under which the on-site 
supervision manual (2003) and off  -site supervision manual (14 Jan 2004) have been prepared 
and implemented.  Th   ese manuals are based on a risk-based supervision framework. NRB has 
implemented Basel-II framework (simplifi  ed standardized approach) from year 2007. Under 
this framework, Basel I-and Basel-II are being implemented in parallel for year 2007/08. For 
the year 2007, banks are required to implement the reporting format as prescribed by the 
new capital-adequacy framework, but they will be monitored for compliance under Basel-I 
framework.
3.2 Prudential  Requirements
To date, the NRB has issued 17 directives, 2 guidelines and various circulars to the 
banking and fi  nancial institutions. All these directives are required to be complied by the 
banks and fi  nancial institutions at all times.
Th   e NRB, as the central bank, has the important task of regulating and supervising 
the banking system of Nepal. In order to discharge this role, the NRB assesses the overall 
strength of the banking system as well as the safety and soundness of the individual banking 
and fi  nancial institutions. Th  e NRB uses a uniform rating system, known as “CAMELS,” 
whereby supervisors in doing the assessment assign individual numerical ratings to the key 
areas of Capital, Assets, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk 
(CAMELS) as well as assign an overall composite rating to each banking institution. In this 
way, the banking and fi  nancial institutions are categorised into groups based on their overall 
strength, quality and operating soundness. By the rating system, problem banks that are in 
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In the CAMELS rating system each bank is assigned two sets of ratings:
1.  Performance Ratings, which comprise six individual ratings that address each of the 
CAMELS components; and
2.  An overall Composite Rating, a single rating that is based on a comprehensive 
assessment of the overall condition of the bank. 
Both the ratings are scored on a numerical scale of “1” to “5” in ascending order of 
supervisory concern. Th   at is, “1” represents the best rating, while “5” indicates the worst 
rating.
Th  e following is the description of the rating scores for the each of the six 
components:
Rating 1 - indicates very strong performance
Rating 2 - indicates above-average performance that adequately provides for the safe  
  and sound operation of the banks and fi  nancial institution.
Rating 3 - indicates performance that is fl  awed to some degree.
Rating 4 - indicates unsatisfactory performance. If left   unchecked, such      
  performance could threaten the solvency of the banking and fi  nancial    
 institution. 
Rating 5 - indicates very unsatisfactory performance in need immediate remedial    
  attention for the sake of the banking and fi  nancial institution’s survival.
3.3  Early Warning Systems, Other Indicators and Risk Assessment
To date, the early warning signals are observed and monitored from through on-site 
inspections based on the CAMELS ratings and through off  -site supervision based on the 
CAELS ratings. However, a draft   of the enforcement actions to be taken in response to the 
Early Warning Signals is under preparation and will be implemented. 
3.4   Communicating Concerns
Concerns on problems are communicated to the banking and fi  nancial institutions 
in various ways:
 
1.  During the inspection: Th  e  signifi  cant issues are put in front of the management during 
the inspection period. Th  ese issued are verifi  ed and suggested to the management 
immediately. Th  e concerns which can be resolved during the inspection are not 
mentioned in the inspection report and those which cannot be resolved during the 
period of inspection are incorporated in the report for the bank to comply in the 
future.
2.  During the course of fi  nalising of the inspection report: Aft  er the completion of the 
inspection, the draft   inspection report is discussed with the management of the bank 
and it is forwarded to the management for formal comments. 
3. Report  implementation:  Aft  er completion of the inspection and having obtained the 
comments of the bank management on the report, the report is forwarded to the 
management of the bank again along with the recommendations and instructions 
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4.  Special Meetings with the Management: Th   ere is a system used by the NRB to monitor 
the quarterly progress of the bank on the report implementation. 
If there is multi-disciplinary issue that involves various regulatory authorities, the 
issue is resolved through the high-level co-ordination committee (HLCC). Th  e  HLCC  does 
not deliberate on implementation issues raised by the inspection report, but only resolves 
specifi  c issues of the related to the fi  nancial system that  bear on the Financial Sector Reform 
Programme.
Th  e consolidated Annual Report of Inspection and Supervision is prepared by the 
Supervision Department and posted on the web site of the NRB for the information of the 
general public. Th   e NRB also puts the executive summary of the inspection reports of the 
individual banks on the web-site for the information of the general public.
4.    Main Problems in the Banking System
About one third of all the commercial banks continue to encounter various defi  ciencies 
in their operations. Th   e problematic areas fall under these main categories:
-  Inadequate working capital 
-  High levels of NPL
-  Poor governance and internal controls
-  Poor information technology and MIS in the bank
-  Poor credit, human resource and asset/liability management capabilities
-  Improper planning and business strategy
5.   Causes of Problems in the Banking System
Th   e Nepalese banking system suff  ers from various defi  ciencies in credit management 
governance, IT, account/audit and so forth. Th  e problem of non-performing loans is a 
burning issue in the fi  nancial system. Some of the obstacles are beyond credit management, 
contributing to a higher level of NPL. However, the level of NPLs in the banking system has 
been reduced from around 29 percent in 2003 to 10 percent in July 2007 (Annex 1). 
For the purpose of analysis, the factors contributing to high NPLs can be classifi  ed 
into two groups. Th  e  fi  rst group of causal factors is internal factors, mainly weaknesses of the 
individual banks in credit management and defi  ciencies in oversight. Preventive measures 
have been taken at the institutional level to reduce the level of NPLs, Th   e problems of NPLs 
are also being resolved by the banks themselves to some extent. Th   e next group of causal 
factors are external in nature which are essentially beyond the control of the banking and 
fi  nancial institutions. Th   e causes behind the alarming NPL level in the banking system are 
due to some of these factors:  
5.1 Internal  Factors 
A.  Risk management defi  ciencies within the banking and fi  nancial institutions: Th  ese 
comprise poor internal-control systems, operating procedures and credit culture, 
which are being improved.144
B.  Management oversight defi  ciencies at the policy level: Along with the adoption of 
rapid and aggressive growth strategies is a corresponding lack of competencies at the 
level of the Board of Directors in monitoring these strategies.
C.  Limited supervision by the NRB itself in the past and weak internal controls within 
the commercial banks: these comprise  weak supervision and monitoring, inadequate 
system of reward and sanction, and poor Management Information System (MIS) to 
monitor, manage and control the risks within the banking and fi  nancial institutions 
themselves.
D. Signifi  cant off  -balance sheet exposure ultimately giving rise to problematic on-balance 
sheet exposure.
E.  Insider abuse and fraud.
F. Poor  eff orts in recovery even when the loans have been categorised as bad.
G. Signifi  cant NPLs in the system due to a few major banks which have been poorly 
managed.  
5.2 External  Factors 
A.  Weak legislative regime in the past, especially the legal framework governing the 
fi  nancial system and its poor implementation.
B.  Lack of supportive institutions that can help to reduce the NPL: Lack of eff  ective and 
professional Notary public services in eliminating problems associated with cheques, 
bills purchased and discounted, lack of secured transaction offi   ce to register moveable 
properties, lack of credit-rating agencies facilitating to rate the risk grades, lack of asset 
management corporation assisting the fi  nancial institutions to manage the distressed 
loans, lack of proper training facilities and academic institutions for enhancing the 
skills and knowledge of the personnel of banking and fi  nancial institutions. 
C.  Political instability, deterioration in economic growth rates and business activities 
over the last few years. 
D.  Poor regulatory and supervisory capacity of the central bank in the past.
E.  Security and confl  ict situation at present. 
F.  Other systemic problems that are being faced by all the fi  nancial institutions equally.
Th  e two big banks of Nepal, which are still state-owned, lack adequate capital to
operate. If we analyse the information provided in the Annex 2, the overall capital of the 
fi  nancial system appears negative (due to negative reserve and surpluses). Th  is is only 
because of the heavy cumulative losses of the above-mentioned two big banks. Th  erefore, 
there is a need to re-capitalise these banks and improve the level of governance and 
professionalism in the system. Most of the private banks are operating prudently and the 
banking system (excluding these problem banks) is heading towards achieving macro-
economic sustainability in the economy. 
6.  Problem Bank Intervention
6.1   Prompt Corrective Actions
Based the CAMELS rating system, if the ratings of a bank should indicate that the 
bank has a problem in one or more of the key areas, the matter is addressed in the inspection 
report and taken up and discussed with the management. Management is requested to submit 145
a plan of action to resolve the issues. If the corrective action is carried out in accordance with 
the plan, the NRB will not initiate the process to take over control of the bank. 
Section 100 of the NRB Act specifi  es the punishment for the violation of bank 
regulations. Th   is section stipulates that in the event that any licensed commercial bank or 
fi  nancial institution violates an order or directives issued by the NRB or is in breach of 
the regulation or bye-laws formed there under, the NRB may impose one or more of the 
following penalties on the banking and fi  nancial institution.
 
(a)  Issuance of reprimand or written warning;
(b)  Securing an undertaking from the board of directors to adopt reformative measures;
(c)  Issuance of written order to cease or abstain from such violation and to adopt 
reformative measures;
(d)  Suspension or termination of the services provided by the NRB;
(e)  Prohibition imposed on the commercial bank or fi  nancial institution from distributing 
dividend to its shareholders; 
(f)  Prohibition from accepting deposits or granting loan and advances
(g)  Imposition of full or partial restriction on transaction of business by the banking and 
fi  nancial institution.
(h)  Suspension or revocation of licence of the banking and fi  nancial institution.
In the event that any offi   cial violates the rules and regulations of the NRB, the NRB 
may impose a monetary penalty on the person of up to Rupees 500,000 or the NRB could 
issue an order to terminate the employment of the offi   cial.
In this way the management is compel to recover the problem bank as per instructions 
and order of the NRB.
Th  e corrective measures implemented by the banks are assessed by the board of 
directors of the NRB, and further instructions are provided formally by letter issued through 
the concerned supervision department, if required.
Besides this, Basel-II capital adequacy framework will be implemented in full phase 
from July 2008, for which a directive has already been issued to the commercial banks. 
Within this framework, the prompt-corrective-action (PCA) rule has been prescribed on 
the basis of minimum capital-adequacy ratio (CAR). Th   e minimum capital-adequacy ratio 
is prescribed at 10 percent. Th  e nature of the enforcement action will largely depend on 
degree of the capital adequacy of the bank. Th   e trigger points and the prescribed action have 
been determined as follows: 
1.  CAR below 10 percent and equal or above 9 percent
•  Prohibition from establishing new branches.
•  Prohibition from declaring dividends.
•  Submission of a capital plan for recapitalization of the bank.
•  Interaction with the senior management on course of corrective action.
 
2.  CAR below 9 percent and equal or above 6 percent
•  Action required under Category 1.
•  Suspension of lending, investment, and credit extension activities.146
•  Prior approval of the NRB for acquiring, through purchase or lease, additional 
fi  xed assets.
•  Prior approval of NRB for establishing new business lines
•  Other actions under the Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 2002 and the Bank and   
Financial Institution Act, 2006.
3.  CAR below 6 percent and equal or above 3 percent
•  Action required under Category 2.
•  Restriction on deposit mobilization
•  Prohibition from acquiring, through purchase or lease, additional fi  xed 
assets;
•  Restrictions on payment of incentives, severance packages, management fees 
or other discretionary compensation to directors or offi   cers without prior 
approval of the NRB.
•  Restriction on Standby Liquidity Facility (SLF).
•  Other actions under Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 2002 and the Bank and  Financial 
Institution Act, 2006.
4.  CAR below 3 percent and equal or above 1 percent
•   Action required under Category 3.
•  Restrictions on salary increments, recruitments and promotions.
•  Action to directors and chief executive if capital position of the institution 
does not improve in six  months aft  er initiating action under this Category.
•  Other actions under Nepal Rastra Bank Act 2002 and Bank and Financial 
Institution Act 2006.
5.  CAR below 1 percent
•  Action required under Category 4.
•  Declare the bank as problem bank and initiate actions under Section 86 of 
NRB Act.
•  Suspend existing board of directors and chief executive of the bank and bring 
in new board and management.
•  Initiate steps to dilute the ownership of the existing shareholders.
•  Other actions under Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 2002.
Th   e trigger points and stipulated actions will be applied uniformly to all banks under 
this framework. However, the NRB may allow certain exceptions in the following cases:
1.  Branch expansion which is targeted in the rural parts of the country where the banking 
facility is not available in a competitive manner.
2.  Banks that are already under the restructuring process.
3.  Banks whose management and operation are under the direct control of the Nepal 
Rastra Bank.
4.  Banks that are too big to fail in the national context.
6.2   Resolving Liquidity Problems
Commercial banks are required to maintain  CRR (cash reserve ratio) at 5 percent of 
total deposits. If they fail to maintain the prescribed ratio, they are  enalized at the bank rate, 147
i.e., 6.25 percent for the fi  rst time in the fi  scal year, the rate would double on the second time, 
and triple from the third time onwards.
Th   e CRR is monitored weekly and the liquidity profi  le is monitored on a quarterly basis 
by the NRB. As the liquidity component is one of the major components of CAMELS-based 
supervision system, the NRB evaluates all aspect of the liquidity management of the bank. 
Th   e Directive No. 5 of the NRB deals with the liquidity risk management. Th   e NRB collects 
the profi  le on maturity, liquidity, maturity mismatch, and gap-analysis information from 
the banks on a quarterly basis. On the basis of these quarterly fi  nancials and information, 
the liquidity risk of the bank is evaluated, causes of liquidity problems are uncovered and 
communicated to the bank for timely rectifi  cation and some times with instruction for the 
submission of contingency plans for resolving the liquidity problems.
   
In the event that banks have a liquidity problem, there are two types of modalities to 
support the problem banks.
General window: If a problem bank has adequate government securities in its 
investment portfolio, it can obtain assistance from the general window of the NRB. Each 
and every commercial bank can enjoy standby liquidity facility (SLF) to get out from 
temporary liquidity problem. Under this scheme, 50 percent of the value of treasury bills 
can be withdrawn for a short period of 7 days at the  prevailing average discount rate of 
treasury bills.
Lender of last resort: Th   e Board of the NRB has the discretion to decide whether or 
not to support the problem bank. In general, banks which are solvent are supported through 
this window if they have a liquidity problem. Th  e lender-of-last-resort facility was once 
provided to a problem bank, which was taken over by the NRB. In this particular case, 
the collateral value of its good loans, based on the loan documentation, was assessed in 
determining the solvency of the bank. Th   ere is a need for policy guidelines to specify the 
circumstance by which a bank can obtain lender-of-last-resort assistance from the NRB, 
along with the prescribed process and the required documents to obtain such assistance. 
Commercial banks can also avail for refi   nancing under various schemes. Th  ese 
schemes are provided to facilitate lending in the desired sectors, such as towards micro-
credit lending, lending for foreign exports and for rehabilitation of sick industries. 
Section 49 of the NRB Act incorporates a provision for refi  nancing to any banking and 
fi  nancial institution for a maximum period of six months. In order to obtain refi  nance, the 
bank should have collateral, such as internationally negotiable instruments, gold or precious 
metals, government bonds or other securities, as prescribed by the NRB. Th   is is a general 
method to provide liquidity for making additional lending in the sectors as prescribed by 
the NRB. 
6.3   Resolving Credit and Capital Impairment Problem
6.3.1  Resolving Credit Problems
Credit usually represents the bulk of a banking institution’s assets and interest on the 
credit represents the major source of income. A bank needs to have a quality credit portfolio. 148
Th   erefore, the credit operations are reviewed carefully during on-site inspection. Th  e  banking 
and fi  nancial institutions are to have documented credit policies in place. Th  e  institution’s 
credit appraisal system, credit approval system, documentation, credit authority, security, 
credit supervision and credit recovery and restructuring aspects are examined during the 
on-site supervision. If any type of credit problem is identifi  ed, this is communicated to the 
management for further improvement.
Th   e problem of the Nepalese Banking system is high NPLs, but the level is gradually 
decreasing. It is mandatory for a banking and fi  nancial institution to check the credit profi  le 
of a borrower from the Credit Information Bureau (CIB) for loan disbursements of above 
Rs.2.5 million. Th   e CIB also maintains a list of defaulted borrowers and the list is updated 
when a borrower is black-listed by the banking institution. Blacklisted borrowers are 
barred from applying for any additional loans and facilities from any banking and fi  nancial 
institutions until they settle their outstanding liabilities and have their names deleted from 
the blacklist.
Th   e banking and fi  nancial institutions are required to maintain their NPL level at the 
prudent level of below fi  ve percent. If their levels exceed the limit, they will not be allowed 
to undertake branch expansion. Recently, the government has made it a policy that state-
owned agencies and organizations are not allowed to keep their deposits in the banking and 
institutions whose NPL levels are 10 percent or more.
In order to reduce the level of NPLs, the banking and fi  nancial institutions can initiate 
auctions to dispose of the collaterals pledged with them and to recover the outstanding loan 
amounts from the proceeds. Where a loan has been categorised as bad and the collateral is 
inadequate to cover the loan, and if the borrower has additional property not pledged with 
the bank, the bank can appeal to the Debt Recovery Tribunal to recovery the loan from those 
un-pledged securities. Th   e DRT initiates the legal action to seize the additional property of 
the borrower, and to auction it and recover the proceeds for the bank.
6.3.2  Resolving Capital Impairment Problem
Th   e banking and fi  nancial institutions are required to maintain a minimum capital 
adequacy ratio (CAR) at all the times. As of July 2008, banks are required to maintain 
5.5 percent core capital and 11 percent capital fund to total risk- weighted assets. Capital 
adequacy is monitored on a quarterly basis by the NRB. Any banking and fi  nancial institution 
that is not able to maintain its capital adequacy ratios in any quarter, must report to the NRB 
within 15 days, stating the causes for its capital inadequacy, plan and programme to meet the 
requirement. Th   e bank will not be allowed to declare dividends and distribute bonus shares 
unless and until it maintains the adequacy ratios. In addition, the bank will not be allowed 
to open new branches and will be prohibited from obtaining refi  nance from the NRB. Th  e 
bank may be restricted from lending and accepting new deposits, and the NRB can initiate 
any action, as provided under Section 100 of NRB Act, 2002.
Th   e capital of commercial banks and fi  nancial institutions is also prescribed in the 
form of paid-up capital. Th   e minimum paid-up capital of a commercial bank is Rs.2 billion. 
Th   e banking and fi  nancial institutions that fall short of the prescribed level are required to 
meet the requirement by the year 2013. For this purpose, the bank has to formulate a capital 149
plan and increase the paid-up capital proportionally within the plan period. Almost all the 
commercial banks are presently strengthening their capital base by issuing right shares and 
bonus shares.
Th   e banking and fi  nancial institutions that do not meet their capital requirements are 
deemed to be in breach of the regulations and are punishable under the provisions of the 
NRB Act, 2002. 
6.4   Removing Bank Management and Ownership 
Th   is issue has been addressed in Section 86 of the NRB Act 2002. Aft  er declaring a 
bank/fi  nancial institution as a problem bank/fi  nancial institution, the NRB can remove the 
management and restructure the ownership itself.
Th  ere have been a few instances where NRB intervened, removed the board of 
directors, and assumed control of the bank. Th  e examples are: NEFINCO, Nepal Bank 
Limited, Lumbini Bank Ltd. and Nepal Bangladesh Bank Ltd. Th   e main reason behind the 
NRB’s intervention was non-compliance to its directives, failure on the part of these banks 
to abide by the principles of corporate governance, like insider lending to family members, 
relatives, fi  rms and companies where the promoters, directors and Chief Executive Offi   cer 
of the bank had an interest. Th   e NRB in these cases declared the banks as problematic banks 
and took over the management. Th   e NRB has still retains control of the  Nepal Bangladesh 
Bank Ltd. In the case of the Lumbani bank, the NRB has constituted a new board of directors 
from its owners and the management has been handed over to them.  
Th   e Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 2002 empowers the NRB to forfeit the rights attached 
with any class of shares if it believes that such forfeiture would avoid certain group of 
shareholders from infl  uencing the management. Th   e Act has also allowed the NRB to direct 
these shareholders to transfer these shares to certain groups as approved by the NRB.
6.5   Role of the Courts in Bank Intervention
Th   e NRB Act, 2002 provides full authority to NRB to intervene in a bank. Th   e NRB is 
not required to initiate court proceedings to intervene, but it has to inform the government 
aft  er taking over control of the management of any bank.  Voluntary liquidation also requires 
the NRB’s prior approval before a bank obtains a court order. Liquidation is administered by 
the court according to the provisions of the Insolvency Act, 2006, whether it is appealed by 
the NRB or is under the bank’s voluntary arrangement. 
7. Resolution  Management
Some banks are experiencing losses and erosion of capital in the Nepalese fi  nancial 
system. Th  ese losses have been due to poor asset quality, poor management, and poor 
corporate governance. High risk concentration resulting from the exposure of banks in 
related companies and increase in the value of collateral which gives banks a false sense of 
security, have contributed to the failure of banks in most of the countries, including Nepal.150
Banks restructuring is generally a management tool that is deployed to improve 
the bank’s profi  tability, quality of assets and corporate governance. However, in practice, 
while the banking law confers legal authority to the bank regulator to take over control and 
restructure a problem bank, the actions of the regulator may be subject to judicial review. 
Restructuring a bank begins with the corrective measures ordered by the Court or by the 
bank’s regulator as soon as the bank shows signifi  cant signs of non-compliance with the 
prudential requirements. Non-compliance with the prudential requirements can include 
failure on the part of the bank to maintain the minimum capital-adequacy norms, non-
compliance by the bank with the provisions of a single-obligor limit, and the provision of 
loan loss. Prudential non-compliance can jeopardize public deposits and the interest of the 
stockholders of the bank. All these issues should be addressed in time and corrective actions 
should be initiated. If such actions fail, resolution seems inevitable in the system.
7.1   Resolution under Insolvency Act, 2006
Th  e Insolvency Act, 2006, provides that insolvency action can be initiated for any 
company (including banking and fi  nancial institutions) in any of the following ways to apply 
to the Court for insolvency proceedings:
a) Company  itself
b)  At least 5 percent of the total creditors of the company.
c)  At least 5 percent of the shareholders of the company.
d)  At least 5 percent of the debenture holders of the company.
e)  Liquidator of the company.
Th   e prior approval of the Nepal Rastra Bank and of the relevant regulatory authorities 
is required to obtained, respectively, by banking and fi  nancial institutions and by other 
specifi  c companies, before a court application can be made. 
A person (who is enlisted in the business of liquidation) is selected and appointed 
by the Court as a liquidator. On the appointment of the liquidator, the board of directors, 
management and employees are removed from the service of the company. Th  e  liquidator 
also takes over the books of accounts of the company.
 
7.2   Offi   cial Administration of Insolvent Banks
To date, Nepal has not experienced any bank insolvency. However, the NRB has 
declared a number of banking and fi  nancial institutions as problematic. Reform actions and 
plans have been taken by the NRB to protect the banks from falling into insolvency. Th  e 
measures include extending refi  nancing assistance to the banks to help them maintain their 
liquidity position and sustain their restructuring. 
Th  ere are two methods of liquidation: Th  e fi  rst is voluntary liquidation. If a bank 
or fi  nancial institution is sound enough to pay up all its liabilities and the NRB grants its 
approval, which may be subject to some terms and conditions, the voluntary liquidation may 
proceed. Second, if any bank or fi  nancial institution that could not be recovered through 
corrective and restructuring eff  orts, then the  NRB can appeal in court to liquidate the bank. 
Th   e liquidation process and procedures are not specifi  ed in both the BAFIA 2006 and the 151
NRB Act, 2002. Th  erefore,  aft  er submitting the application in the court, the provisions of 
Insolvency Act, 2006 will prevail for completing the liquidation.
Under the Insolvency Act 2006, the court can appoint an investigating offi   cer to 
initiate the insolvency process. Th  e investigating offi   cer will investigate the fi  nancial and 
other position of the company and prepare a report, convene a  meeting of the creditors, and 
submit the resolutions of the meetings to the court. With these documents, the court can 
issue an order to do any of the following:
1.  Initiate liquidation immediately.
2.  Implement restructuring program.
3.  Wait for some time to recover the bank (if possible), instead of carrying out the 
liquidation.
4.  Provide additional time for insolvency process in order to conduct additional 
investigation
5.  Cancel the order to initiate the process of insolvency
7.3   Initiation of Bank Insolvency Proceedings
Th   e Insolvency Act 2006 stipulates that the legal proceedings for bank insolvency will 
have to meet all the requirements defi  ned in the Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 2006, 
the Nepal Rastra Bank Act, 2002 and the Companies Act, 2006. Th   e Insolvency Act, 2006 also 
requires the prior approval of the NRB to liquidate banks and fi  nancial institutions. Th  ere 
are two types of liquidation in Nepal, namely, voluntary liquidation (including liquidation 
by the Company Registrar) and compulsory liquidation (by the court upon the request of 
the regulators or creditors).
A company is presumed to be insolvent when eligible persons (5 percent share holders 
or 10 percent creditors or debenture holders), or the company itself, or the liquidator, or 
regulator make an application for insolvency proceedings. For applications by companies, a 
special resolution is passed by the BOD and the application is given to the court. If creditors 
make the appeal for insolvency, they have to complete a 35-day period from the date of 
notice directing the company to payoff   its debts. If waiting period is completed, than 
the court can initiate the investigation for insolvency. A liquidator is appointed and the 
liquidation process is initiated thereaft  er. 
7.4   Some of the Important Roles and Responsibilities of the Liquidator 
in Insolvency Act and Companies Act 
a)  File a case on behalf of the company.
b)  Hire employees for the purpose of expediting the work of liquidation.
c)  Recover ‘calls in arrears’ on shares from the shareholders.
d)  Use company’s offi   cial seal.
e)  Take a loan secured by assets of the company.
f)  Sell the assets in the best interest of the company and discharge liabilities of the 
company.
g)  Amicably solve the issue of payment of dues with the creditors of the company.152
h)  Sell the assets and settle the liabilities
i)  Initiate all the activities to liquidate the company. 
j)  On appointment of a liquidator, all the powers and duties of BOD, management 
and other employees will rest on the liquidator.
k)  BOD, management, and employees of the bank will be barred from taking part in 
the management and operation of the bank and they shall be removed from their 
respective positions, unless and until the liquidator gives them an order to stay.
l)  Take over the assets, accounts and other necessary documents of the bank.
m)  Submit statement of performance to the Registrar every 6 months aft  er the start 
of liquidation proceedings.
n)  Submit statement of aff  airs to the shareholders every 6 months aft  er the start of 
liquidation proceedings.
o)  Realization of assets and discharge of liabilities.
p)  Call general meeting of the shareholders or creditors to discuss the proceedings 
of liquidation.
7.5   Restructuring Programs under Insolvency Act 2006
Th   e Insolvency Act, 2006 defi  nes restructuring as a process under which a restructuring 
program is launched under this Act for any type of company (including a bank) which is 
facing the fi  nancial crisis, and, if it is not addressed in time, would result in the company 
falling into possible bankruptcy or insolvency. Under Section 22 (2) of the Insolvency Act, 
2006, the liquidator, manager or the offi   cial is ordered to complete the restructuring activities 
within the prescribed timeframe. Th   e restructuring manager has to prepare a restructuring 
plan incorporating the following matters:
a)  Plan to change the capital structure by capitalising the debt
b)  Payment of dues to the creditors by realisation of some of the assets of the 
company.
c)  Issue of securities in lieu of outstanding obligations to the creditors.
d)  Conversion of the claims of creditors into capital
e)  Merger of the company with another company.
f)  Change in the management of the company.
g)  Any other restructuring programs as directed by the Court. 
 Th   e person appointed as a restructuring manager will have exclusive power to manage 
the company undertaking the restructuring.
7.6   Treatment of Bank Deposits and Other Claims
Th   e provisions for the priority of claim settlement diff  er between the diff  erent Acts. But 
in the case of banking and fi  nancial institutions, the claims should be settled in accordance 
with the provisions of the NRB Act and the  Bank and Financial Institution Act, 2006. Upon 
realisation of the asset value, the claims are settled by the liquidator in the following order: 
a) Liquidation  expenses.
b)  Payments to saving depositors.
c)  Payments to fi  xed depositors.
d)  Payment to other depositors.153
e)  Payment of taxes and other similar fees & duties.
f)  Payment of loan taken from the NRB.
g)  Payment of outstanding salaries, allowances, gratuity and provident fund.
h)  Payment of other loans and advances.
i)  Payment to shareholders.
8.   Crisis Management
8.1    Issues Related to Systemic Banking Crisis
Th   e risks emerging from the system as a whole, arising from any internal or external 
shocks, could have systemic eff  ects on to the fi  nancial system. So far the issues relating to 
systemic crisis in Nepal, are not related to the external shocks as experienced in the South-
east Asian nations, but have to do with the internal weaknesses of the system. Poor fi  nancial 
legislation, poor institutional infrastructure, poor regulatory and supervisory capabilities, 
poor risk management and operational skill in the banking and fi  nancial institution, low 
level of capital structure, and so forth, were the main causes in the past, which distorted the 
credit culture, corporate culture and governance and generating high levels of NPLs and 
huge losses in the fi  nancial system. To resolve such systemic problems, Nepal had launched 
a comprehensive Financial Sector Reform Program in 2001. Nepal today is in the process 
of building a strong fi  nancial architecture to enhance the soundness of its fi  nancial system. 
Under FSRP, the two dominant state-owned banks are being restructured, and the NRB has 
launched a re-engineering programme to modernise its operation and build up its capacity. 
Similarly, to remove the weaknesses of the fi  nancial system as a whole, a capacity-building 
programme is also being launched.  Most of the points of weaknesses in the fi  nancial system 
are being addressed and are  being resolved with minimal cost and burden to the public.
8.2   Institutional Arrangements to Deal with Systemic Crisis 
Th   e authorities have to play an active role to prevent systemic crisis. Th  e  government 
of Nepal is discharging its role in various forms. Th  e FSRP has been introduced as a 
programme by the government to address this issue, and the Nepal Rastra Bank is  an 
implementing agency. Th   e reform program has been launched with the fi  nancial assistance 
of the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank group. Th  e fi  rst 
phase of Financial Sector Technical Assistance Project (FSTAP) credit agreement was signed 
on 30th April 2003 with a closing date of 30 June 2007. Th   e cost of the project is US$ 30.1 
million. Th  e sources of the funding are from the following: IDA Credit: US$16 Million, 
DFID Grant: US$10 Million and HMG/N Grant: US$ 4.1 Million.
Similarly, the second phase of the FSTAP, credit agreement was signed on 10 June 
2004 with a closing date of 29 April 2009. Th   e cost of the second phase is US$75.5 million. 
Th   e sources of funding are from the following: IDA Credit: US$68.5 Million, Grant: US$7.0 
Million. Th  erefore, all together around US$105.6 million is going to expending in this 
program.154
9.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
Th  e objectives of the NRB are to promote stability, develop a secure, healthy and 
effi   cient banking system. In addition, as the primary concern of depositors is the safety of 
their money, NRB also aims to enhance the credibility of the banking system. To benefi  t the 
overall economy, funds that are placed in the banking and fi  nancial institutions should be 
channeled to the productive sectors. However, it was discovered in several instances that the 
funds collected from the public have been diverted by the promoters, directors, and members 
of the senior management of the banks for their private use. Th   e NRB views these matters 
as serious non-compliance to its directives on corporate governance and has acted against 
the perpetrators. In this regard, the NRB has been working to prevent insider lending in 
the banking and fi  nancial institutions and to enhance corporate governance in the system. 
Another major weakness is the disbursement of loans and advances by senior managers 
of the bank to related companies of the promoters. Th  e weaknesses in poor corporate 
governance and weak internal control have been commonly found in almost all the problem 
banks taken over by the NRB. It is also found that poor governance has led to imprudent 
lending, which in turn led to increase in the level of NPLs and losses, and brought on many 
other complications to the institutions. 
Th   e NRB Act, 2002 and the Bank & Financial Institution Act, 2006 have empowered 
the NRB to intervene and resolve a problem bank by initiating corrective action or by 
restructuring. Defi  ciencies in a bank are identifi  ed through several ways, such as notifi  cation 
of the bank itself, or on the basis of reports like the auditors’ reports, on-site and off  -site 
inspection reports. Among these, the most eff  ective and comprehensive way to identify 
the problem areas is through the on-site inspection reports. As the increasing severity of 
the problems could lead to insolvency of the bank, intervention and resolution modalities, 
which have been discussed under Section 6 and Section 7 above, must be in place to prevent 
the bank from falling into insolvency and from facing possible liquidation. 
In Nepal, the banking and fi  nancial institutions cannot on their own initiate insolvency 
proceedings to resolve their problematic position. Voluntary liquidation is possible if a bank 
is solvent and has the prior approval of the NRB, otherwise a problem bank must fi  rst be 
taken over by the NRB and subjected to corrective action or restructuring. If the problem 
bank cannot or does not seem to not be able to be rehabilitated, then the NRB can appeal 
to the court for liquidation. On obtaining the court order, the liquidation is carried out in 
accordance with the provisions of the Insolvency Act.
In order to prevent systemic crisis, the government has been undertaking 
comprehensive fi  nancial reforms that encompass preventive as well as corrective actions 
in the fi  nancial system. One of the best examples is the Comprehensive Financial Sector 
Reform Program, which uses the public funds as well as donor’s technical assistance. 
In general, risks of bank failure should be viewed as part of a competitive environment. 
Regulators cannot and should not guarantee that there will not be any bank failure in the 
system. Fortunately, Nepal has not experienced any bank liquidation in its history. Even 
though there are a few problem banks in its fi  nancial system, they have been making steady 
progress under restructuring. 155
It is noted that while the resolution and exit policies are already in place, sometimes 
actions are taken based on discretion. Th   erefore, to make the system more transparent, a 
clear prompt corrective actions (CPA) policy and programme has been formulated and is 
being implemented. 
To refi ne the resolution and exit policies, well-defi  ned criteria are being framed for 
determining when a bank requires intervention or closure. Th  e regulators should take 
prompt action whenever such criteria are met. In the resolution of problem banks, private 
sector solutions should be considered best. It allows the takeover of the problem bank by a 
healthy institution that fi  nds ownership of the problem bank attractive. Th   e regulators need 
to encourage such private-sector solutions, and apply the least-cost criterion when initiating 
the resolution and exit of problem banks. 
Th   e challenge of supervisors of the fi  nancial system is to resolve problem banks in 
time. Th   e rehabilitation of a problem bank should be quick to minimise the eventual cost to 
depositors, creditors and taxpayers.
It is observed that a resolution strategy sometimes may not be on a competitive basis. 
Th  is is the case with the large state-owned banks when they get into trouble, although 
the NRB may have the view that the resolution or exit techniques should be done on a 
competitive basis. While implementing any strategy on bank resolution, initiatives to resolve 
a problem bank should not distort competition and penalise the effi   cient banks. Th  e  choice 
of resolution measures and the choice between resolution and closure should be made with 
the aim of minimising market disruptions.
Defi  ciencies in the banking and fi  nancial institutions can be resolved more easily if 
they are identifi  ed early. Th   e CAMELS rating system is an eff  ective mechanism to identify 
problems at the early stage. It also facilitates timely intervention by the supervisors. 
Insolvent banks should be allowed to close. On the other hand, problem banks, which 
are in a tight liquidity situation and which are recoverable, should be rehabilitated and 
restructured. To provide the fi  nancial safety nets in the Nepalese fi  nancial system, a deposit 
insurance company should be established. In addition, lender of last resort and other policy 
to deal with systemic crisis should be put in place.   
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Th  e object of this paper is to present the regulatory and supervisory framework 
of Papua New Guinea (PNG) and analyse the process of problem bank identifi  cation, 
intervention and resolution in PNG. A former state-owned bank, the Papua New Guinea 
Banking Corporation (PNGBC), is used as the example to present how the Bank of Papua 
New Guinea (BPNG) undertakes the processes involved in problem bank identifi  cation, 
intervention and resolution. Details on the PNGBC are attached in Appendices 1a and 1b.
Th   e total assets of PNG’s fi  nancial system (“system”) is valued at K13,754.40 million or 
US$4,524.47 million (K3.04:$US1) as at 30 June 2007. Th   e system comprises 4 commercial 
banks with total assets of K9,544.50 million or US$3,139.64 million, 11 licensed fi  nancial 
institutions (K488.20m/US$160.59m), 21 savings and loan societies (K441.6m/US$145.26m), 
7 authorised superannuation funds (K3,089.60m/US$1,016.32m), 5 life insurance companies2 
(K190.50m/US$62.66m), 2 investment managers, 5 fund administrators and 3 life insurance 
brokers.
Th   e banking sector is the critical sector as it holds 69.4 per cent of the system’s total 
assets and the rest by other authorised fi  nancial institutions. 
Figure 1 below shows the spread of the assets in the fi  nancial system.
Figure 1










Source: Bank of PNG
PROBLEM BANK IDENTIFICATION, INTERVENTION 
AND RESOLUTION IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA
by Steven Avel1
1  Manager, Financial System Supervision Department, Bank of Papua New Guinea
2  Excludes general insurance companies and brokers which are supervised by the Insurance Commissioner’s Offi   ce. Th   e National Development Bank 
and Unit Trusts are not supervised by BPNG.160
Th   e distribution above shows that the soundness and stability of the banking sector is 
crucial in ensuring stability in PNG’s fi  nancial system. As part of the BPNG’s responsibilities, 
the key aim is to identify and prevent vulnerabilities in the fi  nancial system and take 
appropriate mitigating actions to prevent systemic consequences. 
2.  Legal Framework for Regulation and Supervision of Financial 
System 
2.1 Legal  Framework
Besides the other core responsibilities of formulating and implementing monetary 
policy and ensuring an effi   cient payment system, the BPNG is responsible for regulating and 
supervising all banks and licensed fi  nancial institutions operating in PNG. Legislations that 
mandate the BPNG to perform its functions and responsibilities are the Central Bank Act, 
2000 (CBA) and the Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 2000 (BFIA). Th   e BPNG is also 
responsible for the regulation and supervision of savings and loan societies under the Savings 
and Loan Societies (Amendment ) Act, 1995 (SLSA), authorised superannuation funds under 
the Superannuation (General Provision) Act, 2000 (SA) and life insurance companies under 
the Life Insurance, Act 2000 (LIA).
2.2  Coordination and Information Sharing 
Under the above laws, the BPNG, in dealing with problem banks and all other fi  nancial 
institutions for which the BPNG is responsible, can solicit the assistance of other agencies, 
such as the Financial Intelligence Unit (attached to Fraud Squad), Police Department, 
Registrar of Companies and the CPA PNG Limited (Institute of Accountants). Th  e  BPNG 
takes responsibility for the overall co-ordination of activities. 
Although the sharing of information between these agencies is limited, given that the 
legislations covering the agencies do not allow for sharing of information unless required 
by a court order, a few government agencies, including the Internal Revenue Commission 
(IRC) and the Investment Promotion Authority (IPA), have acknowledged the importance 
of information sharing with the Central Bank and have each signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) with the BPNG.   
2.3  Issues on Autonomy, Accountability and Legal Protection of Bank 
Supervisors
As a result of the reform of the fi  nancial system in 2000, bank supervisors have a 
greater degree of independence in performing their roles and responsibilities without 
infl  uence or interference from the government or other external agencies. Bank supervisors 
are also protected under the above fi  ve (5) Acts that the BPNG administers. However, there 
is a greater accountability required of bank supervisors – accountability to the public and to 
the BPNG in ensuring eff  ective performance of its objectives and functions.161
3.  Problem Bank Identifi  cation
3.1  Supervisory Strategy  
Supervision is a preventative and collaborative practice, intended to be fl  exible and 
designed to identify and assess risks. Th  e BPNG’s approach to supervision is focused on 
the bank’s systems, policies and internal controls. Th  is helps the BPNG to ensure that 
appropriate procedures are in place to contain risks and, importantly, that the bank’s 
management adheres to them.  Th   e objective is to ensure public confi  dence and a sound and 
stable fi  nancial system.
 
Th   e supervisory approach used by the BPNG in monitoring the condition of authorised 
banks is twofold:
i)  On-site examinations or reviews – which involve the physical presence of the BPNG 
examiners on a bank’s premises to assess a range of activities including: a) the adequacy 
of management’s risk and internal control procedures; b) the bank’s systems and 
processes with regard to the overall operations and condition; c) key ratios, factors 
and conditions aff  ecting capital; d) the interrelationships between capital and other 
components of CAMELS3; and e) the bank’s adherence to laws and regulations and to 
the terms stipulated in the banking licence.
ii)  Off  -site surveillance – which involve collecting, reviewing and analysing reports and 
statistical returns. Information used for the analyses are collected through standardized 
Call Reports submitted to the Financial System Supervision Department (FSSD) on 
a quarterly basis, monthly reports to Monetary Policy Unit (MPU) and daily market 
reports to Financial Market Department (FMD). Other sources of information used 
for off  -site monitoring are annual accounts, correspondences and any other publicly-
available information provided by the market. Call Reports are also used to check 
adherence to prudential requirements. 
Off  -site monitoring is oft  en used to identify potential problems, particularly in the 
intervals between on-site visits, thereby providing early detection and prompting corrective 
actions before problems become serious. 
From on-site examinations and quarterly off  -site reviews, a rating is given to a bank 
using the CAMELS rating system. Under CAMELS, a bank is assigned a composite rating 
between 1 and 5 on a numerical scale based on the evaluation and rating of six essential 
components of an institution’s fi  nancial condition and operations. 
Th   e BPNG also uses CAMELS to categorise institutions with defi  ciencies in a particular 
component and to identify problematic fi  nancial institutions. In order to do that, the BPNG 
has set prudential requirements for all components under CAMELS. 
 
3  CAMELS - Th   e component factors address the adequacy of Capital, the quality of Assets, the capability of Management, the quality and level of 
Earnings, the adequacy of Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk. It is a rating system used by the BPNG to evaluate the soundness of fi  nancial 
institutions on a uniform basis and for identifying those institutions requiring special attention or concern. 162
3.2 Prudential  Requirements
In line with international practices, the BPNG as the regulator and supervisor has 
implemented all of the 25 basic principles of the Basel Committee on eff  ective banking 
supervision. Th  ese principles provide the basis for the BPNG to strengthen its current 
supervisory regime.
 
Th   e Financial Sector Reforms adopted in 2000 played a major role in enhancing the 
performance of banks and fi  nancial institutions in PNG. Legislative amendments were made 
to a number of statutes including the BFIA, setting the framework under which banks and 
other institutions are supervised. Th  e BPNG has the prudential powers under the BFIA 
to implement the principles, including setting prudential standards and requirements for 
banks.
Th  e prudential guidelines include requirements on: (i) minimum capital (CAR 
12 percent, Tier 1 Ratio 8 percent, Leverage Ratio 6 percent); (ii) asset classifi  cation and 
provisioning; (iii) limits on Inter-Bank Placements; (iv) limits on foreign currency exposures; 
and (v) limits on loans to related parties. With the responsibility entrusted to the bank 
boards to perform and ensure sound operations, the BPNG also put in place requirements to 
assess the fi  t and properness of persons holding or intending to hold management positions. 
Similarly, key performance indicators on earnings are used to monitor performance, while 
the banks are expected to maintain adequate liquidity for their operations.
Th   ese prudential requirements are essential for prudent supervision without which 
supervision would be diffi   cult to perform. Th   ey can also have some positive impact in the 
growth of bank assets through sound management and adequate risk- management systems 
to mitigate risks. 
Overall, banks have continued to maintain adequate capital relative to risks within the 
banking sector. Figure 2 below shows the movements in the capital ratios since 2004.
  
Figure 2
Capital Ratios of Banks since June 2004

















Source: Bank of PNG163
3.3  Early Warning Systems, Other Indicators and Risk Assessments
Early warning systems and monitoring tools are essential in bank supervision. Th  e 
BPNG uses CAMELS as an internal supervisory tool for evaluating the soundness of fi  nancial 
institutions and for identifying those institutions requiring special supervisory attention. 
Non-compliance with the prudential requirements is a cause for concern. Supervisors also 
use quarterly and annual reports to identify trends in banks that may signal a potential 
problem.
Information from these reports helps the BPNG monitor activities and trends in key 
indicators and plan future examination activities and the scope of those activities. Red fl  ags 
in problem banks take many forms, and BPNG would consider a number of factors before 
determining the most appropriate supervisory response. Th   e BPNG recognises as red fl  ags 
in the early detection of potential problems with a particular bank the following:
a)  Asset Quality Deterioration – is the most common fi  nancial risk in nearly all problem 
banks. Th  is can be caused by economic factors, poor management,  anxiety for 
earnings, insider abuse and other factors.
b)  Adverse Eff  ects of Rapid Growth
•  Capital levels declining rapidly
•  Growth varies signifi  cantly from the bank’s budget or strategic plan
•  New products and activities are being pursued with no expertise or inadequate 
risk-management controls
c)  Management Oversight Defi  ciencies
• Non-responsive  management
•  Passive or uniform board of directors
•  On-going noncompliance with regulatory requirements, laws or internal 
standards
• Insuffi   cient planning and response to risks
•  Inadequate talent and experience at the CEO and management levels
d)  Inappropriate Limits on Access to Bank Staff   and Documents
•  Refusal to provide information within a reasonable time period
•  Blocking access to relevant third-party records
•  Providing incomplete and inaccurate information
e)  Risk Management Defi  ciencies (Policies, Processes, Personnel, Controls) 
•  Sound risk-management systems to mitigate risk assumed by a bank.
f)  Strained Liquidity
•  Low liquidity levels
•  Decline in deposit levels
• Funding  mismatches
•  Higher cost of funds relative to market164
g)  Insider Abuse and Fraud
•  Extension of credit granted on a more favorable term
•  Excessive salaries, bonuses and fees relative to the size of the bank
•  Fees paid for services not yet received
•  Dishonest or fraudulent act
• Profi  ting from insider knowledge, etc. 
Th   e above can be assessed off  -site using the data provided in the Call Reports and 
during on-site examinations. Indicators from off  -site assessment are increasing levels of past 
due loans and Non-Performing Loans as a percentage of total loans and signifi  cant changes 
in provisions for loan losses. Figure 3 is an example of the type of analysis supervisors 
performed on reports submitted to the BPNG. Th  ese ratios are compared against the 
benchmarks in place to determine the quality of the loan portfolio.
Figure 3




Source: Bank of PNG
Jun-07 Dec-06 Jun-06 Dec-05 Jun-05 Dec-04
2.5% 2.6% 3.8% 4.4% 4.1%
2.9% 2.8% 3.5% 4.7% 5.0%





Deteriorating asset quality is caused by a combination of factors including high loan 
concentrations, in adequate management information system (MIS), large volume of loans 
with structural weaknesses and large volume of unsecured lending. 
3.4 Communication  Concerns
Th  e BPNG recognises that eff  ective, accurate and frequent communication with 
the board and management is extremely important in problem-bank supervision. It also 
recognises the value in communicating concerns with other regulators on matters concerning 
problem banks. Th   e manner in which concerns are communicated to the bank should be 
clearly defi  ned, and refl  ect the severity of the given situation. Th   e commonly used methods 
of communicating concerns to problem banks are:
discuss the matter over the phone followed by a letter or email confi  rming the matters 
discussed;
conduct exit meetings at the conclusion of an examination or review with senior 
management and, in some cases, with directors, to summarize the conclusions, 
required corrective actions and plan for follow-up actions by the BPNG, including 
formal enforcement actions, if any;
communicate through the ROE – this is a formal communication of supervisory 
concerns to a bank;
conduct meetings with the board whenever there is material information to convey; 
and
communicate the concerns to other regulators, e.g. IRC, Insurance Commissioner, 







3.5  Problem Bank Identifi  cation: Th   e Case of PNGBC
Th  e process taken to identify the PNGBC as a problem bank is summarised in 
Appendix 1a and discussed in detail in Appendix 1b. 
4.  Problem Bank Intervention
4.1  Prompt Corrective Actions     
In determining the appropriate corrective actions, the BPNG takes into consideration   
the severity of the problem and the most appropriate supervisory and enforcement action 
to take. Th  e type of action chosen depended also on the bank’s current condition with 
consideration given to the cooperation, responsiveness, and capability of the board and 
management. 
Supervisory and enforcement actions that BPNG may take on a problem bank 
include: (i) issue letter of commitment; (ii) impose additional conditions on a bank’s licence; 
(iii) signing of MOU; (iv) removal of board and or management; (v) sanctions on certain 
business activities; and (vi) instituting a statutory manager to run the aff  airs of the bank.  
4.2  Resolving Liquidity Problems 
Liquidity levels with banks in PNG continue to be high. However, the BPNG requires 
all banks to have a policy detailing what, how and where to obtain cash for operations at a 
reasonable cost when needed. It must also have eff  ective processes in place to monitor and 
react to the contraction of deposits and other funding.
A prudential standard on minimum liquidity will soon be released, outlining the 
prudential liquidity requirements for all banks. Th   e standard prescribes the level of liquidity 
a bank should have based on its capital and the quality of assets. Th  is standard will also 
replace the Minimum Liquid Asset Ratio (MLAR) which is used as a monetary policy 
instrument.
   
4.3  Resolving Credit and Capital Impairment Problems
Lending activity is predominately the source of income and fi  nancial risk to banks. 
Th  us, the potential for loss in the event of default is imminent. Banks classify and make 
provisions on all loans under the following categories: Pass (0 – 30 days) – 1 percent, Special 
Mention (31 – 90 days) – 5 percent, Substandard (91 – 180 days) – 25 percent, Doubtful 
(181 – 360 days) – 50 percent and Loss (> 360 days) – 100 per cent. Th   ese provisions are 
prescribed in the standard on asset classifi  cation and provisioning. During reviews, bank 
supervisors check to ensure that correct and adequate provisioning is made for loans.
In a situation where a bank experiences capital impairment, the BPNG can impose 
sanctions such as no dividend payment to shareholders, no major capital expenditures and 
selling of assets. Th   e BPNG can ask the bank to raise additional capital through injection by 
the bank holding company or shareholders or through new share issues to the public.     166
BPNG has set minimum capital requirements of CAR at 12 percent, Tier 1 Ratio 8 
percent and Leverage Ratio 6 percent. However, it also has the authority to require more 
capital in a bank with signifi  cant risk.
4.4 Removing  Bank  Management and Ownership Issues 
If the problem relates to mismanagement, then necessary steps can be taken to replace 
management. For ownership issues, divestment of shares is one option a bank could take to 
dilute majority shareholding. 
4.5  Role of the Courts in Bank Intervention
When all avenues have been exhausted and the aggrieved party is not satisfi  ed with 
the actions taken, the matter can be put before the courts to decide. Th   e BPNG does not have 
an in-house legal counsel; therefore, it uses private law fi  rms to take up any litigation cases 
in the courts on its behalf.
4.6  Problem Bank Intervention: Th   e Case of PNGBC
Following the identifi  cation of the PNGBC’s problems, the BPNG intervened to save 
the bank from total collapse and possible disruptions to the fi  nancial system. Details of the 
BPNG’s intervention process are shown in Appendix 1a and discussed in Appendix 1b. 
5.  Problem Bank Resolution
5.1 Grounds for Receivership and Early Resolution
Th   e BPNG has the power and responsibility to appoint a receiver for a problem bank. 
Under Section 36 of the BFIA, the BPNG may take control of the business of an Authorised 
Institution (AI) or appoint an Administrator to take over control of the business of an AI 
where:
(a)  the AI considers that it is likely to become unable to meet its obligations or that it is 
about to suspend payment; or
(b)  the BPNG considers that the AI is likely to become unable to meet its obligations or is 
about to suspend payment; or
(c)  the AI becomes unable to meet its obligations or suspends payment; or 
(d)  the AI fails to implement or observe, or is breach of, a prudential standard or a 
condition imposed on its licence such that, in the opinion of BPNG, the interests of 
the depositors of the AI are materially threatened.
Section 37 of BFIA makes provisions for the basis of terminating control where it 
empowers the BPNG or the appointed Administrator to take control of the business of an 
AI until:
(i)  the deposits of the AI have been repaid or the BPNG is satisfi  ed that suitable provision 
has been made for their repayment; or
(ii)  the BPNG considers that it is no longer necessary for it or the appointed Administrator 
to remain in control of the business of the AI.   167
5.2  Supervisory Responsibilities for Failing Banks
Th  e BPNG does not have a specifi  c offi   ce or unit responsible for supervising the 
resolution of critical problem banks. Institutions experiencing signifi  cant problems are 
handled by assigned analysts who are also desk offi   cers and an assigned senior analyst 
as overseer. Together with the manager responsible, they will plan supervisory activities, 
including the development of an on-going strategy, off  -site reviews, and prepare various 
enforcement actions.
Depending on the action to be taken, a legal counsel can be engaged to assist with the 
matter. Th   e supervision of a problem bank is a time-intensive process, and oft  en in PNG it 
can take long to resolve. Th   e problem bank is placed under on-going supervision, which 
includes liquidity monitoring and regular review of the bank’s fi  nancial movements in the 
balance sheet or of further depletion of capital levels.
5.3  Asset Quality and Financial Review Process
Th   e PNGBC was the only problem bank that experienced deteriorating asset quality 
as a result of poor management of its loan portfolio. Th   e quality of assets was critical enough 
to deplete the bank’s capital as shown in Figure 4. 
Jun-01 Dec-00 Jun-00 Dec-99 Jun-99 Dec-98
Req’ment 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0%







Capital of the Problem Bank
Source: Bank of PNG 
Further, there were records of signifi  cant write-off  s and inadequate provisioning or 
allowance for loans and leases.
Figure 5 below indicates that non-performing loans ranged from 18 percent o 25 
percent of total loans. Th   is is considered very high indicating poor credit management.
Figure 5
Asset Quality of PNGBC
Jun-01 Dec-00 Jun-00 Dec-99 Jun-99 Dec-98
NPL/Total Loans 21% 23% 22% 23% 18% 25% 24%
Prov/NPL 79% 70% 49% 80% 104% 79% 78%
Source: Bank of PNG
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5.4  Bank Closing Process
By the late 1990s, the PNGBC was undercapitalised and it was evident that the safety 
of depositors’ funds was at stake. As the largest bank with a total asset base at K1 billion 
(US$320m), it was evident that any closure would aff  ect other institutions, thus, creating a 
systemic risk to the whole fi  nancial system.
Th  e decision to sell the bank was made by the government of PNG as part of its 
privatisation program. Th   e process to expedite the sale was a detailed one, with all parties 
involved. Th   e PNGBC was successfully sold off   in 2002. 
5.5 Resolution  Methods
Th   ere are several methods for resolving failing banks: (i) closure of the bank: deposit 
payoff  ; (ii) purchase and assumptions transactions; (iii) open bank assistance; (iv) public/
radical restructuring and (v) mergers and acquisitions. 
5.6  Problem Bank Resolution: Th   e Case of the PNGBC
Th   e problems of the PNGBC were resolved through a successful merger and acquisi-
tion as illustrated in Appendix 1a and further explained in Appendix 1b. 
6. Crisis  Management
6.1  Key Policies in Dealing with Systemic Banking Crisis 
Th   e BPNG did not have at the time of the PNGBC crisis any documented policies 
detailing how to deal with a bank in crisis. Despite this, the BPNG has a very good working 
relationship with other relevant agencies that could assist the BPNG to institute legal action 
against institutions who fail to comply with the BFIA and the licensing requirements.
Th   e BPNG, as the Central Bank, is also the lender of last resort. Th   is lending facility is 
provided for banks that are solvent but may have been faced with a critical liquidity problem. 
So far, BPNG has not directly used this facility to assist a problem bank because PNG has 
yet to experience a bank failure. However, where there is a critical problem with a particular 
bank, BPNG would work very closely with the concerned bank to resolve the matter, in 
order to prevent a systemic crisis.   
6.2  Institutional Arrangements for Systemic Banking Crisis  
As much as possible the BPNG sees to it that there is a continuous dialogue between 
the problem bank’s board and management to ensure that minimal disruption is caused on 
its normal operation and there is no systemic risk. In the supervision history of the BPNG, 
it has been successful in preventing a systemic banking crisis. Nevertheless, with increased 
reliance on the banking sector for all fi  nancial needs, arrangements amongst institutions, 
particularly the regulated institutions and other regulators, need to be instituted to prevent 
bank crisis or failures.  169
6.3  Key Issues in Crisis Management
All banks are required to plan for any “worse case scenario” and have in place 
a contingency plan. A business continuity plan should be also put in place to ensure its 
banking business is not disrupted. Bank management must understand the seriousness of 
the need to plan for future problems. 
All banks should review and assess the sources of risks in their own business and 
conduct an audit of areas or provide contingency plans for possible events that can lead to 
a crisis. In this way, institutions could determine which potential crisis can be avoided by 
planning for appropriate measures to take and determining the resources to allocate to these 
areas.    
7.  Prospects and Future Outlook for PNG’s Financial Sector
Th  e  fi  nancial sector reforms which commenced in 2000 and other structural reforms 
contributed to the country’s favourable economic conditions since 2002. Economic activity 
continues to grow with renewed confi  dence by the business community in the government’s 
macroeconomic management. All the major macroeconomic indicators show this positive 
outlook. Th   ese include rising employment levels, increased exports, higher credit growth 
in the banking system, and prudent fi  scal management. Th   ese developments have created 
an enabling environment for the BPNG to conduct monetary policy and achieve price 
stability. Th   e BPNG has achieved and maintained low infl  ation, a stable exchange rate and 
low interest rates. Foreign reserves reached a historic level of US$2,117.50 million (equal to 
approx. K5,890.20 million) as at 26 November 2007.
Figure 6 below shows a fi  ve-year monthly weighted average lending and deposits rates 
and the margins of commercial banks up to June 2007.
Interest rates on loans Interest rates on Deposits Margin
Figure 6
Monthly Weighted Average Lending and Deposits









































































































































Source:   Bank of PNG170
Although PNG’s fi   nancial sector is strengthened by these favourable economic 
conditions, the BPNG has to be vigilant in its supervisory responsibilities to ensure the 
stability of the system and the soundness of the institutions that it regulates and supervises.  
It is prudent for the BPNG to be aware of the strengths as well as perceived weaknesses, 
threats and challenges that may undermine continued growth and sustainability of the 
fi  nancial sector.
  
7.1  Strengths and Perceived Vulnerabilities of the Financial Sector
Th  e government’s decision to reform the fi  nancial sector was the signifi  cant factor 
that laid the foundation in building the strength of PNG’s fi  nancial sector. Th   e passing of the 
CBA and BFIA gave the Central Bank a focused set of objectives, increased its independence 
and improved regulation and supervision of the fi  nancial system. Th   e CBA also limited the 
government’s access to Central Bank fi  nancing and introduced a new Board with wider 
community representation. Stringent ‘fi  t and proper’ criteria were introduced in the BFIA 
for managers and directors of banks and fi  nancial institutions. Strong supervision by the 
BPNG and the external auditors provided the impetus to growth and strengthen the tripartite 
















A variant structure, but with the similar approach/methodology of regulation and 
supervision, also applies to the superannuation and life insurance industries following the 
passing of the SA and LIA in late 2000. 
Th   ere are perceived vulnerabilities or weaknesses that the BPNG must address which 
include:
lack of competition due to few major banks and limited licensed fi  nancial 
institutions;
limited domestic investment options to invest liquid funds;
•
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lack of or inadequate prosecution powers of BPNG in the current Acts; and
penalties in the current Acts are not prescriptive
Weaknesses in FSSD include:
Department is relatively too large 
High staff   turnover
Department needs to build its staff   capacity to strengthen technical expertise in 
banking, superannuation and insurance; and 
Ineff  ective enforcement due to inadequate prosecution powers of the BPNG.
7.2 Th   reats and Challenges to Growth and Sustainability of the 
Financial Sector
Financial sector growth and sustainability cannot be achieved alone by the government 
undertaking major legislative reforms or the Central Bank formulating and implementing 
sound monetary policy and carrying out an eff  ective supervision of the fi  nancial system. 
Th   reats and challenges for the BPNG are many. Among them and equally important 
is the need to adopt and implement good governance in the fi  nancial sector. Good corporate 
governance is important to enhancing strong reporting system, effi   cient internal controls 
and risk-management systems. 
PNG has an open economy and events and developments elsewhere in the world have 
a direct impact on the domestic economy and, hence, on its fi  nancial sector due to its reliance 
on the export of its many natural resources. Th   e current favourable economic condition is, 
to a greater extent, due to the high world prices of these resources, particularly oil and other 
mineral resources. Signifi  cant threats and challenges will come when the opposite scenario 
becomes a reality for PNG to face. Th   is will present a much greater challenge for the BPNG 
in its supervisory responsibilities.
7.3 Future  Plans
 
Th  e immediate plan for the BPNG is the restructure of FSSD. Th  e restructure is 
expected to result in having two Departments reporting to the Deputy Governor, Policy 
and Regulations. Based on grouping by related industries, the two new Departments would 
be the Banking Supervision Department (BSD) and the Superannuation and Insurance 
Supervision Department (SISD). Th   is change is necessary in view of: (i) the FSSD taking 
on additional responsibilities; (ii) the possibility that the BPNG will regulate and supervise 
the general insurance industry; and (iii) ensuring greater focus on the industries that are 
currently paying or prepared to pay the cost of supervision.
For the longer term, the BPNG will review the current legislations to tighten up 
any loop holes and make adequate provisions for issues, such as penalties for breaches, 
prosecution powers, cross-border supervision, cost of supervision and a review of the 








Th  e  eff  ectiveness of a Central Bank in dealing with a problem bank is determined by a 
number of critical factors. Th   ese include having an eff  ective legal framework that empowers 
a Central Bank to carry out its core functions and responsibilities without undue infl  uence or 
interference from the government, other institutions of government and external agencies. 
In PNG, the fi  nancial sector reforms undertaken in 2000 had paved the way for the BPNG 
to ensure banks comply with the prudential requirements introduced as part of the reform 
process. Th   e BPNG also sought external assistance from the IMF and APRA to carry out 
the reform.
Further, a number of fi  nancial institutions, savings and loan societies, superannuation 
funds and life insurance companies have had to introduce major changes in their structure 
and business operations to comply with the prudential requirements. Th  ese changes, 
which conform to the Basel Core Principles of Eff  ective Banking Supervision, have realised 
signifi  cant benefi  ts for these institutions and their members/policy holders.
Although these positive developments are continuing, the BPNG will continue 
to be vigilant in overseeing the performance of all banks, licensed fi  nancial institutions, 
savings and loan societies, superannuation funds, life insurance companies and the general 
insurance companies in the future. Th   e BPNG is now in the initial stages of restructuring 
the FSSD as part of its continuing eff  orts to strengthen its supervisory role and to ensure the 
fi  nancial system remains stable and strong. Th   is calls for equally greater responsibility on 
the managers and directors of all licensed fi  nancial institutions to prudently manage these 
institutions and to avoid the problems experienced by the PNGBC – the problem bank used 
in our case study.
Th   e PNGBC, the largest commercial bank owned by the government with an extensive 
network in PNG and signifi  cant market share, and whose profi  tability was on the decline as 
a result of its ineffi   ciencies in managing its loan book and bad management practices, was 
sold to another commercial bank. Although profi  tability of the bank improved in 1998, this 
was not suffi   cient to resurrect the troubled bank as the government had made a decision to 
privatise it.
As the PNGBC was a wholly state-owned bank, political pressures for loan approvals 
marred the bank’s lending processes. Loan proposals were pushed from two fronts - 
pressure from national leaders and from the PNGBC CEO level. At the operational level 
of the PNGBC, loan offi   cers tended to support or favour loan proposals from relatives and 
business associates. Th   e end result was deterioration in the quality of loans resulting in high 
non-performing loans and poor earnings. Continuing losses diminished capital; thereby 
breaching the prudential limits.
Th  e BPNG took corrective actions to rehabilitate the problem bank, and the best 
option acceptable to all parties was for the sale of the PNGBC to the BSP in 2002. 173
9. Recommendations
Th   ere are many supervisory issues and challenges that the BPNG is faced with. Some 
of these are discussed in this report. A number of these issues and challenges have been 
addressed. However, the following recommendations require immediate attention and action 
to enhance capacity-building and to lift   supervision of the LFIs to another level higher:
  
(i)  Following the restructure of the FSSD, which will commence in the fi  rst quarter of 
2008, the proposed two Departments, namely, the Banking Supervision Department 
and the Superannuation & Insurance Supervision Department, should start the 
process to shift   away from the current approach, which is based largely on CAMELS, 
to a more dynamic, forward-looking risk-based supervision approach.
(ii)  While a review of the SLSA is underway, a review of the BFIA and LIA should be 
considered necessary in view of the need to address a number of emerging issues 
confronting the BPNG, including:
•  enforcement and compliance issues;
•  prescriptive powers of the BPNG;
•  penalties for breaches;
• fi  t and propriety of shareholders;
•  cost of supervision;
• user-pay  policy;
• consolidated  supervision;
•  cross-border supervision; and
•  possible inclusion of the general insurance sector under the supervision of the 
Central Bank.
(iii) Th  ere is a need to develop a structured and coordinated approach to ensuring 
continuous application of knowledge, skills and information received from 
international training, such as from SEACEN, APRA, PFTAC, etc., to improve the 
eff  ectiveness of supervision.
(iv)  Given that supervisory issues, threats and challenges of SEACEN member countries 
are not necessarily the same in nature and magnitude, a forum or a similar avenue 
should be created for the member countries to share information whereby bank 
problems and solutions can be shared electronically on a web-page or as an agenda on 
annual meetings of heads of supervisors.174
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Appendix 1a
Problem Bank Identification, Intervention and Resolution in
Papua New Guinea 
(Based on PNG’s experience with Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation)
Identification Intervention Resolution
■  On-site Examination
■  Independent Review-
 PWC
- Rapid loan growth
- Lending concentration
  and asset quality
 deterioration




- Weak Internal controls
- Management oversight
 deficiencies
- Poor business strategy
- Larger surplus cash
  held by branches
- Risk management
 deficiencies
- Inappropriate limits on
  access to bank staff and
 documents
■  Supervisory Responses
 or  Actions




 other  regulators
- Commiting to a signed
 MOU
■  Enforcement Actions
- Remedial Actions in
  accordance with the
  Act and upon
 Minister's  approval
- Removal of the Board
 of  PNGBC
- Appointment of a
 Caretaker  Board
■  Sale of PNGBC to BSP
■  Revocation of  
 PNGBC’s license
- a successful sale of
 PNGBC  through
 competitive  bidding
- a successful merger and
  aquisition of the
 problem  bank177
Appendix 1b 
PROBLEM BANK: PAPUA NEW GUINEA BANKING CORPORATION (PNGBC)
1.  Problem Bank Identifi  cation: Th   e Case of PNGBC
Due to resource constraints and lack of supervisory oversight by the Banking 
Supervision Department (BSD) at the time, the BPNG requested Price Waterhouse Coopers 
(PwC), an accounting & auditing fi  rm to assist with an examination to review the loan 
portfolio and internal control systems of PNGBC in 1998 and again in 2000. 
Similarly, the Finance Pacifi  c Group (FPG) which is the holding company of PNGBC, 
requested PwC to undertake a diagnostic review on PNGBC and its wholly owned subsidiary, 
Nambawan Finance Limited  in March 2000. Th   e review was aimed at identifying areas for 
improvement, which might enhance the value of the divestment given the Government’s 
stated intention to privatise PNGBC and its subsidiaries. Although the review was requested 
by the FPG, a copy of the review report was made available to BPNG. Both reviews uncovered 
many problems with varying degrees of severity that were critical to the viability of the bank 
and the fi  nancial system as a whole. Th   is was because PNGBC was the largest bank with 
an extensive branching network in PNG and total market share of K1,355.14 million as at 
December 2001.
Below is a brief account of some of the problems uncovered during the review and 
actions taken by BPNG and the Government to resolve the problems and privatize the 
bank.
a.  Rapid Loan Growth 
 
Signifi  cant growth in assets was reported. PNGBC was increasing its lending at an 
unsustainable and alarming rate over the six months from January to June 1998 by about 
30% against the market trend. Th   is includes an exposure of K50 million to its subsidiary 
company, the PNGBC Holding No.1 Pty Ltd. When lending is higher than the general level 
of economic activity, this could be expected to increase the level of risk in the loan portfolio, 
particularly given the sharp increases in interest rates at the time. 
b.  Lending Concentration & Asset Quality Deterioration 
(i) Th   e quality of the assets deteriorated and was of great concern. Th  e  bank’s  strong 
orientation towards the fi  nancial needs of the average population (asset side) was 
not refl  ected on the credit side. It was more focused on sectors such as agriculture, 
fi  shing, forestry and logging which were riskier requiring high provisioning for 
bad debts. Th   e industry concentrations were not closely monitored by PNGBC 
and contributed to the poor performance.  
(ii) As at December 1997, exposures to 23 customers amounted to K396 million, 
representing 66.4 per cent of the total portfolio of K596 million. Th   ese large loans 
performed so poorly that they threatened the bank’s liquidity and solvency.178
(iii) As at December 1998, only 1.7 per cent of the bank’s loan portfolio comprised 
personal loans, with a maximum credit size of K10,000. PNGBC’s experience 
is even more limited regarding the credit business with small and medium 
enterprises. As at December 1997, PNGBC had about 400 outstanding loans 
in this market segment with an estimated loan default rate of more than 40 
percent. 
c. Large  Exposures
 
As at 31 December 1999, there were 5 non-group exposures, which exceeded 
PNGBC’s prudential limits (plus 2 borderline exposures). Intra-group exposures to Motor 
Vehicle Insurance Limited (MVIL) and Nambawan Finance Limited (NFL) were in excess of 
prudential large exposure limits for individual and aggregate connected parties. 
PNGBC had inadequate processes in place to assess large exposures, including lack of 
rigorous measures to prevent future overexposures and to contain existing large exposures.
d.   Asset Impairment
  Even with the high rate of non-performing assets, the bank failed to apply its policy 
with respect to the treatment of impaired assets. Concerns were also raised about the 
recoverability of certain claims made against the Government of Papua New Guinea.
e. Capital  Defi  ciencies 
  While PNGBC’s capital as at December 1997 was 7.89%, it was grossly insolvent as 
adjustments to capital were not considered by the bank. As at 31 December 1998 
the bank’s capital marginally increased above 8%. Again, as the adjustments were not 
considered, the ratios given in the table below do not accurately refl  ect the extent of 































Aft  er 1998, there were discussions and attempts within the BPNG to increase the 
capital requirements and CAR. Th  e PwC review found that with increases in both kina 
amount (from K5 m to K15 m) and capital ratio (from 8% to 10%); PNGBC would still suff  er 
a signifi  cant short fall. Note also that during 1999, the Government, being the shareholder of 
the bank, made a decision to amalgamate the PNGBC’s holding companies with the problem 
bank to create a single entity. As a result, CAR of the bank had increased signifi  cantly in 
1999.  
As the regulator, BPNG had great concern about the amalgamation. Th  ere were 
relatively low levels of capital in PNGBC as well as the FPG companies, particularly MVIL 
which presented a potential contagion risk to PNGBC. MVIL had a number of subsidiary 179
companies, most of which were non-performing or not operating. Th   us, the review by PwC 
recommended to the board of PNGBC to consider isolating the bank and its subsidiaries 
from that risk by separating MVIL from the FPG. Th   e recommendation was accepted by the 
board of PNGBC and implemented in 2000.
f. Internal  Controls
Th   ere were substantial weaknesses in almost all aspects of the internal control systems 
of the bank, particularly in the lending, treasury and foreign exchange operations. Th  e 
weaknesses included outdated or no manuals for some activities, an inadequate information 
system and inappropriate procedures regarding the origins of transactions, accounting and 
recording, monitoring and review and reporting of transactions.
g.  Management Oversight Defi  ciencies
Within the bank’s organizational structure, responsibilities and reporting lines were 
not clearly defi  ned resulting in overlaps and ineffi   ciencies. Th  e  defi  ciencies include:
•   overlap in the roles of the Executive Chairman, Managing Director and    
  General Manager – Banking;
•   potential for a fl  atter structure with more direct reporting channels; and
•   no appropriate representation at Executive Committee level for certain key   
  operational divisional heads.
Th  e Head Offi   ce and Support Function of PNGBC had a support role of other 
companies within the FPG. Th   e review recommended that a decision be made separating 
the activities for PNGBC and those for FPG.
h. Business  Strategy
Th   e review identifi  ed that the strategy document was not wholly complete or integrated 
with various other divisional business plans. Th  ere was no comprehensive strategic plan 
prepared at the Board level to provide direction and guidance to all business units within 
PNGBC. 
PNGBC had not adopted a specifi  c strategic approach in developing particular markets, 
customers, products or services. Instead, it relied on its traditional banking businesses and 
placed a lot of emphasis on expansion and customer-outreach at the expense of profi  tability 
as the bank was expected to deliver banking services as part of its social obligation to the 
communities. Th   is caused some branches, sub-branches and agencies to be unable to sustain 
operations and forced closures.
i.  Surplus cash held by branches
High levels of currency notes were being held at branches. Cash holdings at branches 
should have been reduced to a more appropriate level to preclude exposures to crime and to 
re-deploy to earning assets. 180
j.  Risk Management Defi  ciencies
i)  Risk Management Framework - PNGBC failed to develop a risk management 
framework to be used in identifying, measuring and monitoring risks on a bank-
wide basis. It also had fundamental weaknesses in its procedures and risk controls. 
Th   e Board and management’s lax attitude towards putting in place systems and 
processes to mitigate risks led to more serious problems. Th   e bank’s appetite and 
tolerance levels for risk were not clearly stated. A risk appetite and attitude should 
have been developed to drive the establishment of various risk limits for the 
Treasury and International Departments and other business units of the bank. 
ii)  Policies & Procedure - PNGBC failed to have adequate and appropriate policies 
in place. Furthermore, existing policies were not updated to refl  ect the changes 
taking place within the organization.   
iii)  Human Resource/Personnel – PNGBC’s personnel cost ratios were one-and-half 
times more compared to the other banks. It had the highest number of staff   per 
branch and the lowest level of assets per branch.
  Political interference with the operations of the bank resulted in the promotion 
of inexperienced managers and loan offi   cers.  Th  e loan book continued to 
deteriorate in the process. Also, with the political appointment of the CEOs, a 
lack of continuity in key positions within the bank created uncertainties. 
 
iv)  Management Information System - Th  e Integrated Banking System (IBS) had 
weaknesses that impeded on proper controls of the lending function. Lack of 
improvement or enhancement in the system led to it being defi  cient in:
•  loan grading by asset quality;
• fl  agging the expiry of security documentation;
•  improvements in loan arrears reporting;
• identifi  cation of related group of borrowers;
•  accurate assessment of concentration risk within the loan portfolio; and
•  historical provisioning levels.
k. Communicating  Concerns
Eff  ective, accurate and frequent communication is extremely important in problem 
banks and it was no diff  erent with PNGBC. Hence, BPNG was careful in how to address 
the issues. Th   is is because the troubled bank was a large bank and its closure could have 
signifi  cantly aff  ected confi  dence in the banking industry and have destabilizing eff  ects on 
the fi  nancial system and the overall economy. In the resolution process, there was ongoing 
communication between BPNG, PNGBC and the Minister for Treasury and Finance.   
2.  Problem Bank Intervention: Th   e Case of PNGBC
In the process of rehabilitating the troubled bank, BPNG took certain corrective 
actions and ensured subsequent monitoring for adherence to those supervisory enforcement 
actions. Detailed below were some of the rehabilitation actions.
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a)  Informal Supervisory Responses or Actions
i)  Communication through the Report of Examination (ROE) - From the reviews 
conducted by PwC and the Bank and as part of the examination process, a 
ROE discussing potential and signifi   cant problems aff   ecting the bank were 
communicated to the Board with recommendations for corrective actions.
 
ii)  Meetings and Consultations - Exit meetings were held aft  er the examinations/
reviews to discuss the issues identifi  ed during the examinations. Many other 
meetings and consultations were convened during the whole process as problems 
were identifi  ed with the management and the Board.
iii)  Communication with other Regulators – the only other fi  nancial supervisor with 
interest in the FPG was the Insurance Commissioner. Continuous dialogue 
between the Bank and the Commissioner took place due to the fact that MVIL, a 
subsidiary is involved with insurance.
iv)  Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) – was also used where all stakeholders 
involved had to provide their undertaking in resolving the issues.
b)  Formal Enforcement Actions 
i)  BPNG, with the approval of the Minister for Treasury and in accordance with 
Sec. 18(2)(a) and (b) of BFIA, had directed the bank to refrain from extending 
any further loan commitments to any clients while at the same time endeavor to 
recall any existing commitments where commercially and legally feasible, until 
such time as the capital adequacy ratio has been restored and all other prudential 
concerns have been rectifi  ed.
ii)  BPNG, using powers under the BFIA, removed the Board of PNGBC and replaced 
it with independent directors who had demonstrated integrity.
3.  Problem Bank Resolution: Th   e Case of PNGBC
(a)  Sale of Problem Bank
In line with the Government’s policy to privatize the government owned institutions, 
including the troubled bank, PNGBC was prepared for sale. Th   is was despite the signifi  cant 
improvement in the fi  nancial position of the troubled bank following BPNG’s intervention 
Within the GoPNG’s short time-frame for the privatization of PNGBC, considerable eff  orts 
were made to enhance the value of the bank to bring to the point of sale. 
During the whole process, issues prevalent in a normal sale were discussed at great 
lengths and resolved before the necessary agreements were signed. Th   is included issues on 
shareholding (controlling interest at 51% or more), bad debts, safety of depositor’s funds of 
both banks, future dividend payments by the acquiring bank, capital requirements of the 
acquirer and other related issues. Th   e bids to acquire the trouble bank were issued in late 
2001. Th   e successful bidder was a local privately-owned bank, Bank South Pacifi  c Limited.  182
At the time of sale, prudential regulation and supervision under the new regime has 
improved considerably. Th   erefore, care was taken to ensure that the acquiring bank complied 
with all the prudential requirements and regulations imposed by the relevant authorities 
before the acquisition and amalgamation took place.  Some issues remained unresolved 
but with the understanding that these matters would be resolved in the normal course of 
supervision, and acting within the privatization time-frame to sell the bank, BPNG approved 
the sale to BSP in April 2002. Additional conditions were imposed on the acquirer’s license 
regarding the unresolved matters. 
(b)  Revocation of PNGBC’s License
BPNG also consented to surrender the license of the troubled bank to take eff  ect on 
the date of the acquisition.  However, this did not eventuate due to certain unresolved issues. 
Th   e revocation of the license of PNGBC was eventually done in July 2002.183
CHAPTER 7
1. Introduction 
Th   e banking sector dominates the fi  nancial system in Sri Lanka, accounting for about 
60% of the total fi  nancial sector assets. Th   erefore, the soundness and the resilience of the 
banking sector is crucial in the maintenance of fi  nancial system stability, which is one of the 
core objectives of the Central Bank. 
Sri Lanka has a multi regulatory system for the regulation and supervision of the 
fi  nancial sector, consisting of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), and Insurance Board of Sri Lanka (IBSL). In addition, the 
Registrar of Companies (ROC), Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Monitoring Board 
(SLAAMB) and the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) also perform some regulatory functions 
relating to the fi  nancial sector.  However, the share of assets and deposits of entities coming 
under the supervision of the CBSL, is by far, the largest share as shown in the Table 1. Th  ere 
are two types of banks identifi  ed under the Banking Act (BA), i.e., Licensed Commercial 
Banks (LCBs) and Licensed Specialized Banks (LSBs). Th   e main diff  erences between these 
two types of banks are that LSBs cannot accept demand deposits and deal in foreign exchange 
transactions. Th   ere are 23 LCBs consisting of 2 state banks, 8 domestic private banks and 
12 branches of foreign banks. Th   ere are 14 LSBs bringing the total number of banks in the 
country to 37.
PROBLEM BANK IDENTIFICATION, INTERVENTION
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Table 1
Assets and Deposit Liabilities of the Main Financial Institution
in the Financial System
Banking Sector
 Central  Bank
  Licensed Commercial Banks (c)
  Licensed Specialised Banks
Other Deposit Taking
Financial Institutions
  Registered Finance Companies
  Co-operative Rural Banks
  Thrift and Credit Co-op. Societies
Other Specialised Financial Institutions
  Specialised Leasing Companies
 Primary  Dealers
 Merchant  Banks
  Stock Broking Companies
 Unit  Trusts
  Venture Capital Companies
  Credit Rating Agencies
Contractual Savings Institutions
 Insurance  Companies
  Employees’ Provident Fund
  Employees’ Trust Fund
  Private Provident Funds







































































































(c) Consolidated assets of both DBUs and OBUs of LCBs
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka
2.  Legal Framework in Dealing with Problem Bank
2.1 Legal  Framework 
Th  e regulation and supervision of licensed banks are governed mainly under 
the Monetary Law Act (MLA) No. 50 of 1949, the Banking Act No. 30 of 1988 and the 
Exchange Control Act (ECA).Th   e CBSL is the regulatory authority for the banking sector 
and the regulatory authorities designated under these legislations are the Monetary Board 
(MB), the Governor, Director of Bank Supervision and the Controller of Exchange. Th  e 
Bank Supervision Department of the CBSL carries out the supervisory functions relating 185
to banks. Th   ere is no mandatory deposit insurance scheme although there is a voluntary 
deposit insurance scheme in which none of the licensed are registered.
Th   e MLA has some general provisions with respect to the supervision of banks. It 
includes provisions for the following:
Th  e objectives of the CBSL are “economic and price stability and fi  nancial system 
stability with a view to encouraging and promoting the development of the productive 
resources of Sri Lanka.
Th   e  establishment of the department of bank supervision and its functions
Power of the MB to suspend or restrict business of a bank
Winding up of a bank
Th  e BA clearly defi  nes the CBSL’s functions regarding the supervision of banks. 
BA and the regulations made under it by the CBSL provide the framework of prudential 
regulations that banks must meet. Th  e BA contains detailed provisions relating to the 
procedures to be followed with respect to problem banks. Th   e MB is the ultimate authority 
for major supervisory decisions. However, the Director of Bank Supervision (DBS) too has 
power under the BA to issue cease and desist orders, approve fi  tness and propriety of bank 
directors, and act as the liquidator of banks under the BA.
Where the Director of Bank Supervision (DBS) is satisfi  ed that a licensed bank is 
found to have encountered problems and if those problems cannot be resolved through 
the formal communication with the management of the respective bank, there are several 
resolution measures available to the regulator in terms of the legal provisions.
In addition to the entities mentioned above, Courts intervene in the case of liquidation 
and examination of executive powers of the regulator. Furthermore, the concurrence of the 
Minister of Finance is required for licensing of banks. 
Several issues have been raised by concerned parties on the fact that legal powers  for 
supervision are contained in both the MLA and BA. Although there does not seem to be 
serious legal confl  icts, it is desirable to have a consolidated banking law to clarify the powers 
of the MB and banks’ obligations. Accordingly, a new banking law has been draft  ed. It is also 
argued that licensing power should be fully ascribed to the MB without requiring the need 
for the Minister’s concurrence or approval.
2.2  Coordination and Information Sharing 
Information sharing among regulators is aff  ected by the secrecy provision in the MLA 
(Section 45) Accordingly, except in the performance of his/ her duties under the Act, no 
offi   cer should communicate information to anyone other than those authorized. Similar 
provisions are found in legislations governing other regulators such as SEC and IBSL.
However, this has not become a major issue due to the fact that banks, which come 
under the purview of the CBSL for supervisory purpose, are dominant in the fi  nancial 
sector. Furthermore, the risks are limited mainly because there are limits on the extent to 





in banks. Risks, if any, are mitigated due to the following administrative arrangements in 
place to improve information sharing among regulators:
A Deputy Governor of the CBSL is represented in the Boards of SEC and IBSL.
Establishment of an Inter Regulatory Institutions Council (IRIC) – Th  is  Committee, 
chaired by the Governor of the CBSL, discuss on a regular basis, common issues faced 
by the fi  nancial sector. 
Working Group on Financial Conglomerates – Th   is functions as the research arm of 
the IRIC to examine issues assigned to it by the IRIC. Issues relating to information 
sharing is discussed at this Committee.
Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) with regulators:  MOUs have been  signed 
with the IBSL and SEC. However, these are again subject to the legal provisions on 
secrecy.  On a cross broader basis, an MOU has been signed with Pakistan  and 
discussions are underway to sign MOUs with few other countries.
However, it is possible that the linkages between fi  nancial institutions may become 
complex and less transparent. It is therefore, necessary, that exceptions to the barriers of 
information sharing be put in place to meet future needs.
2.3  Issues on Autonomy, Accountability and Legal Protection of Bank 
Supervisor
Th  e banking regulator, i.e. the CBSL, has the operational independence without 
government or industry interference. Th  e Monetary Board (MB) which is the governing 
body of the CBSL, consists of the Governor, the Secretary to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
and three members appointed by the President on the recommendation of the MOF with 
the concurrence of the Constitution Council. Th   e Governor is appointed for a fi  xed term of 
6 years and cannot be removed without cause (MLA Section 13). 
  
Th   e CBSL has budgetary autonomy (MLA Section 6) and is able to attract and retain 
qualifi  ed staff   by off  ering relatively high levels of remuneration. Th   e CBSL has a substantial 
training program for its staff  .  Supervisory decisions are generally taken by the MB while the 
concurrence of the Minister of Finance is required for some decisions.
Th   e CBSL is required under the MLA (Section 35) to produce an annual report for 
the Minster who should present it before the Parliament for discussion by the Committee 
on Public Enterprises (COPE).  Th  e fi  nancial statements of the CBSL are audited by the 
Auditor General (AG) who report the fi  ndings to the Parliament. Th   e AG also has the right 
to determine whether the CBSL is providing value for money.
An issue that has been raised with regard to the autonomy of the CBSL is the presence 
of the Minster’s representative in the MB. Th   is is questioned on the grounds that the two 
state banks (which accounts for about 46% of the LCB’s assets) are owned by the government 
and that the representative of the Minister responsible for these banks sitting in the MB, 
supervises them as well. Th   is is alleged to compromise the MB’s independence and could 
inhibit the CBSL from enforcing good standards of corporate governance for banks. For 
example, members of the bank boards are expected to take no part in approving transactions 
with parties with which they may be involved. An example suggested is the inability of the 





Th  e counter arguments put forward in defense of the presence of the Minister’s 
representative on the MB is that draft  ers of the MLA (John Exter, a  Federal Reserve Bank 
offi   cer from the USA)  intended a closer cooperation and coordination between the Minster 
of Finance and the CBSL, given the fact that Sri Lanka is a developing country  and that  his 
presence on the MB does not imply a lack of independence. Th   e CBSL  has treated all banks 
alike despite its ownership diff  erences. Bank supervisors are given legal protection for the 
activities done in good faith.
3.  Problem Bank Identifi  cation
3.1  Supervisory Strategy (Risk-based Supervision Framework)
Of late, the Bank Supervision Department (BSD) shift  ed to a risk based supervision 
from a compliance based supervision where supervision is focused on identifi  cation of 
evolving trends in risks of banks, and capacity of banks to eff  ectively face potential sources 
of risks. Th   e operational manuals  and internal directions  and regulations issued to banks 
provides the methodology for determining and assessing the nature, importance and scope 
of the risks to which individual and banking groups are exposed. Whenever necessary, 
contacts are made with the non–bank supervisor. 
Banks are expected to notify any substantive changes in their activities and report 
adverse developments to the supervisor. Banks are examined on-site once in every two years 
with the scope and duration of the examinations depending on the size of the bank.  A 
CAMELS approach is used for the purpose of examinations. Continuous examination is 
carried out by identifying evolving risks to the soundness of each bank. In addition, spot 
examinations are conducted as and when required, to examine specifi  c issues in depth. A web 
based on-line reporting system is used for continuous surveillance  to facilitate processing, 
monitoring and analysis of prudential information. 
Further improvement to supervisory methodology, including a forward looking view 
on the risk profi  le of banks, are being developed. Stress testing techniques and integrated risk 
management are being developed to proactively address any serious threat to the stability of 
the banking system from currency or emerging risks.
3.2 Prudential  Requirements 
Th   e law provides for the issue of directions by the MB to banks on a broad number of 
banking activities (BA, Section 46).
Capital Adequacy: Th   e current capital adequacy is 10% of the risk weighted assets 
for both types of banks, with Tier 1 capital adequacy being 5%.   Th   e Basel I supervisory 
framework is adopted with the focus on credit and market risks. Dividends cannot be declared 
when a bank is not in a position to meet the minimum capital adequacy requirements.  Basel 
II will be eff  ective from January 2008 with the standardized approach for credit  and market 
risks and  the basic indicator approach for operational risk.  Th   e minimum initial capital 
requirement was increased to Rs. 2.5 billion and Rs.1.5 billion respectively for LCBs and 
LSBs in 2005.188
Asset Quality: Th   ere are directions on classifi  cation of loans, advances, investments, 
valuation of securities, provisioning and income recognition, single borrower limit, related 
party transactions. With the implementation of the International Accounting Standards in 
2008,  concepts of fair value options and impairment test may be used for the purpose of   
loan classifi  cation.
A time bound classifi  cation method is adopted for non-performing advances with the 
transfer of advances to NPA  category aft  er interest or installment in arrears for more than 
3 months. NPAs are grouped into 4 depending on the time elapsed aft  er being classifi  ed, 
i.e. overdue, substandard, doubtful and loss.  Provisions are made at 20%, 30% and 100% 
respectively, net of the value of collateral on NPAs. Recognition of income has to be stopped 
when the advance is in arrears for 3 months or more.
Management: A fi  t and proper test is used with respect to directors and employees 
of banks. Th   e criteria include qualifi  cations in relevant fi  elds, commission of any act which 
involves fraud, deceit, dishonesty or any other improper conduct, investigations into such 
acts, conviction by courts, insolvency and so on, provisioning both specifi  c and general, etc. 
With a view to improving the risk management in banks and prevent confl  icts of interests, a 
mandatory code of corporate governance will come into eff  ect from January 2008.
Earnings: Th  ere are directions on income recognition dividends and maintenance 
of specifi  c reserves. No bank can declare dividends until all its capitalized expenses, initial 
expenses or any other expenses not represented by tangible assets, have been completely 
written off  .
Liquidity:  Th   e current liquidity ratio is 20% of the total liabilities minus liabilities to 
the CBSL and shareholders. A list of permitted assets for this purpose has been issued.
3.3  Early Warning Systems, Other Indicators and Risk Assessment
Th  e  off  -site or continuous examination is used as an early warning system to identify 
potential sources of risks. For each bank, a report is prepared based on the information 
provided by banks on-line together with information collected from other sources such as 
news reports, rating agencies, auditors’ reports and examination reports. Th  e  information 
collected from these sources and the trends in main prudential indicators are used as an 
early warning system, although currently, there are no specifi  c quantitative early warning   
models. 
3.4 Communicating  Concerns 
Several methods are used in communicating concerns identifi   ed in the course 
of examinations. Th  ese include meeting with boards and management during on-site 
examinations. During and aft  er on-site examinations, issues identifi  ed are discussed with 
the management and relevant offi   cers of banks by the Governor, MB and the DBS.  Aft  er 
the examination, meetings are held to provide information to banks to rectify and take 
necessary actions for errors and omissions identifi  ed. Th   e examination report of the banks 
is sent to the Board for their information and action.  Th   e respective offi   cers of the banks are 
identifi  ed in the examination reports for taking corrective actions. 189
Meetings are held with banks’ management as and when required, on information 
collected from on-going examinations and other sources, and remedial actions are prescribed 
if required.
An on-line early warning system is being designed to provide information to the 
banks’ management on a real time basis. Supervisory concerns, if any, are not generally 
communicated to other regulators due to secrecy restrictions. Sharing of such information 
may be possible with the development of the fi  nancial sector and the establishment of proper 
procedures for preserving the confi  dentiality of such information.
4.  Problem Bank Intervention
4.1  Prompt Corrective Actions 
Banks’ management is called for meetings with the MB and/or DBS to discuss issues 
requiring immediate action depending on the severity of the issues. When the DBS is certain 
that a licensed bank is found to have encountered problems and those problems cannot be 
resolved through the formal communication with the management of the bank, there are 
several measures available to the regulator in terms of the legal provisions.
If the DBS is convinced that the bank
Is engaged in unsafe and  unsound practices which is likely to jeopardize its obligations 
to its depositor;
Has failed to or contravened to comply with the provisions of the BA or any regulations 
issued under the BA or failed to comply with any written law which related to banking 
or fi  nance;
the DBS may issue an order directing the bank ;
To cease and desist from any such practices or; 
Failure to comply with the provisions of the BA or directions or any other written 
laws;
To take necessary actions to correct the conditions resulting from unsound practices 
or failure within such period as specifi  ed in the order;
Cancellation of license issued to a bank (BA Section 9 and 10).
An order for cancellation is issued if the bank has:
Failed  to pay any  debts incurred by  it on such debt becoming due or;
Had a petition or action for relief against such bank and has had appointed with 
respect to such bank under any  bankruptcy law or any other law which provides for 
relief of debtors or which related to debtors, a liquidation or receiver;
Contravention of any provisions of the BA or regulations; 
Furnished false, misleading or inaccurate information to the MB;
Carried on or is carrying on its business in a manner likely to be detrimental to the 












Th   e bank aggrieved by this order can appeal to the MB within 30 days of the order
However, the MB can specify other steps without canceling the license (BA Section 
11). Th   e order made by the MB can include any of the following:
Directing the bank to suspend its business;
Requiring the bank to forthwith take or refrain from taking any actions (freeze on 
deposits, granting loans, impose restrictions on other risky business);
Appointing a fi  t and proper person to advise such bank with regard to the proper 
conduct of the business;
Restraining any director, manager or controller of the bank from carrying out any 
functions and appointing a fi  t and proper person to carry out such functions;
Assumption of control of, and for the carrying on of the business of the bank by the 
MB or delegating the control so assumed to another person in order to carry on the 
business of the bank;
Re-organising the bank by arranging for the increase of its capital or reconstitution of 
its board or both;
Providing the necessary for the amalgamation of the bank with any other bank that 
consent to such amalgamation;
Vesting the business of the bank in another bank which consent to it;
Cancel the license when the MB, aft  er taking the above actions, is of the opinion that 
it is in the interest of the banking system to do so.
Th   e bank can appeal to the decision of the MB under Article 136 of the Constitution. 
Th   e license of  a smaller private specialised banks was canceled in 2002 due to serious loss 
in capital resulting from high non-performing loans. However, on appeal to the Supreme 
Court by the bank,  the order was revoked and the supervisor was ordered to explore other 
methods to revive and restructure the bank. However, since no viable restructuring proposal 
was received from interested parties, the license was cancelled again. With the court case 
dragging on, the government decided to vest the assets of the bank into a newly created state 
owned bank, the operations of which are expected to commence in 2008. A scheme for the 
repayment of deposits of the failed bank has been published. 
4.2  Resolving Liquidity Problems
Any indications of serious liquidity problems are examined to identify the causes and 
a proposal for the cause of action for the resolution of such problems is made. In addition to 
the liquid asset ratio, gap analysis, frequent resort to reverse repo window of the CBSL, high 
and consistent call money borrowings are used to identify emerging liquidity problems in 
banks.  Banks facing liquidity issues are called for meetings where the causes and remedial 
actions are discussed.  A spot examination is carried out if required. A lender of last resort 
facility is available for illiquid but solvent banks at the terms and conditions specifi  ed by the 











4.3  Resolving Credit and Capital Impairment Problems 
According to the current regulations, a bank  cannot reduce its capital without the 
approval of the MB and  it should  at all times maintain its  minimum capital adequacy 
ratio. Any variation in the capital adequacy ratio is communicated to banks by the MB. Th  e 
following actions can be taken to address such issues:
Grant of a reasonable period of time by the MB for rectifi  cation when equity capital 
or capital funds of a bank have become defi  cient. Th   e bank should submit a plan for 
the infusion of fresh capital;
Imposition of restrictions on the capital defi  cient bank such as suspension of payment 
of dividends, etc.
4.4 Removing  Bank  Management and Ownership Issues
Without canceling the license, one of the other methods available for the MB is to 
change or remove the bank management. Accordingly, it can remove or restrict functions of 
any director, manager or controller of a bank if it is of the opinion that problems encountered 
are of such a nature that cannot be resolved through formal communication with the bank’s 
management.  
Th   e current regulations limit the amount of share ownership in a bank to a person 
or group directly or acting in concert to 10% of the issued capital, carrying voting rights of 
a bank. Th   e MB can permit shareholdings up to 15% of the issued capital. However, these 
provisions do not apply to the government. Th   e share ownership limits is not a barrier to the 
restructuring of the problem bank since the MB can permit share ownership  in excess of 
these limits only for the purpose of restructuring problem banks.
4.5  Role of the Courts in Bank Intervention
Under Section 176 of the Constitution, a bank can appeal to the Appeal Court in the 
event of the cancellation of its license by the MB. An application needs to be submitted to 
the district court in the case of bank liquidations.
A bank whose license was cancelled by the MB appealed to the Appeal Court to quash 
the decision. Th   e liquidation proceedings have been protracted over a long period of time 
and are still pending since 2002.  Th   e government passed amendments in the BA to vest the 
problem bank’s assets in a new government owned bank in 2006. Th   e new bank has been 
established and is in the process of starting its operations. A repayment  scheme has been 
published for the depositors and other creditors of the bank.
5. Resolution  Management
5.1 Grounds for Receivership and Early Resolution 
Th   e following are the grounds for cancellation of license issued to a bank (BA Section 
9 and 10). If the bank does not appeal to the MB or to the courts within 30 days of the order, 
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the DBS can make an application to the district court for compulsory liquidation of the 
bank. 
Th   e bank has failed  to pay any  debts incurred by  it on such debt becoming due or;
Th   ere has been a petition or action for relief against the bank and has appointed  with 
regard to such bank under any  bankruptcy law or any other law which provides for 
relief of debtors or which related to debtors, a liquidation or receiver;
Contravention of any provisions of the BA or regulations; 
Furnished false, misleading or inaccurate information to the MB;
Carried on or is carrying on its business in a manner likely to be detrimental to the 
interest of its depositors.
It can be deduced from the grounds listed above, that the adequacy of capital is the 
main basis for the liquidation of a bank.
5.2  Supervisory Responsibilities for Failing Banks 
Although there are no permanent institutional arrangement for dealing with problem 
banks, special units can be created when such banks are identifi  ed as was the case  with regard 
to the failed bank referred to above. A strategic enterprise management agency (SEMA) was 
established in 2004 to advise and  monitor the aff  airs of selected state enterprises including 
banks. Plan for infusion of capital for a one state commercial bank with defi  cient capital has 
been prepared by the SEMA. Accordingly, an ADB line of credit has been obtained subject 
to the meeting of specifi  ed performance criteria by the bank.
5.3  Asset Quality and Financial Review Process 
If statutory examinations carried out indicate that the bank is insolvent or illiquid 
and has become unable to meet the demands of its depositors and creditors or that its 
continuance in business is likely to involve losses to its depositors or creditors, the MB can 
suspend the operations of the bank. Pursuant to the suspension, special examinations can 
be carried out by auditors to determine the level of capital and quality of assets. Depending 
on the results of such audits, either a restructuring or cancellation of the operation can be 
initiated by the MB.
5.4  Bank Closing Process 
Th  e DBS becomes the liquidator of a bank with regard to both voluntary and 
compulsory liquidations. Liquidation of any company including a bank is carried out by 
a court of law. Voluntary liquidations cannot be eff  ected without the authorization of the 
MB. Th   e approval is given only if the bank is solvent, has suffi   cient liquid assets to repay its 
depositors and a majority of shareholders have approved such a liquidation.
When approval is granted, the bank should cease to carry on business and repay 
depositors and creditors.  In the case of a compulsory liquidation consequent to the 






To wind up its operations by institution of liquidation proceedings in Court;
To stop or limit the payments of it obligations;
To execute any instrument in the name of the bank;
To initiate, defend and conduct in its name any action or proceedings to which the 
bank may be a party;
To terminate any contract of employment entered with such bank.
Th   e DBS should issue a statement of the nature and the amount for which their claim 
is shown in the bank’s books to all depositors and other creditors. A three month period is 
given to such parties to fi  le objections regarding the claims.
 Liquidation expenses, wages and salaries of employees, taxes, fees due to the CBSL, 
deposits, creditors and shareholders, get priority of claims respectively, under the BA. When 
all assets have been distributed an audited account is submitted to the Courts to terminate 
the liquidation. Th   e DBS then should proceed to terminate the judicial existence of the bank 
in accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act.
5.5 Resolution  Methods
In terms of the law, a problem bank can be revived through change of ownership, 
amalgamation with another bank  and liquidation. In addition, the operations of the bank 
can be vested in a state owned bank as was practiced recently in case of a problem bank. 
However, this method can be used only  with regard to the failure of a specialized bank.
5.6  Cost of Resolution 
Th   ere have not been bank failures except for a private specialized bank mentioned 
above. In this case, while government funds have not been used, the deposits of government 
agencies will be converted to capital for the bank. In the past, there have been two instances 
where the government has recapitalized two state owned commercial banks. 
6. Crisis  Management 
6.1  Key Policies in Dealing with Systemic Banking Crisis 
Th   ere have not been a systemic banking crises in the country except problems with 
state owned banks. Th   e law does not provide for defi  nitions or criteria for systemic risks and 
other matters related thereto. It is therefore essential to examine the need for such a legal or 
administrative framework for handling systemic crises.
A lender of last resort (LOR) facility is available under the MLA to provide emergency 
liquidity assistance. However, except for the terms and conditions, the law does not lay down 
the criteria for the provision of such facility to a problem bank. Th   erefore, the formulation of 







6.2  Institutional Arrangements for Systemic Banking Crisis 
Th   ese areas are not specifi  ed in the relevant laws. Th   e institutions that may be involved 
in such a situation would be the same institutions such as the CBSL, Ministry of Finance and 
other regulators in the fi  nancial sector.
6.3  Key Issues in Crisis Management
In view of the above, there are several issues with regard to problem bank resolution 
and crises management. Th  ese include gaps in the existing legal framework covering 
problem banks in areas such as information sharing, lack of defi  nitions for problem bank 
identifi  cation and systemic crises, issues relating to the need for a deposit insurance scheme 
and  the provision of lender of last resort facility. 
However, it should be noted that there are no clear cut answers or defi  nitions with 
respect to some of these issues because of various country specifi  c factors. In the area of 
problem bank resolution and crises management, relevant legislations could be amended 
to facilitate proactive role by regulators. Furthermore, it may be necessary to streamline the 
process of liquidation and winding up process. For example, special tribunals or similar legal 
process could be set up to deal with bank liquidation. 
A systemic crisis could be described as a crises aff  ecting the  entire or a signifi  cant part 
of the fi  nancial system impacting the real economy. However, the problem with a systemic 
crises is that it is oft  en diffi   cult to identify early, whether a particular problem would have 
a systemic impact or not. Th   erefore, many countries do not try to defi  ne or set clear cut 
guidelines on certain areas such as the provision of lender of last  facility. Th  is has been 
clearly evident in the responses of some central banks to the recent sub-prime turmoil in the 
western countries.
7. Conclusions 
Th  ough the existing legal and regulatory framework covering bank supervision 
in general and handling of problem banks in particular,  is fairly adequate and satisfi  es 
internationally accepted principles, improvements could be made to areas identifi  ed 
through the introduction of required changes to the  law as a forward looking measure to 
mitigate risks to fi  nancial system stability in the future. Some of the main issues associated 
with problem bank resolution such as information sharing, deposit insurance and legal 
amendments are currently under consideration.195
CHAPTER 8
1. Introduction
Problem banks occur in a multitude of diff  erent forms. Banking systems can be 
continuously weak, refl  ecting unsafe and unsound banking practices, or they can be the 
result of structural weaknesses in the institutional framework of a country. Widespread 
banking problems can emerge because of external shocks or economic slowdowns aff  ecting 
the economy as a whole or some sectors of an economy. Under these circumstances, the 
government’s goal is to re-establish macroeconomic stability and fi  nancial intermediation 
using a combination of macroeconomic and microeconomic tools.
Over the last decade, Republic of China (Taiwan) [hereaft  er r ef err ed to as ROC 
(Taiwan)] has steadily introduced phased innovations and reforms to its handling of problem 
fi  nancial institutions. Th  e changes since 1999 saw a shift   in Taiwan’s deposit insurance 
system from voluntary to mandatory participation, the establishment of a new mechanism 
for handling problem fi  nancial institutions, as well as the implementation of a risk-based 
premium system. In 2001, the ROC (Taiwan) government set up the Financial Restructuring 
Fund and appropriated a total of US$ 7 billion to dispose of problem insured institutions. 
A temporary blanket guarantee was provided by the Fund over a period of four years. Th  e 
revised Deposit Insurance Act of January, 2007 established a mechanism for handling 
systemic crises, including exemption from the minimum resolution cost restriction and 
adoption of a bridge-bank mechanism to deal with the systemic crises. Such eff  orts have 
earned ROC (Taiwan) widespread recognition for its contribution to bringing about major 
improvements to the overall operational status of the fi  nancial institutions, protecting the 
interests of depositors, and enhancing public confi  dence in the fi  nancial system.
2.  Legal Framework in Dealing with Problem Banks
2.1 Legal  Framework
Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC)
Established on 1st July 2004, the FSC was set up to be the single statutory fi  nancial 
supervisor in ROC (Taiwan). Th   e newly established Commission, with the same standing as 
a ministry, is responsible for the prudential supervision of all fi  nancial institutions, including 
banks, security fi  rms and insurance companies. Th   e goals of the FSC are to promote sound 
business management of fi  nancial institutions, maintain fi  nancial stability, and promote the 
development of fi  nancial markets.
Th   e FSC is in charge of the following matters:
(1)  Financial systems and supervisory policies;
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(2)  Proposal, amendment and repeal of fi  nancial laws and regulations;
(3)  Monitoring and regulation of the following in connection with fi  nancial institutions: 
the establishment, termination, revocation, change, merger, business suspension, 
dissolution, and approval of business;
(4)  Development, monitoring, and regulation of fi  nancial markets;
(5)  Examination of fi  nancial institutions;
(6)  Examination of matters relating to public companies and securities markets;
(7) International  fi  nancial matters;
(8)  Consumer’s protection on fi  nancial matters;
(9)  Enforcement of fi  nancial laws and regulations, punishment of violators and handling 
of matters related thereto;
(10)  Collection, processing and analysis of statistical information relating to fi   n a n c i a l          
monitoring, regulation and examination; and
(11)  Other matters relating to fi  nancial monitoring, regulation and examination.
Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) (CBC)
From 1st July 2004, the CBC no longer conducts regular full-scope on-site examinations 
on individual fi  nancial institutions. Th   e CBC, serving as the lender of last resort, still holds 
the responsibility for the stability of the fi  nancial system as a whole. Th   erefore, it retains 
the authority to examine fi  nancial institutions on issues with regard to the execution 
and implementation of monetary, credit and foreign exchange policies. Th  e CBC’s legal 
responsibility is to promote fi  nancial stability, guide sound banking operations, maintain the 
stability of the internal and external value of the currency, and foster economic development 
within the scope of the above objectives.
Th   e CBC conducts the following main operations:
(1) Monetary  Management 
 Th  e Bank uses various policy instruments to regulate fi   nancial conditions and 
achieve monetary policy objectives, including open market operations, discounts 
and temporary accommodations, required reserve ratios, re-deposits of fi  nancial 
institutions, etc. 
(2)  Foreign Exchange Management 
  Taiwanese residents can freely hold and use foreign exchange export proceeds and 
also make foreign exchange import payments without restrictions. Only certain 
regulations imposed on remittances related to capital account transactions are retained 
for the purpose of fi  nancial stability. Th   e CBC adopts a managed exchange rate system, 
meaning that the New Taiwan dollar exchange rate is determined by market demand 
and supply. However, when there is a large fl  uctuation in the exchange rate, the CBC 
is likely to step in.
(3)  Clearing and Settlement Services 
 Th   e CBC is the major operator of the payments system in Taiwan, providing services 
for payments among banks. Th   e CBC is also responsible for promoting the effi   ciency 
and security of the payments system, as well as for supervising clearing houses 
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(4) Currency  Issuance 
 Th   e CBC is responsible for designing, planning, producing bank notes and coins, and 
destroying old notes, which are no longer fi  t to use. Th   e Bank of Taiwan, a state-owned 
commercial bank, is authorised to distribute notes and coins and sort out returned 
notes.
(5)  Treasury Agency Functions 
  As the fi  scal agency, the Bank handles receipts and disbursements of funds and 
properties for the central government and its agencies. It also handles the issuance, 
redemption and interest payment of central government securities.
(6) Bank  Examination 
  Based on the Central Bank of China Act, the CBC also has the responsibility to 
examine the operations of all fi  nancial institutions under the operational objectives 
of promoting fi  nancial stability and guiding sound banking operations. Following the 
establishment of the FSC, the CBC retains the power to conduct target examinations 
and maintains the off  -site monitoring system to make sure that the operations of 
banks will be consistent with the monetary and exchange rate policies as well as the 
stability of the fi  nancial system.
(7)  Statistics and Research 
 Th   e CBC compiles data on fi  nancial statistics, fl  ow of funds, and balance of payments, 
and publishes these statistics in the Financial Statistics Monthly, Flow of Funds Annual, 
and Balance of Payments Quarterly. Th   e Bank’s Annual Report and Quarterly Review 
are also published. Th  e Bank’s publications are sent to domestic and international 
institutions. Th   e CBC also conducts studies on the economic and fi  nancial conditions 
of major countries as well as the impact arising from innovations in global fi  nancial 
markets. 
Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC)
Th  e government-owned CDIC was established on September, 1985, with capital 
jointly invested by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of China. Th   e CDIC, which 
is  supervised by the FSC, is the only institution in Taiwan exclusively in charge of managing 
the deposit insurance system, and serves as an integral part of the country’s fi  nancial safety 
net.
Th   e main objectives of the CDIC are:
(1)  Protect the rights and interests of depositors in fi  nancial institutions.
(2)  Maintain credit order.
(3)  Enhance sound development of fi  nancial businesses.
If a problem bank occurs, the FSC determines the need for corrective action, assesses 
the types of remedial measures, adopts the appropriate process and corrective action plan. 
Th   e CDIC is usually appointed by the FSC to deal with problem banks. 
When a bank has emergency funding requirement caused by unusual depositor 
withdrawals, the bank may submit a letter of explanation to the CBC, along with the approved 198
collateral, to apply to the CBC for discounting of secured loans. Th   e CBC may also provide 
special accommodation to the CDIC when it is handling problem banks.
In order to maintain fi  nancial stability, the Deposit Insurance Act was amended 
(eff  ective January 18, 2007). Th   e major amendments to the Act include moves to strengthen 
the fi  nancial safety net centered on the depository insurance mechanism, bolster the risk 
management mechanism and solvency of the CDIC, and replenish the insurance reserve fund. 
Th   e amendment will ensure that problem banks are dealt with promptly and eff  ectively.
2.2  Coordination and Information Sharing 
Th   e Standing Committee of Financial Supervisors (SCFS) was established to facilitate 
the coordination and sharing of information among the FSC, CBC, CDIC, or any other 
government agencies on matters pertaining to the monitoring, regulation, or examination of 
banking and fi  nancial institutions. Th   e Standing Committee functions as a communication 
operation platform. Senior executives of the CBC, FSC and CDIC meet periodically, or they 
may meet at any time, if necessary, to consult and cooperate on the above or major fi  nancial 
supervisory concerns, including handling failed banks, funding and liquidity of problem 
banks, and matters concerning foreign bank operation, etc.
Regarding the connection with foreign offi   cial agencies, the FSC enters into bilateral 
surveillance MOUs with overseas fi   nancial supervisory authorities and strengthens 
information exchange and cooperation on fi  nancial supervisory issues, so as to facilitate the 
eff  orts of Taiwan’s more competitive fi  nancial institutions to become more international and 
implement strategies for regional deployment.
2.3  Issues on Autonomy, Accountability and Legal Protection of Bank 
Supervisor 
Th  e Organic Act Governing the Establishment of the Financial Supervisory 
Commission, Executive Yuan 2003 (AEFSC) has promulgated the FSC as the competent 
authority for the development, monitoring, regulation, and examination of fi  nancial markets 
and fi  nancial service enterprises in Taiwan. Th  e FSC shall exercise its authority of offi   ce 
independently in accordance with the prevailing laws. Th   e Commissioners of the FSC shall 
act in a non-partisan manner, and shall not take part in the activities of any political parties 
during their tenure as commissioners.
Th   e FSC may, at any time, appoint a designee, entrust an appropriate institution, or 
direct a local competent authority to appoint a designee to examine the business, fi  nancial 
aff  airs and other relevant aff  airs of a bank or related parties, or direct a bank or related 
parties to prepare and submit, within a prescribed period of time, balance sheets, property 
inventories, or other relevant documents for examination. 
Th   e FSC may, when necessary, appoint professionals to verify statements, materials or 
aff  airs that are subject to examination, and such professionals shall, in turn, present a report 
to the FSC. Any fees arising there from shall be borne by the relevant bank(s).
Th   e responsible person(s) or staff   member(s) of a bank, or other concerned persons, 
found guilty of committing any of the following acts when the competent authority dispatches 199
offi   cials, or mandates appropriate institutions, or orders local competent authorities to 
dispatch offi   cials, or designates professional and technical persons to check the business, 
fi  nancial condition and other related matters, or orders the bank or other concerned persons 
to submit fi  nancial reports, property inventories, or other related documents and reports, in 
accordance with Article 45 of Th   e Banking Act of Th   e Republic of China, shall be punished by 
an administrative fi  ne of not less than NT$2,000,000, and not more than NT$10,000,000:
(1)  Refusing to be investigated, or refusing to open the vault, or other storage facilities.
(2)  Concealing or damaging books and documents related to business or fi  nancial 
conditions.
(3)  Refusing to reply, or misrepresenting responses to inquiries of the investigator without 
justifi  able reasons.
(4)  Failure to timely, honestly or completely provide fi  nancial reports, property inventories 
or other related data or reports, or to pay investigation fees within the specifi  ed 
period(s) of time.
3.  Problem Bank Identifi  cation
3.1 Supervisory  Strategy
(1) On-site  examinations
 Th  e authority directly dispatches personnel, or acts in coordination with other 
regulatory agencies to dispatch personnel, to conduct on-site examinations.
A. All-scope  examinations
 Th  ese are risk-focused examinations focusing primarily on the examinee’s 
fi  nancial, operational, and overall business status.
  We are now applying the top-down approach on fi  eld examination of head 
offi   ce.  Th  e examiners should evaluate the management function, including 
the determination and evaluation of operation policies, board of directors’ 
function, internal control system and audit system, coordination among diff  erent 
management departments, the reporting system, the risk management system, 
and head offi   ce management of its branches, etc. Each bank must undergo a full-
scope examination, so that FSC can understand its operations and detect any 
major irregularities.
B. Targeted  examinations
  Targeted examinations focus on particular aspects of the examinee’s business. 
(2) Off  -site monitoring
 Th  e supervisors review relevant statements, minutes of important meetings and 
other information or reports submitted by the banks in order to understand each 
bank’s operations and determine the bank’s compliance with laws and regulations and 
government policies. Where signifi  cant irregularities are discovered, these should 
immediately be reported to the higher authorities so that further examination can 
take place.
(3)   Business interviews
 Th   e authority invites the responsible persons or supervisory offi   cers of the banks to 
provide reports and express opinions on specifi  c matters.200
3.2 Prudential  Requirements
Th   e ratio between the equity capital and risk assets of a bank shall not be less than 8 
percent. When necessary, the FSC may, based on international standards, increase the ratio. 
For banks that are required to produce consolidated fi  nancial statements, such ratio shall 
also be met on consolidated basis. If the actual ratio of a bank is lower than the required 
ratio, the FSC may prohibit the bank from paying dividends and/or take other necessary 
actions.
Th   e banks may extend medium- or long-term loans for the purchase or construction 
of residential buildings or buildings for business purposes. However, the term of such loans 
may not exceed 30 years. Th   e total amount of loans extended for residential construction 
and construction for business purposes by a commercial bank shall not exceed 30 percent 
of the aggregate of such commercial bank’s deposits and bank debentures issued at the time 
such loans are extended. Th   e total amount of medium-term loans extended by a commercial 
bank shall not exceed the balance of its time deposits received.
No unsecured credit shall be extended by a bank to enterprises in which the bank 
holds three percent or more of the total paid-in capital, to its staff   members, to its major 
shareholders, to any interested party of its own responsible person or of a staff   member in 
charge of credit extensions. However, the foregoing prohibition on unsecured credit shall 
not apply to consumer loans and loans extended to the government.
For any secured credit extended by a bank to enterprises in which the bank holds at 
least fi  ve percent of the total paid-in capital of the said enterprises, to its own responsible 
person, to its staff   members, to its major shareholders, to any interested party of its own 
responsible person or of a staff   member in charge of credit extensions, the terms of such 
extended credit shall not be more favorable than those terms off  ered to other same customer 
categories. If the credit amount to be extended by a bank exceeds the amount prescribed by 
the FSC, the bank is required to obtain the concurrence of at least three-quarters of all of 
such bank’s directors present at a meeting attended by at least two-thirds of the directors, to 
extend such credit.
Acquisitions of real estate and stocks by a commercial bank through the foreclosure of 
mortgages or pledges shall be disposed of within four years from the date of acquisition.
A Bank shall establish an internal control system and audit system; regulations 
governing the objectives, principles, policies, operating procedures, qualifi  cations  and 
conditions for internal auditors, scope of internal control audits that a certifi  ed public 
accountant shall be engaged to undertake, and other matters requiring compliance, shall be 
prescribed by the FSC.
A bank shall establish an internal processing system and procedures with respect to 
the evaluation of asset quality, the creation of loan loss provision, the clearing of and writing 
off   of non-performing and non-accrual loans. Applicable regulations with respect to the 
above system and procedures shall be prescribed by the FSC.
A bank, at the time of distributing its earnings for each fi  scal year, shall set aside 30 
percent of its aft  er-tax earnings as a legal reserve. However, unless and until the accumulated 201
legal reserve equals the bank’s paid-in capital, the maximum cash profi  ts, which may be 
distributed, shall not exceed 15 percent of the bank’s paid-in capital. In the event that the 
accumulated legal reserve equals, or exceeds a bank’s paid-in capital, the foregoing provision 
shall not apply.
In order to assure that a bank maintains adequate liquidity, the CBC, aft  er consultation 
with the FSC, may from time to time prescribe a minimum ratio between the current assets 
of the bank and the bank’s various liabilities. Upon a bank’s failure to comply with the said 
minimum ratio, the FSC shall notify the bank to make due adjustment within a specifi  ed 
period of time.
3.3  Early Warning Systems
Th  e CBC, while retaining the power to carry out targeted examinations, requires 
banks to fi  le non-performing loan reports on a monthly basis. To enhance the liquidity 
management of banks, the CBC also requires banks to report the term structure of fund 
infl  ows and outfl  ows denominated in local currency on a quarterly basis. Th  e CBC also 
collects other call reports, such as banks’ loan-loss reserve provisions, credit card and 
cash card business, country risk exposures, fi  nancial derivative products, etc. Th  ese  data, 
together with systematic analysis and evaluation of banks’ business, fi  nancial conditions and 
compliance with regulations, aids the CBC in maintaining the off  -site monitoring system to 
detect banking problems. 
Th  e  CBC’s  off  -site monitoring system for banks is called CARSEL. 
(1) Methodology
Th   e methodology of the CARSEL involves:
 
A.  Establishing a set of guidelines or benchmark ratios, which are considered to be     
norms.
B.  Utilising statistical model for screening the fi  nancial ratios and fi  gures. (winsorized 
mean)
C.  Accumulating points into “score pool” when fi  nancial ratios or fi  gures exceed the 
benchmark or minimum requirements on each factor.
D.  Allocating weight to each component and factor.
E.  Calculating weighted mean of each component.
F.  Grading component scores into 1 to 5, as follows: 
1 – strong 
2 – satisfactory
3 – fair (watch category)
4 – marginal (watch category)
5 – unsatisfactory (watch category)
G  Calculating composite score of individual system
  Ratings are assigned for each component in addition to the overall rating of a 
bank’s fi  nancial condition. Th  e ratings are also scored on a scale from 1 to 5. 
Banks with ratings of 1 or 2 are considered to present few, if any, supervisory 
concerns, while banks with ratings of 3, 4, or 5 present moderate to extreme 
degrees of supervisory concern.202
(2) Components 
–C: Capital adequacy 
  Main factors are Tier 1 capital and total risk- based capital, Adjusted net-worth to 
adjusted assets, Adequacy of allowances for loan and other assets, the quality and 
strength of earnings to the capital.
–A: Asset quality
  Main factors are the level, distribution, severity, and trend of classifi  ed assets, non-
accrual and restructured loans, delinquent loans and non-performing assets, the 
exposure to off  -balance sheet transactions, the extent of securities underwriting 
activities and exposure to counter parties.–R: Regulation compliance.
  Main factors are compliance with applicable laws and regulations such as single 
lending limit, the volume, diversifi  cation of the loan and investment portfolios, the 
volume of lending to connected persons, the volume of real estate investment.
–S:  Strategies and Stability
 Th   e main factors are the sensitivity of the net earnings to changes in interest rates, 
the concentration of loan by industries, the concentration of collaterals from 
credit extension, the growth rate of loan, deposit, and major business activities.
–E: Earnings
 Th  e main factors are the level of earnings, including trends and stability, the 
sources of earnings including interest revenues, commissions and service fees, the 
adequacy of the allowance for loan losses and other valuation allowance accounts, 
the exposure to market risks such as interest rate, foreign exchange, and price 
risks. 
–L: Liquidity
 Th   e main factors are the adequacy of liquidity sources compared to present and 
future needs, compliance with laws and regulations, the availability of assets 
readily convertible to cash without undue loss, and the trend and stability of 
deposits.
(3) Application
A.  Completing warning signal analysis reports(A) To gauge the soundness, fi  nancial 
and operational weaknesses, or adverse trends of banks for the CBC and related 
authorities.
(B)  To assess the liquidity issues, problems or deteriorating conditions of    
  banks.
B.  Publishing the statistical reports
(A)  Business Overview of Financial Institutions in Taiwan, annual report    
  (Chinese  version). 
(B)  Major Business Statistics of Financial Institutions in Taiwan, annual report  
  (Chinese  version).
(C)  Condition and Performance of Domestic Banks, ROC, quarterly report    
    (Chinese & English version).C. Providing information for business    
    approval or reference    
(A)  Deciding the line of foreign currency call loan for banks.
(B)  Deciding the line of foreign currency deposit for banks.
(C)  Providing comments for the FSC on applying to establish overseas    
  subsidiaries or branches of domestic banks.
(D)  Providing comments for the CBC on applying to operate new    
  business related to foreign currency from fi  nancial institutions.203
(E)  Providing reference for the CBC on applying to operate treasury    
  agency from domestic banks.
(F)  Providing reference for CBC on applying to be a dealer of central    
  government bond from fi  nancial institutions.
C.  Providing analysis data for particular issues, such as
(A)  NPL’s problem of banking institutions.
(B)  Credit card and cash card’s delinquent issues.
(C) Th   e valuation and resolution of problem institutions.
3.4 Communicating  Concerns 
Frequent and eff   ective communication with the board and management and 
other regulators is extremely important in problem bank supervision. Examiners should 
communicate in an appropriate manner according to the severity of a given situation.
When examiners identify signifi  cant problems that aff  ect the bank adversely, they 
must discuss with the management and the board as soon as possible. During the discussion 
meetings, the bank management must be allowed to clarify legitimate misunderstandings 
and commit to corrective action.
Based on an examination or review, an exit meeting should be held with the senior bank 
management or directors to conclude the fi  ndings and agree upon the required corrective 
action and the planned FSC follow-up, including the enforcement action, if necessary.
Th  e examiner should prioritise the issues during the exit meeting to aid the 
management and directors in understanding the associated risks. In the exit meeting, the 
FSC should seek and obtain the commitment of the bank to carry out the corrective action, 
including adherence to the time frames.
Meetings with the board of directors of a problem bank should be convened whenever 
there is material information to convey. Common topics include examination conclusions, 
future supervisory plans, corrective action updates, and presentation of enforcement 
actions.
Th   e report of problem banks oft  en deals with complex issues that must be understood 
by the board. It must also be persuasive to encourage corrective action. Th   e report will also 
provide the essential foundation for any enforcement action that may be required. Th  erefore, 
the amount of detail and the necessity for precise wording is especially important.
To insure its clarity and eff  ectiveness, the examination report should:
 
(1) Refl  ect the bank’s problems, their relative severity, and eff  ect on the bank if left   
uncorrected. 
(2)  Disclose the stage of the bank’s rehabilitation process and the management’s 
competency/ability to correct the noted defi  ciencies.
(3)  Highlight the uncorrected defi   ciencies from prior examinations, or other areas 
needing corrective action. 
(4) Contain  suffi   cient documentation and information to support any informal or formal 
enforcement action, including receivership where appropriate.204
On-going communication with other regulators is necessary to ensure the smooth 
resolution of a problem bank. Communicating concerns to other regulators should take 
place well before the resolution management stage, but will likely intensify as the bank 
conditions worsen. Where the FSC’s monitoring, regulation or examination of bank 
operations are connected with the operations of the CBC or any other government agencies, 
the FSC shall promulgate rules to govern the implementation of the operations thereof, such 
as requests for  the examination reports of both institutions to be shared immediately, and 
the conservatorship or receivership of a bank should be discussed and communicated in 
advance to ensure the above action can be carried out smoothly and eff  ectively. 
4.  Problem Bank Intervention
4.1  Prompt Corrective Action
If there is a possibility that a bank has violated the laws and regulations, or is in breach 
of  its articles of incorporation, or has disturbed the sound operation of the fi  nancial system, 
the FSC may, depending on the situation, take any of the following actions, in addition to 
ordering correction or improvement by the Bank within a specifi  ed period of time:
(1)  Revoke the resolutions of statutory meetings;
(2)  Suspend part of the bank’s business;
(3)  Order the bank to discharge its managers or staff   members;
(4)  Discharge the bank’s directors and supervisors or suspend them from performance of 
their duties for a specifi  ed period of time; and 
(5)  Take any other necessary measures.
If a bank, due to obvious adverse changes in its business or fi  nancial status, fails to pay 
its liabilities when due, or risks damage to depositors’ interests, the FSC should:
(1)  Order the bank to suspend its business and undergo rehabilitation within a certain 
time limit.
(2  Suspend part of the bank’s business.
(3) Assign  offi   cials to take conservatorship or receivership over its operations.
(4)  Take other necessary actions, including a request to the relevant authorities to restrict 
the departure from the country of the responsible person of the bank.
(5) Assign  offi   cials to take conservatorship or receivership over the bank, the FSC may 
suspend all or part of the rights and functions of the shareholders’ meetings, the board 
of directors or supervisors.
If the actual ratio between equity capital and risk assets of a bank is lower than the 
required ratio (eight percent), the FSC may prohibit the bank from paying dividends and/or 
take other necessary actions. 
If the losses of a bank exceed one third of the bank’s capital, the bank’s directors or 
supervisors shall immediately report the matter to the FSC. In this eventuality, the FSC 
may require the bank to correct such defi  cit of capital within a prescribed period of time. If 
the bank fails to do so within the prescribed time period, it shall be ordered to suspend its 
business.205
Th   e FSC’s corrective action policy combines individual judgment with a framework 
to ensure consistency of application. Th   e potential corrective actions range from informal 
advice and moral suasion to formal enforcement actions, such as cease-and-desist orders, 
capital directive (under draft  ) , and safety-and-soundness orders.
Th   e following table summarises the various types of the FSC’s informal and formal 
supervisory and enforcement actions:
Table 1
Informal and Formal Supervisory and Enforcement Actions
Type of Corrective Action  Description of Action
Bank-generated document designed to address one or 
more specific concerns identified by the FSC. It is not 
a binding legal document.
Document is signed by the bank’s representatives, 
reflecting specific written commitments to take 
corrective action in response to the concerns 
identified by the FSC. It is not a binding legal 
document.
An action by the FSC to withhold (or grant 
conditional approvals) or condition approvals  as  






Formal Written Agreements A document signed by the bank’s board and approved 
by the FSC. Its provisions are set out in an article-by-
article form to prescribe the necessary corrective 
action. Violation of a formal agreement can provide 




An order designed for establishing and enforcing 
capital levels and for taking capital-related action.
Civil Money Penalties Authorised civil money penalties levied for: 
violations of law, formal written agreements, final 
orders, and conditions imposed in writing; certain 
unsafe and unsound banking practices; and breach of 
fiduciary duty.
Conservatorship Places the rights to control or dispose of the bank in 
the hands of an FSC-appointed conservator.
Orders Enforcing Safety and Soundness 
Standards
For the bank fail to comply with established safety 
and soundness standards, related agency notification 
of a deficiency, the bank may be directed to submit a 
compliance plan. If the bank fails to submit a timely, 
acceptable plan, or fails to adhere to an accepted plan, 
the (FSC) FRS may issue an order requiring the bank  
to take corrective action.
Th  e FSC is currently drawing up the types of adoption measures of a bank based 
on the individual ratio between equity capital and risk assets. Th  e draft   of the adoption 
measures according to the capital-based ratio is as follows: 206
Table 2
Adoption Measures According to Capital-based Ratio 
(Under Draft) 






Under-capitalised 1. Cannot make any cash distribution and pay out 
compensation, bonuses, and other similar allowances 
given by the bank to directors and supervisors.
2. May order the bank and directors to submit a time-
limited improvement plan for capital increase or for 
reduction of total risk assets.
3. May restrict risk-based assets increase, or take other 
necessary measures.
1. Apply the above measures.
2. May dismiss the directors and supervisors of the bank 
and notify the company chartering agency  (Ministry 
of Economic Affairs-re p20) Ministry of Economic  
Affairs to register the dismissal.
3. May ask the bank to acquire or dispose specific assets.
4. May order the bank to dispose of specific assets.
5. May restrict or ban the credit or other similar  
transactions with related parties.
6. May restrict equity investments, part of business 
operation or dismiss some of the bank’s branch 
organisations within a certain period of time.
7. May restrict the bank’s deposit interest rates relative 
to the rates of other banks or kind of similar deposit.
8. May restrict the payment of reward to the directors to   
an amount not higher than the amount represented by 
the latest 12 month average paid to them when the
bank became significantly under-capitalised.
9.  May take conservatorship, or other necessary measures. 
Must place a bank in receivership or conservatorship 
within 90 days of notifying the bank that it is critically 
under-capitalised, unless the approval of the FSC to 











4.2  Resolving Liquidity Problems 
Th  e examiners should be prepared to deal with the wide-ranging liquidity events 
caused by actual or perceived problems in any area of the bank. Relating to bank capital 
insolvency, the measures to prevent liquidity insolvency may include a combination of both 
discretionary and mandatory supervisory actions.
Th   e examiners must consider the eff  ect of the relevant statutes in assessing liquidity 
risk. In certain cases, these provisions will eliminate the eligible funding sources for the 
banks. Th   ese statutory restrictions are triggered by declines in regulatory capital. Th  is  serves 
to strengthen the correlation between asset quality problems and liquidity problems.
For banks experiencing signifi  cant liquidity problems, the examiners, in conjunction 
with the bank management, should:
(1)  Assess the severity of an identifi  ed liquidity problem and determine an appropriate 
regulatory response.
(2)  Determine the cause of the liquidity problem, the likely public perception, and the 
bank’s ability to respond.
(3)  Organise management to centralise coordination of liquidity throughout the 
company.
(4)  Evaluate the feasibility and desirability of the bank liquidity source from fi  nancial 
markets. Th  is will provide a troubled bank with funds to broadcast to the money 
markets and possibly keep the major fund providers from cashing in as they view 
support. Distinctions should be made between those institutions willing to provide 
support on a short-term unsecured basis and those requiring collateral.
(5)  Analyse the bank’s trading and off  -balance-sheet commitments and identify counter-
parties. Prompt action will minimise contagion spreading to other fi  nancial markets.
(6)  Assess the cash available at all drawing locations. Th   e bank management will need to 
implement systems capable of identifying the needs accurately in terms of volume, 
currency types, and timing. Effi   ciency here is essential to neutralise public concerns 
and prevent panic among the insured depositors.
Th   e banks and their examiners can typically use two distinct discretionary tools in the 
management of liquidity —fund-fl  ow analysis and a contingency funding plan. Although 
these tools should be included in any eff  ective liquidity risk management system during 
normal times, they are critically important during a crisis. Th  e  fund-fl  ow analysis depicts a 
bank’s historical sources and uses of funds and provides a general sense of funding activity 
and trends. Th   e contingency funding plan is a forward-looking document that projects the 
sources and uses of funds under alternative scenarios, when adverse circumstances exist for 
both the bank as well as the capital markets.
Th   e monitoring of the FSC and the CBC can be eff  ective in detecting potential bank 
liquidity insolvency. Th   e level and frequency of monitoring depend on the severity of a bank’s 
liquidity position. Th   e examiners should make and update assessments of an institution’s 
level of liquidity risk and quality of risk management as conditions change. Changes in the 
assessments should be communicated to the senior management as they occur. If the bank’s 
management is not responding adequately to the bank’s liquidity situation, appropriate 
supervisory action should be taken. It may be necessary to impose formal enforcement 
action.208
Liquidity problems may require close coordination with other regulators. Th  e 
examiners should:
(1)  Inform other regulatory agencies of a potential liquidity crisis, as appropriate. Th  e 
FSC or  CBC management should also communicate with the relevant foreign central 
banks where the aff  ected Taiwanese institutions are based. Th   e subsequent regulatory 
eff  orts should be coordinated closely and synchronised sensibly.
(2)  Work with the CDIC in evaluating the bank, including the value and marketability 
of its assets. Th  is may involve discussions with the CDIC agents and potential 
acquirers.
(3)  Have the FSC and the CBC jointly discuss bank contingency funding plans, including 
the nature of bank assets pledged for any discount window borrowing.
In order to assure that a bank maintains adequate liquidity, the CBC, aft  er consultation 
with the FSC, may from time to time prescribe a minimum ratio between the current assets 
of the bank and the bank’s various liabilities. Upon a bank’s failure to comply with the said 
minimum ratio, the FSC shall notify the bank to make due adjustment within a specifi  ed 
period of time.
Th  e CBC has prescribed, “Th  e Directions for the Central Bank of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) Accommodations to Banks,” for the processing of various accommodation 
operations to banks, such as qualifi  ed bills rediscount, accommodations without collateral, 
and accommodations with collateral, pursuant to the provision of Article 19 of the Central 
Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Act.
For emergency funding requirements caused by the following conditions, banks may 
submit a letter of explanation to the CBC, along with the CBC-approved securities or reserve 
accounts as collateral, to apply to the CBC for discount of secured loans:
(1)  Occurrence of unusual depositor withdrawals.
(2)  Occurrence of unusual depositor withdrawals at banks responding to the need to 
remit deposit reserves to the said bank, when the said bank undertakes emergency 
funding accommodations according to the procedures.
In deciding whether to approve or reject the applications for various types of 
accommodations, the CBC may refer to the applicant bank’s credit rating, the eff  ectiveness 
of the client’s credit background checks, the bank’s general reserve position, the purpose of 
the accommodation, cooperation with the central bank’s monetary policy, and any major 
violations, or bad records in the past year.
4.3  Resolving Credit and Capital Impairment Problems
Problem loans are classifi  ed based on the examiner’s best judgment of probability of 
default and the likelihood of orderly liquidation. Bank problem loan review and classifi  cation 
are defi  ned as follows:209
(1) Special  Mention
  Loans falling in this category are loans that have potential weaknesses that deserve 
management’s close attention. If left   uncorrected, the potential weaknesses may result 
in the deterioration of the repayment prospects for the loan, or in the bank’s credit 
position at some future date. Special-mention loans are required to appropriate 2 
percent allowance for doubtful accounts. Th   e overdue duration of a special-mention 
loan in Taiwan is: fully collateralised and overdue for one to twelve months; or 
unsecured and overdue for one to three months.
(2) Sub-standard 
  Loans that are inadequately protected by the current sound worth and paying 
capacity of the obligor, or by any collateral pledged. Loans so classifi  ed must have a 
well-defi  ned weakness or weaknesses that jeopardise the liquidation of the debt, and 
are characterised by the distinct possibility that the bank will sustain some loss if 
the defi  ciencies are not corrected. Sub-standard loans are required to appropriate 10 
percent for allowance for doubtful accounts. Th   e overdue duration of a sub-standard 
loan in Taiwan is: fully collateralised and overdue for more than twelve months; or 
unsecured and overdue for three to six months.
(3) Doubtful 
  Loans that have all the weaknesses inherent in those loans classifi  ed as sub-standard, 
with the added characteristic that the existing facts, conditions, and values make 
collection or liquidation in full, highly improbable. Th   e possibility of loss is extremely 
high, but because of certain important and reasonably specifi  c pending factors that may 
work to the advantage and strengthening of the asset, its classifi  cation as an estimated 
loss is deferred until a more exact status may be determined. Pending factors include 
merger, acquisition, liquidation procedures, capital injection, additional collateral, 
new fi  nancing sources, or additional guarantors. Doubtful loans are required to 
appropriate 50 percent for allowance for doubtful accounts. Th   e overdue duration of 
a doubtful loan in Taiwan is: unsecured and overdue for six to twelve months.
(4) Loss 
  Loans that are considered uncollectible and of such little value that their continuance 
as bankable assets is not warranted. Such loans should be charged off   in the period in 
which they are deemed uncollectible. Th   e overdue duration of Doubtful in Taiwan is 
Unsecured and overdue for more than 12 months.
Th  e examiners must also ensure that banks have an adequate allowance for loan 
losses. Th   e allowance for loan losses is a valuation reserve established and maintained by 
charges against the bank’s operating income. As a valuation reserve, it is an estimate of the 
uncollectible amounts that is used to reduce the book value of loans to the amount that is 
expected to be collected. Th   e allowance for loan losses must be maintained at a level adequate 
to address the estimated inherent losses in the loan portfolio as of the evaluation date.
A bank experiencing problems should recognise the need to raise additional capital 
before it falls to the under-capitalised level, as defi  ned in the Domestic Bank Capital Mandate, 
or when its risk-based capital ratios fall below the regulatory minimums. If a bank does not 
undertake a capital-raising eff  ort independently, the FSC may legally require the bank to 
develop and implement a plan to increase its capital.210
4.4 Removing  Bank  Management and Ownership Issues
If there is a possibility that a bank has violated laws and regulations, or is in breach of 
its articles of incorporation, or has disturbed the sound operation of the fi  nancial system, 
the FSC may, depending on the situation, take any of the following actions, in addition to 
ordering correction or improvement by the bank within a specifi  ed period of time:
(1)  Revoke the resolutions of statutory meetings;
(2)  Suspend part of the bank’s business;
(3)  Order the bank to discharge its managers or staff   members;
(4)  Discharge the bank’s directors and supervisors, or suspend them from performance of 
their duties for a specifi  ed period of time; and/or
(5)  Take any other necessary measures.
In the event that a bank’s directors or supervisors are discharged in accordance with 
the preceding four scenarios, the FSC shall notify the Ministry of Economic Aff  airs to cancel 
the registration of such directors or supervisors.
If business assistance is needed in order to improve a bank’s operation defects, the 
FSC may designate institutions to provide such assistance.
If a bank, due to obvious adverse changes in its business or fi  nancial status, fails to pay 
its liabilities when due or risks damage to depositors’ interests, the FSC may assign offi   cials to 
take conservatorship or receivership over its operations or may take other necessary actions, 
including a request to the relevant authorities to restrict the departure from the country of 
the responsible person of the bank.
When assigning offi   cials to take conservatorship or receivership over a bank, the FSC 
may suspend all or part of the rights and functions of the shareholders’ meetings, the board 
of directors or supervisors.
When the FSC orders a bank to suspend business and undergo rehabilitation within 
a certain time limit, or sends offi   cials to take conservatorship or receivership over a bank, 
the provisions of the Company Act concerning temporary managers, inspectors, and 
reorganisation shall not apply.
4.5  Role of Courts in Bank Intervention
Th   e CDIC is the legal receiver of a failed bank in ROC (Taiwan). It carries out the 
resolution of failed banks, and is a legally-constituted entity, delegated by a government 
agency to exercise governmental power with respect to certain specifi  cally designated 
matters under Article 16 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Th   e CDIC is empowered to 
perform administrative acts and assume the right to manage and dispose of property of the 
resolved bank as a receiver. Th   e supervisors acting in a resolution procedure are delegated by 
an administrative agency. Th   e Courts decide the disputes in the administrative procedure. A 
deposit insurance contract exists between the CDIC and the resolved banks before resolution. 
Th   e CDIC pays the depositors when the insured banks are resolved. Th   e persons who are 
legally in charge of the banks are responsible for non-performance of obligation and tort.211
5. Resolution  Management 
5.1 Grounds for Receivership and Early Resolution
Th   e FSC has authority and responsibility to appoint a receiver for a bank (which will 
be the CDIC, if the bank is insured) for a number of grounds, discussed below. Th  e  Financial 
Restructuring Fund Statute also accords the FSC the authority to require the sale or merger 
of a bank in certain circumstances. Th   e agency’s goal is to resolve an institution in a manner 
that avoids or minimises losses to the deposit insurance funds.
Th   e most commonly used grounds for receivership have been:
(1)  Adjusted net worth is negative aft  er the examination by the FSC, or aft  er certifi  cated 
auditing by Accountant.
(2)  Failure to repay its debts.
(3) Signifi  cant deterioration in businesses or fi  nancial status. As stipulated in paragraph 
1 of Article 62 of the Banking Law, failure to repay its debts, risking damaging the 
benefi  ts of depositors, or, pursuant to Article 64, losses exceeding one third its capital 
and failure to improve within a prescribed timeline, and being determined by the FSC 
and the Management Committee of the Financial Restructuring Fund to be incapable 
of continuing operations. 
Th  e FSC also has the authority to place a bank into receivership before the bank 
comes under the above situations, if one or more of the specifi  ed grounds exist. Such 
action may help resolve a problem bank at the least long-term cost to the deposit insurance 
funds. Early resolution can reduce or limit losses that might otherwise result if the bank is 
allowed to remain open until its capital has dropped below 2 percent. Early resolution can 
be considered, for example, when a bank is: losing capital, has no realistic prospects for 
recapitalisation, or is engaging in practices likely to increase losses in the future. Moreover, 
even in situations where the bank is adequately capitalised, receivership may be appropriate 
if there are substantial unsafe and unsound practices the bank is not addressing, or there are 
other signifi  cant failings identifi  ed in the receivership statutes.
Th   ere are grounds based on violations of law or unsafe or unsound practices that have 
had, or are likely to have, a substantial negative eff  ect on the bank:
(1) Th   ere is substantial dissipation of assets or earnings due to any violation of statute or 
regulation or any unsafe or unsound practice.
(2) Th   ere is a violation of law or regulation, or an unsafe or unsound practice or condition, 
that is likely to cause insolvency or substantial dissipation of assets or earnings, weaken 
the institution’s condition, or otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of the bank’s 
depositors or the deposit insurance fund.
(3) Th   e bank is in an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business.
Th   ere are grounds based on a variety of critical management failures of the bank:
(1) Th  e bank’s board of directors are controlled and manipulated by a few family or 
interest-group members.212
(2) Th   ere is a willful violation of a cease-and-desist order that has become fi  nal.
(3) Th  ere is concealment of the bank’s books, papers, records, or assets, or refusal to 
submit the bank’s books, papers, records, or aff  airs for inspection to any examiner or 
to any lawful agent of the government.
(4) Th   e bank, by resolution of its board of directors or its shareholders, consents to the 
appointment.
(5) Th   e bank ceases to be an insured institution.
(6) Th   e Attorney General notifi  es the FSC in writing that the bank has been found guilty 
of a criminal money laundering off  ense.
When a bank becomes undercapitalised, or when a bank begins to show the substantial 
safety and soundness or other failings indicated in the receivership grounds, but is not 
yet critically undercapitalised, the supervisory offi   cers should consider whether an early 
resolution contingency plan involving the sale/merger or receivership, would be appropriate. 
Once a decision is made to adopt an early resolution approach, the FSC’s resources should 
be focused on the best available option at the least cost to the deposit insurance funds. Th  e 
facts and reasons on which the receivership grounds are based must be well supported and 
documented. In most instances, prior enforcement or action would have addressed these 
matters at an earlier stage before they became more severe (e.g., when the bank fi  rst became 
undercapitalised, or when the bank was required to remedy unsafe and unsound practices 
in an enforcement action). Th  e record prepared for those actions will later be a part in 
documenting the receivership grounds.
Additional documentation of the continuation and worsening of the problems, and, 
for some grounds, documentation of the substantial negative impact on the bank’s assets, 
earnings, and/or ability to conduct business, will be needed. All the FSC offi   ces involved in 
early resolution planning (e.g., appropriate bank supervision, corporate licensing, and legal 
offi   ces) should be informed of the possible need to take steps to support early resolution. 
Th   e examiners should consult with these agencies regarding the options available and what 
records will be needed to support them.
5.2   Supervisory Responsibilities for Failing Banks
Th   e FSC established the Special Inspections Unit to review major cases of suspected 
crime, and to conduct targeted examinations to promptly collect evidence to be referred to 
the prosecutors. Th   e FSC also supervise closely about the resolution of critical problem banks 
through rehabilitation or orderly resolution management. On-going supervision can include 
daily liquidity monitoring and the regular review of a bank’s fi  nancials for movements in the 
balance sheet or further depletion of capital levels. Th  e  fi  eld examiners assigned to problem 
banks could also be responsible for the development of on-going strategy, off  -site reviews, 
and input into the development of various enforcement actions.
Consistent with their respective statutory mandates, the CBC and the CDIC both 
have important roles to play in problem bank supervision.
Th  e CBC’s supervisory interest in problem banks is premised on its role as lender 
of last resort. Th   e CBC’s maximum term of short-term accommodations to bank shall not 
exceed ten days. Th   e following types are provided:213
(1)  Short-term accommodations with eligible collateral.
(2)  Short-term accommodations without eligible collateral.
(3) Intra-day  overdraft  s.
Th  e  CBC’s  refi  nancing of secured loans to banks shall be limited to the following:
(1)  Undertaking government-approved lending which the CBC also approves.
(2)  Lending undertaken compatible with the Bank’s monetary policy.
(3)  Emergency funding requirements as approved by the CBC.
Th  e maximum term of the CBC’s discount of secured loans shall not exceed 360 
days.
In any action taken by the CDIC, pursuant to Article 28 to Article 30, and Paragraph 2 
Article 41 of the Deposit Insurance Act, the CDIC may ask the FSC, to negotiate with the CBC 
so as to receive its approval and obtain accommodation. Th   e CDIC shall weigh and consider 
its own funding situation and the actual funding requirements of individual cases when 
submitting requests to the FSC to arrange for approval of the amount of accommodation 
from the CBC. Th   e CDIC shall submit requests to the FSC to arrange for the CBC’s approval 
of the term of accommodation based on the progress of each individual case. Th   e CDIC may 
provide government bonds, certifi  cates of deposit of the CBC and other eligible collaterals 
to apply for accommodation from the CBC. If the aforesaid accommodation exceeds the 
amount of collateral provided by the CDIC, the FSC shall, together with the Ministry of 
Finance and the CBC, submit to the Executive Yuan for National Treasury guarantee. Aft  er 
its approval, the National Treasury shall guarantee the accommodation.
Th   e CDIC, as insurer and receiver, has numerous responsibilities for failing and failed 
banks. If a bank violates the laws, regulations or deposit insurance agreements, or engages 
in unsound business operations, the CDIC may give a warning notice of termination of the   
deposit insurance agreement and require rectifi  cation within a stipulated timeframe. 
Th   e CDIC shall notify the FSC and terminate its deposit insurance agreement and 
make announcements with respect thereof, in the event any one of the following occurs to 
a bank:
 
(1)  Failure to take corrective actions within the stipulated time-frame aft  er the CDIC 
gives a warning notice of termination of the deposit insurance agreement. 
(2)  Failure to make improvements upon being ordered by the FSC, or to undertake 
recapitalisation or make improvements in fi  nancial condition and business operations 
within a certain time-frame, or being assessed as being unable to make improvements 
by the FSC or the FDIC, prior to the deadline. 
(3)  Occurrence of a major fraud or other illegal activities with the potential to increase 
deposit insurance payouts.
Also, the CDIC should establish the coordination mechanisms with the FSC and 
the CBC for the purpose of handling business crises of banks, or any major event aff  ecting 
fi  nancial order.214
5.3  Asset Quality and Financial Review Process
Loan and other asset write-ups that provide support for the required charge-off  s and 
allowances for loan provisions are essential in establishing the accuracy of the bank’s capital 
levels, and thus determining whether grounds for closing the bank are present. A line-review 
process validates these examination fi  ndings by ensuring that the asset classifi  cations and the 
approach and methodology used to arrive at the required provision balance are consistent 
with the FSC’s policies and procedures. 
Th   e decision to write up an asset depends on:
(1)  Bank management’s concurrence with the classifi  cation.
(2)  Whether an insider loan is involved.
(3) Th   e size of the asset being classifi  ed relative to the total assets of the bank.
(4) Th   e dollar amount of the classifi  cation.
(5)  Complexity of the asset. 
Since accurate classifi  cation of assets is critical to the bank’s survival, a fi  nancial 
review process exists to verify the identifi  ed losses independently. It also serves as a quality 
assurance process in that other examiners not involved in the examination validate and 
review the examination fi  ndings. Th   is process ensures that the decisions made during the 
on-site examination are not arbitrary, inconsistent with the FSC examination policies and 
procedures, or based on the opinion or decision of one person. Th  e  fi  nancial review consists 
of the work papers and write-ups used to document the information concerning the assets 
reviewed during the examination, especially those classifi  ed sub-standard, doubtful, or loss. 
Th   e participants in the fi  nancial review will be experienced examiners, who have not been 
involved directly in the current bank examination. 
Since capital-based closings are tied to the level of equity capital, the review to 
validate the results of the allowance for loans analysis is critical. Th   e allowance for loans 
methodology, with supporting documentation, should be submitted for review, along with 
the recommended allowance for loans balance and provision. If the participants in the 
fi  nancial review are unable to reach agreement on the classifi  cation of specifi  c assets or the 
allowance for loans provision, other senior examiners will decide the issue.
5.4  Bank Closing Process
Where the FSC has assigned offi   cials to take receivership over a bank, the bank’s 
operations and property management shall be handled by a receiver. Upon the bank 
receiving a letter ordering receivership, the responsible person(s) and staff   members of the 
bank shall deliver all books, documents, chops and properties, together with an inventory 
thereof to the receiver; disclose all necessary matters concerning the assets and liabilities of 
the bank to the receiver; and take other necessary actions to permit such receivership. Th  e 
bank’s responsible person(s) or staff   members shall not refuse to answer relevant inquiries, 
or falsely respond thereto. A bank which is placed under the conservatorship of offi   cials 
dispatched by the FSC shall be subject to the preceding mandate.215
Th   e following actions by a receiver with respect to a bank under receivership, shall 
require preparation of a feasibility report and approval from the FSC:
(1)  Mandating other banks, fi  nancial institutions, or the CDIC to operate all or part of the 
business;
(2)  Increasing capital, reducing capital, or increasing capital aft  er reducing capital;
(3)  Sale of all or part of the business, assets or liabilities;
(4)  Merger with another bank; and/or
(5)  Other important actions, as determined by the FSC.
Since its establishment, the CDIC has been entrusted with the tasks of assisting 
problem banks or of providing assistance jointly with the central and local competent 
authorities to stabilise the operations of the problem banks as well as prevent moral hazard. 
Th   e assistance includes primarily the dispatching of personnel to attend important meetings 
of the board of directors or of the resident directors of the problem banks, or to attend the 
assistance meetings held by the competent authority, and cooperate closely with the said 
authority to strengthen the assistance of the problem banks; prompting the problem banks 
with major fl  aws in fi  nancial and business status to correct their management defi  ciencies as 
soon as possible in collaboration with the relevant authority; and dispatching of personnel 
to reside in the problem banks with higher management risk to render assistance as required 
to eff  ectively control insurance risk, and make timely recommendations to the competent 
authority regarding any other necessary measures, as ma be required by law to safeguard the 
depositors’ benefi  ts.
Pursuant to the Financial Restructuring Fund (FRF) Statute, the FRF shall entrust the 
CDIC with the full amount required to settle the deposit-related and non-deposit-related 
claims on the problem banks with unsound operations. Th   e FRF shall, in its own name, take 
over the assets of the problem banks, and shall dispose of them by off  ering them for sale by 
tender, auction or other method. Any proceeds from the disposal shall be included in the 
Restructuring Fund. Th   e CDIC shall, as entrusted by the FRF, continue to settle the liabilities 
and deal with the assets of the problem banks that listed and scheduled prior to the Fund’s 
expiration date on July 10, 2005, as well as other unfi  nished matters related to the Fund.
In the event that a bank shall have been closed by the FSC, the CDIC should, in order 
to maintain an orderly credit system and protect the interests of that bank’s depositors, fulfi  ll 
its responsibility as a deposit insurer by means of any one of the following methods:
(1)  Directly making payout refunding the principal amount from its insured deposits in 
accordance with the failed bank’s own accounting records, or based on the evidence 
of outstanding amounts provided by the depositors. 
(2)  Holding consultations with other insured institutions that are in close proximity to 
the failed bank, and transferring the deposit accounts of the depositors in the failed 
bank to those institutions so that the claims of depositors can be met. 
(3) Extending  fi  nancial assistance to other insured institutions, or fi  nancial holding 
companies, through the provision of funds, loans, deposits or guarantee, or purchase 
of subordinated debts issued by them, in order to facilitate the sound institutions to 
merge with the closed bank, or else to assume its operations, assets and liabilities 
either in whole or in part.216
It needs to be noted, however, that the cost to CDIC of proceeding with any one of 
the last two methods needs to be less than the losses that would arise from directly making 
a pay-off   on the basis of the fi  rst method. 
Upon the closing of a failed bank, the CDIC, in addition to performing the insurance 
obligation, shall be appointed by the FSC as the receiver to commence the winding up of 
the closed bank. Th   e CDIC may, in order to meet the liquidity needs of the creditors of the 
closed bank, without increasing the costs incurred by the CDIC and aft  er having calculated 
the value of the closed bank’s assets, make advance payment against claims fi  led by the 
depositors beyond the maximum insurance coverage and non-depositors based on the 
anticipated reimbursement ratio. Such amounts may fi  rst be deducted from the total sum of 
money fi  nally realised from the liquidation and repaid to the CDIC.
Th   e proceeds resulting from the sale of the assets of the banks taken over by the FRF 
through tender, auction, or other means shall be deposited into the account of the Fund. 
For the assets assumed by the FRF arising from the FRF’s management and disposal of the 
failed banks, the FRF may entrust the CDIC to perform the tasks of collection, debts rating, 
packaging and combination, public sale by tender, (or?) and securitisation.
Banks are typically closed at the end of the normal business day on Friday, with a 
CDIC representative in each branch offi   ce. If a bank comes under new ownership, the bank 
normally reopens the following Monday to ensure continuity of operations and access to 
customer deposits. Actually, failed bank close practice never happened in Taiwan.
When there is a systemic crisis and the CDIC is unable to resolve the problem banks a 
P&A transaction, the CDIC may set up a bridge bank to assume all or part of the businesses, 
assets and liabilities of the said banks. A bridge bank is deemed as an insured institution 
without capital, but the CDIC could provide it with working capital, if necessary. Th  e 
duration of a bridge bank is limited to two years, which can be extended for one more year 
aft  er the approval by the FSC. A bridge bank may be exempted from some regulations of the 
Banking Act, when it continues operation within the scope of assumption of the business, 
assets and liabilities of a closed insured bank.
Th   rough July 2001 to August 2007, the resolution cost of failed depository institutions 
is NT$ 172 billion and the fi  scal cost to GDP is 1.5 percent.
6. Crisis  Management
A systemic crisis is identifi  ed by its threat to the stability of the banking system. 
Systemic crises are suffi   ciently severe to aff  ect adversely the payments system and, in 
consequence, the real economy through reductions in credit fl  ows, or the destruction of 
asset values. A typical feature of a systemic crisis is the diffi   culty in distinguishing between 
solvent and insolvent banks. A systemic crisis must be resolved by close coordination and 
cooperation of all fi  nancial safety net participants. 
At the outset of a crisis, macroeconomic policies will need to be adjusted to restore 
confi  dence in the currency and the banking system. Systemic fi  nancial crises aff  ect most 
sectors of the economy and require macroeconomic policy adjustments. Th  e appropriate 217
policy mix will depend on the nature of macroeconomic imbalances and the state of the 
banking system. 
A systemic crisis can be referred as 
┌
In the event that there is any potential that will 
signifi  cantly endanger credit order and fi  nancial stability┘.When there is an impending 
systemic crisis, the CDIC may be exempted from the restriction of least cost resolution 
aft  er obtaining the consent of the FSC in consultation with the Ministry of Finance and the 
Central Bank, and with the fi  nal approval of the Executive Yuan (Cabinet).
Th   e Financial Restructuring Fund (FRF) Statute was promulgated and implemented 
on July 2001. On June 2005, it was revised to refl  ect changes in the domestic fi  nancial 
environment. As of the end of August 2007, a total of 49 unsound fi  nancial institutions 
have been withdrawn from the market under the Fund, helping to reduce the average 
non-performing loan ratio across all fi  nancial institutions from 8.16 percent at the end of 
December 2001 to 2.45 percent at the end of August 2007. In addition to reducing the excess 
number of fi  nancial institutions in ROC (Taiwan), the withdrawal of problem institutions 
has resulted in a clear improvement in the overall asset quality of the fi  nancial institutions, 
as well as the creation of a sound economic environment. Th   e initial period of the FRF’s 
establishment was a time marked by the spread of the Asian fi  nancial crisis. In this regard, 
when undertaking a large scale disposition of problem institutions, it is crucial for the 
government to tread carefully avoiding the occurrence of a systemic fi  nancial crisis and 
social unrest. 
To make use of the limited fi  nancial restructuring fund, the FSC requires problem 
banks to submit a self-rescue plan, including a timetable for capital injection and/or merger, 
and to fulfi  ll the plan under supervision. In order to protect depositors and maintain 
fi  nancial stability, the problem banks that fail to complete the plans will be taken over by the 
government and made to exit from the market.
In dealing with systemic banking crisis, the role and responsibilities of the relevant 
supervisory agencies are stipulated as follows (in draft   stage) 
(1) Th   e Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC)
A.  Implementation of the relevant policy decision.
B.  Contact and assist local competent agency or relevant authority to exercise related 
matters.
C.  Coordinate funding or accommodation related matters.
D.  Publish press announcement in unity.
E.  Exercise targeted examinations, if necessary. 
F.  Take any necessary administrative or corrective action, if involving suspected 
fi  nancial crime, and present the facts of the case to a prosecutor or the court of 
jurisdiction to inspect.
(2) Th   e Central Bank of China (CBC)
A.  Give necessary accommodation pursuant to the regulation.
B.  Smoothen and regulate the operation of the payment system, and the clearance 
and settlement of accounts among banks.218
(3) Th   e Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) 
A.  Dispatch personnel to assist problem bank in dealing with contingent matters 
depending on containment condition.
B.  Take administrative measures pursuant to the Deposit Insurance Act. 
(4) Th   e Ministry of Finance (MoF)
Th   e CDIC may ask the FSC to negotiate with the CBC to receive its approval and 
obtain special fi  nancial accommodation within the amount of the collaterals provided by 
the CDIC. Th   e Ministry of Finance shall guarantee that aforesaid fi  nancial accommodation, 
which exceeds the collateral provided by the CDIC.
Th  e bank restructuring strategy begins with a diagnosis of the fi  nancial condition 
of the individual banks. Th  e size and distribution of bank losses must be identifi  ed. As 
supervisory data may be outdated and not refl  ect the full economic impact of the crisis, the 
supervisors may attempt to update the available information based on uniform valuation 
criteria. Th   e supervisors will also examine information on the banks’ ownership structures 
to help determine the scope for up-front support from existing or potential new private 
owners.
Th   e diagnosis of banking sector conditions in a crisis is typically hampered by data 
limitations. A frequently used measure of solvency is the risk-weighted Basel capital assets 
ratio (CAR). However, when data limitations delay the evaluation of banks’ capital levels, the 
supervisors may need to rely on other sources of information to determine bank viability. 
Independent auditors have been useful in developing an impartial view of the current 
conditions of the bank, based on uniform criteria.
Banks determined to be non-viable and insolvent must be removed from the system. 
Depositor protection will facilitate this clean up, as banks can be closed without the fear 
causing of contagion. Many countries have been able to move aggressively in removing 
failed banks, once the blanket guarantee is in place.
Th   e supervisors classify the remaining banks in the system and develop the appropriate 
resolution strategies. Typically, the supervisors would diff  erentiate between banks that are 
(1) viable and meeting their legal CAR and other regulatory requirements; and (2) viable 
but undercapitalised. In the latter classifi  cation, an additional assessment will be needed 
to determine whether the existing shareholders can recapitalise their bank within an 
acceptable period, or if the use of public funding should be considered. Th   e shareholders of 
undercapitalised banks must agree to a monitored recapitalisation and restructuring plan 
with time-bound targets. Failure to meet the targets would be cause for intervention and 
resolution of the bank. Th   e plan should also include suffi   cient restrictions on bank operations 
as to establish incentives for the shareholders to over-perform in their restructuring.
Asset management and corporate debt restructuring are the fi  nal components of 
crisis management. A key aspect of this process is the orderly transfer of ownership and 
management of problem assets. Th   e strengthening of this process may include both legal 
and institutional reforms. Th   e resolution of the banking system issues is ideally carried out 
in conjunction with the resolution of the corporate sector issues.219
Th   ere are a number of institutional options for managing impaired assets. Banks can 
manage them directly, or sell them to a specialised asset management company (AMC), 
either privately or publicly owned. Specialised institutions are necessary when managing 
NPLs interferes with the daily running of the bank, or when specialised skills are needed. 
While each institutional set-up has advantages and disadvantages, the experience suggests 
that privately-owned AMCs can respond quickly and effi   ciently, while government-owned 
centralised AMCs may be relatively more effi   cient when the size of the problem is large, 
special powers for asset resolution are needed, or the required skills are scarce.
7. Conclusion
Th  e management of problem bank is accompanied with diffi   culties and potential 
setbacks. Th   e tools for crisis containment and bank restructuring are powerful but, when 
misused, can set back the process of re-establishing fi  nancial sector stability. Accordingly, 
both the benefi  ts and potential pitfalls of crisis management tools must be well understood 
and carefully adapted to local condition.
Bank resolution should be as effi   cient as possible. Bank resolution strategies should 
be comprehensive and complete. Moreover, the faster the recognition and resolution of 
banking distress, the less costly will be the resolution. Strong political support is necessary 
to ensure the full implementation of the strategies designed. Particular eff  orts should be 
made to ensure that the legal system is adequate for the strategy adopted. Th  e  experience 
suggests that the biggest threats to successful restructuring of the banking system include 
failure to complete the restructuring, excessive forbearance, failure to ensure loss-sharing of 
shareholders, inconsistent treatment of banks, and lack of political support for the process.
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Appendix 1
Summary of the CDIC Supervision and Conservatorship of Problem Banks
1996~2006








1998.11.25 Supervision Its Chairman forced the deal of 
making illegal big loans extended by  
its Taipei branch to its affiliated 
businesses Large-scale bank run was 
triggered resulting from illegal 
transactions of the shares of its  listed  
company. The Ministry of Finance 
appointed the CDIC to station on 
site personnel for supervision after 
determining that its board of 
directors had serious problems of 
mal-function.
The Ministry of Finance 
terminated the CDIC’s 
supervisory task on May 24, 
1999 after new members of 
board of directors and 
supervisors were elected 
successfully and most 
businesses had been in 
normal operations.
Assumed by the Union Bank
of Taiwan on March 19, 2005
According to the media, illegal loan  
was made to Typhone Group. 
occurred on April 27, 2000. The 
Ministry of Finance appointed the 
CDIC to station personel on site for 
supervision and later for 
business  operation and maintain 
Abnormal withdrawals by depositors 
2000.4.28 Supervision for half 
year 2000.10.28 Supervision 
extended for half year 2001.4.28 
Supervision extended for half 
year 2001.10.25  
Conservatorship temporarily
 for five months 2002.3.25 
Conservatorship for half year
2002.10.5 Conservatorship by 
Land Bank 2003.8.4 
Conservatorship by CDIC
again and entrusted Land Bank









2000.5.13 Supervision for half 
year 2000.11.13 Supervision 
extended for half year
The media reported the controversies 
over the land of Far Eastern Silo and 
Shipping (FESS) it had bought and 
the disputed earnings figures. 
Withdrawal of trust funds took place 
from May 12 to May 17, 2000 The 
Ministry of Finance appointed the 
CDIC to station personnel on site 
to assist resolving operation 
problems.
On May 11, 2001 the 
Ministry of Finance released 
the CDIC of its the 
supervisory task, but still 
appointed the CDIC to 
provide assistance. On 
January 27, 2005, the TDTC 
sold its trust department to 
the Jih Sun International 
Bank. The assumption was
completed on August 6, 2005
Assumed by E.Sun Bank on 
September 4, 2004
Asset quality continued to deteriorate 
and failed to increase capital by cash 
injection . The Ministry of Finance 
appointed the CDIC to station 
personnel on site for conservatorship.
half year 2003.6.28
Conservatorship extended for
half year 2003.12.28 
Conservatorship extended for 
half year
2002.1.28 Conservatorship for 
five months 2002.6.28 
Conservatorship extended for 
half year 2002.12.28 




conservatorship to stabilise its 
financial order.221
Appendix 2
Auctioning Off of the Non-performing Loans of Chung Hsing Bank














































































Th   e Financial Restructuring Fund (FRF)
Introduction
Since the 1990’s, ROC (Taiwan) had been suff  ering from the burst of the economic 
bubble, with the real estate market mired in recession. Th   e situations were exacerbated by 
the Asian fi  nancial crisis of 1997 and the September 21 earthquake in 1999. Many businesses 
started to experience fi  nancial crises. As a result, the business operations of ROC (Taiwan)’s 
fi  nancial institutions were fast deteriorating with bad loans continuing to soar. Th  e  market 
was awash with negative news and impacted the fi  nancial industry with detrimental eff  ect. 
Rumors were rampant that systemic fi  nancial risk would be triggered. To facilitate the 
withdrawal of ailing fi  nancial institutions from the market smoothly and as soon as possible, 
and to preempt the occurrence of fi  nancial turmoil, the government utilised public funds to 
quickly resolve the fi  nancial crises of the business sector and safeguard depositors’ benefi  ts. 
Th  e Statute for the Establishment and Management of the Executive Yuan’s Financial 
Restructuring Fund was promulgated, and the Financial Restructuring Fund was set up and 
operative for a period of three years. However, it was extended for one further year on the 
approval of the Parliament. In 2004, the Parliament extended its validity by one year to 
July 10, 2005. Within this period of time, the Financial Restructuring Fund shall provide a 
transitional blank guarantee to all depositors and other creditors of the problem fi  nancial 
institutions to avert chain risk of fi  nancial crises. Th  e revised Executive Yuan’s Financial 
Restructuring Fund Establishment and Management Statute was approved by the Legislative 
Yuan on May 31, 2005 and promulgated by the President on June 22 the same year.
Competent Authority
Th   e Financial Restructuring Fund’s competent authority is the competent authority 
provided under the Banking Law. At the present time, this is the Financial Supervisory 
Commission.
Governing Body
Th  e Financial Restructuring Fund’s governing body is the Financial Restructuring 
Fund’s Management Committee, which is responsible for deliberating the uses and operations 
of the Fund, approving the Fund’s receipts and expenditures custodianship plans, reviewing 
the Fund’s fi  nancial reports and cash-fl  ow arrangements, and the appraisal of other issues 
concerned with the management, implementation and public disclosure in relation to the 
Fund. Th  e Committee consists of nine to thirteen members, including one Committee 
Chairman and one Committee Vice-Chairman, who according to the Financial Restructuring 
Fund Statute, serve concurrently as the Head and Deputy Head of the competent authority, 
respectively. In addition, there are four Committee members, who serve concurrently as 
the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of China, the Deputy Chairman of the Council 
of Agriculture, Executive Yuan, the Deputy Director of the Directorate-General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, the Chairman of the Central Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. As for the remaining Committee members who are appointed, they serve on the 223
basis of the professional knowledge and experience that they have in law, economics, fi  nance 
and other fi  elds that are relevant to the Committee. Such Committee members associated 
with the same party should not exceed one half of the total number of Committee members, 
in order that the Committee’s decision-making process can be more independent. In addition 
to the Fund Management Committee, an Evaluation Sub-committee shall be established 
under the Fund. Th   e functions of the Sub-committee are to identify unsound institutions, 
determine the priority and manner of disposition work and amount of compensation, and 
submit such fi  ndings to the Management Committee for its resolution. 
Executive Body
Th   e passing of resolutions by the FSC may be, pursuant to Article 10 of the Financial 
Restructuring Fund Statute, entrusted to the CDIC for implementation. Th   e results of the 
implementation are then reported to the FSC for ratifi  cation, in order to achieve the division 
of duties objective. 
Financial Resources and Funding Accommodation
Th  e Fund’s resources include government fi   nancial-business-tax revenue and 
deposit-insurance-premium income received from the fi  nancial sector. Th  e  former  includes 
fi  nancial-business-tax-revenue covering the years 2002-2005, and it is estimated to be about 
NT$120 billion. Th   e latter comprises the CDIC’s incremental insurance-premium income 
covering a ten-year period from January 2002 onwards that arose as a result of the increase 
in the insurance assessment rate which took eff  ect on January 1, 2000, and which is expected 
to amount to approximately NT$20 billion. Th   e revised Statute stipulates that business-tax 
revenue from the fi  nancial industry for the fi  ve-year period from January 1, 2006, to the 
end of 2010 should be included in the fi  nancial source of the Restructuring Fund, up to 
a maximum of NT$110 billion. Th   e surplus over this amount shall be appropriated to the 
deposit insurance fund. In the event that the revenues from the above fi  nancial sources 
are not realised, the CDIC may apply to the Central Bank of China for accommodation, 
borrow from other fi  nancial institutions, or else issue bank debentures, in order to meet the 
needs of the Fund’s operations, and shall repay any such amounts from the above fi  nancial 
resources.
Applicable Financial Institutions 
(1) Th  e  fi  nancial institution’s adjusted net worth is negative. 
(2) Th  e  fi  nancial institution is unable to pay its debts 
(3) Th  e  fi  nancial institution’s fi  nancial situation is deteriorating, and the competent 
authority maintains that it cannot continue to operate. 
Of all the fi  nancial institutions, the community fi  nancial institutions, because of 
structurally derived problems, are in a relatively serious situation. Accordingly, the Fund 
stipulates that priority shall be given to the handling of community fi  nancial institutions. 
Twenty percent of the additional fi  nancial sources stipulated under the revised Statute 
shall be used for compensation in the disposition of the credit departments of farmers’ and 
fi  shermen’s associations, not subject to the expiration date of the Fund establishment.224
Handling Problem Financial Institutions
Compensation for the non-deposit liabilities incurred by unsound fi  nancial 
institutions before promulgation of the revised Statute shall still be guaranteed under the 
principles of non-retroactive and legitimate expectation. No compensation will be provided 
for such liabilities incurred aft  er the revised Statute came into force. As to the way in which 
the fi  nancial institutions are handled, this will be in line with the relevant regulations at 
the present time, such as the Banking Law, the Financial Institutions’ Merger Law, and the 
Deposit Insurance Act, including:
 
(1)  Settling the liabilities and taking over the assets that not settling by tender. 
(2) Th  e  diff  erence by which the liabilities to be settled exceed the assets. 
Custody of the Fund
Th   e funds of the FRF, apart from being used to handle problem fi  nancial institutions 
with unsound operations, shall be deposited in the form of cash in creditworthy fi  nancial 
institutions, used to purchase government bonds, bank debentures, and negotiable 
certifi  cates of deposit issued by banks, or else maintained by other means, in accordance 
with regulations prescribed by the competent authority.
Th   e Handling of Acquired Assets
Pursuant to the Financial Restructuring Fund Statute, the Restructuring Fund shall 
entrust the CDIC with the full amount required to settle the deposit-related and non-deposit-
related claims on problem fi  nancial institutions with unsound operations. Th  e  Restructuring 
Fund shall, in its own name, take over the assets of the aforementioned fi  nancial institutions, 
and shall dispose of them by off  ering them for sale by tender, auction or other method. Any 
proceeds from the disposal shall be included in the Restructuring Fund.
Accounting Treatment
When handling accounting and auditing matters, the Fund shall conform to generally 
accepted accounting principles and auditing standards, and shall establish an accounting 
system which conforms to such principles and standards. 
Legal Prosecution
Th   e government established the Financial Restructuring Fund to dispose of problem 
fi  nancial institutions. Prosecuting personnel whose illegal actions create losses at a fi  nancial 
institution, to hold them accountable for their misconduct, could safeguard the rights and 
interests of the Fund and uphold social justice. Th   e CDIC, therefore, actively pursues civil 
and criminal action against illegal acts by the responsible parties and employees of fi  nancial 
institutions, in accordance with the FRF Statute and the resolutions of the Fund Management 
Committee. As of the end of 2006, the CDIC had submitted 179 cases of malfeasance to the 
prosecution agencies for handling, and civil compensation has already been sought in 106 
civil cases.225
Fund Payments
Between July 2001 and the end of 2006, the Financial Restructuring Fund disposed of 
48 unsound fi  nancial institutions, with the paid-out claims amounting to NT$165.1 billion 
according to law. Th  e disposed institutions included 36 community fi  nancial institutions 
in 2001, eight community fi  nancial institutions in 2002, the Fongshan Credit Cooperative 
and Kaohsiung Business Bank in 2004, and the credit department of the Sinpi Township 
Farmers’ Association and the Chung Shing Bank in 2005. As of December 31, 2006, the fund 
had handled claims for 37 credit departments of farmers’ and fi  shermen’s associations, with 
total payments of NT$49.4 billion, or 29.9 percent of the total; nine credit cooperatives, with 
total payments of about NT$43.3 billion, or 26.2 percent of the total; and two banks, with 
total payments of about NT$72.4 billion, or 43.9 percent of the total.
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Administered by • Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC)
Participating 
Institutions
• Domestic Banks (including trust and investment companies and postal savings
bank) 
• Credit cooperatives 
• Credit departments of farmers’ and fishermen’s associations 
• Foreign bank branches in Taiwan (Foreign bank branches  whose  deposits
are protected in their home countries may not participate.)  
• Agricultural Bank of Taiwan 
Premiums • Paid by member institutions
• Risk-based rate system and five rates instituted: 
1. For domestic banks, local branches of foreign banks and credit cooperatives,
they are 0.03 percent, 0.04 percent, 0.05 percent, 0.06 percent, and 0.07
percent of  covered  deposits.  Insured deposits in excess of maximum
coverage applied to the flat rate of 0.0025 percent. From Jan. 1, 2010, the
flat rate changes to 0.005 percent. 
2. For credit departments of farmers and fishermen's associations, they are 0.02
percent, 0.03 percent, 0.04 percent, 0.05 percent, and 0.06 percent of covered



















(The above-said deposits are restricted to those dominated in New Taiwan
Dollars)
Other deposits which the Financial Supervisory Commission has approved as  •
Deposits in foreign currency
Negotiable certificates of deposit




Deposits from the Central Bank •
Deposits from banks, postal savings bank (Taiwan Post Company), credit
cooperatives, Agricultural Bank of Taiwan and credit departments of farmers’
and fishermen’s association




Other deposits which the Financial Supervisory Commision has approved as
non-insurable (e.g. structured deposits)
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Appendix 5
Additional Information on Problem Bank Management in
ROC (Taiwan)
Strengths and Weaknesses
Strengths –  1. Adequate capitalisation to absorb moderate industry risks 
    2. Ample liquidity 
    3. Government commitment to system stability 
Weaknesses – 1. Fragmented industry structure and highly competitive operating    
    environment
    2. Low profi  tability 
    3. Over reliance on interest-sensitive income 
    4. Occasional political pressure that could disrupt fi  nancial reform 
Future Initiatives for Improving Problem Bank Management Supervision
Th   e Taiwan government will continue providing strong support to large, systemically 
important banks in the event of an unexpected shock that threatens the stability of the 
banking sector, with the aim of maintaining public confi  dence in the operation of the 
fi  nancial system.
Th   e future initiatives for improving problem bank management supervision are:
1.  Stabilising the fi  nancial environment 
  Stabilising prices and fi  nancial markets by adopting appropriate monetary policies 
tailored to meet prevailing macroeconomic conditions; proceeding with unifying 
supervision of the banking industry, and strengthening the oversight and early-
warning mechanisms.
2.  Building up an integrated and orderly fi  nancial market
  Measures include strengthening corporate governance, improving the code of ethics 
of fi  nancial markets, setting up a sound mechanism to deal with disputes over 
fi  nancial transactions, enhancing fi  nancial examinations and cooperation with the 
justice agencies, as well as enhancing cross-border fi  nancial cooperation.
3.  Completing the market exit mechanism for failed banks
  Measures include utilising the Financial Restructuring Fund and the deposit insurance 
reserves together in order to increase the fl  exibility of the failed bank exit mechanism, 
adding the provisions of prompt corrective actions in the Banking Act to improve the 
effi   ciency of the market exit mechanism.
4.  Assisting in establishing a sound social system
  Measures include encouraging the protection-type and annuity-type of insurance 
products to cope with an aging society, continuing the promotion of small-and-
medium enterprise loans, pressing on in preventing fi  nancial frauds and nominee 
bank accounts, and strengthening fi  nancial education.228
Policy Recommendations
1.  A uniform, accountable authority can facilitate problem bank management. Strong 
leadership is needed to deal with vested interests, determine issues aff  ecting wealth and 
income distribution, and shepherd the restructuring program through the legislative 
process. Th   is authority should clearly communicate the strategy and decisions to the 
public. 
2.  Speed of intervention is crucial.
  Delays in resolving a problem bank may result in larger losses for the public fund. 
Decisive steps need to be taken in the initial stages to stop creditor and depositor 
withdrawals. Th   e faster the recognition and resolution of problem bank, the less costly 
will be the resolution. 
3.  Bank should be allowed to fail 
  Bank failure can be a positive force for banking system stability. Th  e presumption 
should not be that all banks must be protected. In any decision to use public money to 
support a bank, the benefi  ts of keeping a bank open must be judged explicitly against 
the costs to the public sector and to the banking system of maintaining a weak bank.
4.  Resolution should be guided by least cost (or least loss) criteria
  In a resolution with loss sharing, the recovery value is to be maximised for creditors and 
uninsured depositors. In resolution with a blanket guarantee, recovery value should 
be maximised (losses/costs minimised) for the government. Least loss calculations 
need to be based on estimated of net present asset values under diff  erent recovery 
scenarios, including estimates for operational, recovery and fi  nancing costs.
5. Th   e bank resolution strategy should include a thorough diagnosis and bank resolution 
plan A process of bank separation should be carried out. Non-viable banks should be 
liquidated or merged with viable banks, and adjustment periods could be provided for 
viable but undercapitalised banks.
6.  Bank resolution should follow a principle of equity and fair treatment.
  Restructuring policies should be applied to all banks on a uniform basis, which is 
independent of their ownership or type.
7.  Corporate restructuring should accompany bank restructuring
  Without corporate restructuring, problem bank will deteriorate further, and may 
fall into the failed category. Corporate debt restructuring should be based on market 
principles and reinforce payment discipline.
8.  Legal action must be taken against bank offi   cials responsible for banking failure
 Th   e prosecution of managers and directors responsible for wrongdoing in banks is 
the best recipe to impose market discipline. In cases when legal action has been taken, 
the remaining actors in the market understand that the authorities are determined to 
have a sound and safe banking system. In the absence of such resolve, similar illegal 
events will be repeated in the future.
9.  Enhanced cooperation and coordination among diff  erent authorities
 Th  e design and implementation of supervision policy, with close cooperation and 
coordination among the diff  erent authorities, including policy harmonisation and 
mutual recognition, is essential in the resolution of problem banks.